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Socialism as the Development of Liberalism

Marxist Analysis of Values

Satoshi Matsui

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Preface

Ron Kovic's ([1976] 2016) autobiography, *Born on the Fourth of July*, depicts the despair of a young man who was proud of his country and served in the Vietnam War. My birthday, November 7, 1960, falls on the Russian Revolution's anniversary. At that time, Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev had finished criticizing Joseph Stalin, and the illusion of socialism had disappeared. I did not have a good image of communist countries since I was a child; however, after reading Karl Marx's *On Jewish Question* (CW 3:146–74) when I was 18 years old, I found it difficult to deny the author's analysis of liberalism. Moreover, his vision of a communist society seemed natural to me. The communist society advocated by Marx is a society wherein people freely cooperate and communicate with each other, and he proposed to create such a quite ordinary society. The basic premise of a social life today is liberalism, and people think and act in a liberal society. Historically, socialism has been an idea proposed by people who doubted liberalism.[1] Therefore, I returned to the starting line and asked myself what type of thought liberalism was and how socialism overcame liberalism. I made answering this question my life's work. Contrary to Kovic's experience, I started with a distrust of socialism and then endeavored to explore its possibilities.

My current answer to this question is the content of this book, a study on socialist normative theory.[2] The normative theory deals with norms or values, not with facts or the truth. This book addresses normative theories about social systems. After John Rawls' ([1971] 1999) *A*

*Theory of Justic*e, normative theories flourished in liberalism but did not spread in Marxism due to a misunderstanding of historical materialism.[3] However, after the 1980s, analytical Marxism engaged in the core values of socialism.[4] This book aims to elaborate on a socialist normative theory by analyzing the central values of liberalism and socialism. The central value of liberalism is justice, which comprises liberty, equality, property, and utility; the central values of socialism are essence and community. This book deliberates the basic values of social systems by employing historical materialism, theories of exploitation, alienation, and a communist society. Most of the philosophical works on Marxism have relied on Hegelian dialectic, but this book utilizes an analytical method to study values. The following is a brief description of each chapter.

Chapter 1 examines the relation between socialism and liberal normative theories. First, I explain why reexamining socialism at the level of value, compared with liberalism, is crucial. In liberal normative theory, neoliberalism emerged from the crisis of welfare liberalism, and debates between egalitarian liberalism, libertarianism, and communitarianism became active. This situation demonstrates that liberalism is diversifying enough to lose its identity. The socialist normative theory has a close relation with each of the liberal normative theories. It remains unclear how socialism relates to liberal normative theories and whether the slogan of the French Revolution stands for liberal or socialist normative theory. Resolving these problems is the task of socialist normative theory.

Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between socialism and moral theory. First, I classify theories of moral philosophy. The normative theory is grouped into moral and nonmoral theories, and moral theory is composed of teleology and deontology. Teleology consists of consequentialism and essentialism, and deontology comprises pure and mixed deontology. Next, I inquire into the relation between liberal normative theory and moral philosophy. Welfare liberalism and neoliberalism employ consequentialism. Communitarianism is rooted in essentialism. Libertarianism and egalitarian liberalism are categorized into pure and mixed deontology, respectively. Then, I contemplate the relation between socialism and theories of moral philosophy by referring to R. G. Peffer's work. Opinions on socialist normative theory extend to almost all theories of moral philosophy, including the affirmation and denial of normative or moral theories, utilitarianism, nonwelfarist consequentialism, essentialism, and mixed deontology. What moral theory the socialist normative theory relies on remains unsolved.

Chapter 3 reviews the controversy on the position of justice in Marxism and proposes a new theory. After defining the concept of justice, I analyze the Tucker-Wood thesis, which comprises two theses, A and B. According to thesis A, Marx condemns capitalism but not because he thinks it is unjust, and according to thesis B, Marx expects the concept of justice to lose priority in communism. Given the distinction between these two theses, I reexamine Norman Geras's nine points and discover that neither the justice nor nonjustice interpretation corresponds to all nine points. Although the justice and nonjustice interpretations are in opposition, they share a common feature: an assumption that the attitude toward theses A and B should be the same; that is, one should either accept or reject both. I argue that their presupposition has a problem, and that thesis A should be denied and thesis B approved. In conclusion, I propose a new interpretation that Marx condemns capitalism from the perspective of justice but does not expect that a communist society prioritizes the idea of justice.[5]

Chapter 4 discusses Marx's theory of liberty and responds to its critiques. First, the fundamental value of liberalism is liberty since it pursues absolute liberty within negative liberty. Next, Marx's concept of liberty can be analyzed into regulative liberty and personal liberty; the latter consists of developmental liberty and communal liberty. The subjects of regulative liberty and personal liberty are a group and an individual, respectively. Regulative liberty precedes personal liberty in time; however, in value, the latter precedes the former. Personal liberty is classified into developmental liberty and communal liberty. Personal liberty becomes sufficient only when developmental liberty is combined with the communal liberty possible in a communist society. Then, I probe the critiques of Marx's theory of liberty. Friedrich Hayek, Robert Nozick, and Isaiah Berlin contend for the priority of negative liberty over positive liberty from the theory of spontaneous order, the principle of self-ownership, and antitotalitarianism, respectively. Andrzej Walicki alleges that liberty has been suppressed in existing socialist countries because, in Marxism, the subject of liberty is a group. Charles Taylor highlights that Marx craves for absolute liberty. I respond to these critiques by employing Marx's theory of liberty.

Chapter 5 delineates the position of equality in Marxism by comparing Marxist concept of equality with that of egalitarian liberalism. First, in a socialist society, productive assets and means of consumption are

not equally owned by individuals but are placed under social ownership. Second, communist society prioritizes equality of conditions over equality of opportunity. The reason for choosing equality of conditions is not rooted in egalitarianism but communism. Third, radical egalitarianism encourages individualism and does not solve the problem of alienation. Fourth, as individuals in a communist society find their highest self-realization in contributing to society even if their condition is lowered from the average, inequality of conditions might occur; however, correcting inequality is unnecessary. Thus, Marxism supports egalitarianism as far as it contributes to communism but prioritizes communism in situations where egalitarianism and communism conflict with each other. Marxism is nonegalitarian in this sense.

Chapter 6 ponders the position of property in Marxism concerning labor and the ownership of means of production. Two factors of production are labor and means of production. Accordingly, Marx's theory of property can be roughly split into two types. Type 1 is the theory of labor (TL), which claims that the title to own a product lies in labor. According to this theory, Marx's criticism of capitalism and his vision of a postcapitalist society are grounded on labor. Type 2 is the theory of ownership of means of production (TOMP), according to which ownership of means of production entitles the holder to own the product. Marx adopts both TL and TOMP; thus, his attitude seems inconsistent. Therefore, I delve into his seemingly conflicting attitudes. Historical materialism can explain how the relation between TL and TOMP varies as the social system changes. Marx's reliance on both TL and TOMP reflects the historical development of society, not a logical contradiction or rhetorical counterargument.

Chapter 7 explores Marx's position on utilitarianism as a normative principle for assessing social systems. After surveying three interpretations concerning Marx's stance on utilitarianism, I scrutinize how Marx evaluates the three elements of utilitarianism: consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking. In a capitalist society, utilitarianism functions as a principle to promote the rapid development of productive forces; Marx admires such progressive aspects. In a socialist society, utilitarian values that prevail under a capitalist society still remain. Utilitarianism's task is to increase social welfare, and Marx tolerates utilitarianism at this stage, as long as it serves this purpose. As the goal of constructing a communist society, which is the last stage, is achieved, utilitarianism loses its role. Then, Marx designs a communist society based on normative principles that

differ from those of utilitarianism. Thus, Marx's assessment of utilitarianism changes as the social system develops. Marxists attempt to end the role of utilitarianism by pursuing it rather than refusing it.

Chapter 8 deals with the relation between Marxism and essentialism. Modern ethics can be divided into three categories—deontology, utilitarianism, and essentialism—the last of which comprises virtue ethics and perfectionism. Deontology and utilitarianism are the dominant ethics in a capitalist society. Marxism utilizes deontology and utilitarianism to denounce a capitalist society but does not rely on these ethics as the main principles in forming a communist society. Nonwelfarist consequentialism is more progressive than utilitarian consequentialism because it abandons the hedonistic character of utilitarianism; it is thus the most suitable principle in a socialist society. In a communist society, essentialism becomes influential. Essentialism may sometimes include the following characteristics: relativism, moralism, elitism, and paternalism. The communist countries that have treated essentialism as national morality have stuck to these four characteristics. The communist society envisioned by Marx refuses all of these qualities.

Chapter 9 clarifies the concept of community, one of the primary values in Marx's communism, by comparing it with that of modern communitarianism, which also centered on community. Communitarianism has emerged as a substitute notion for communism through debate with liberalism. Its advocates comprise Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. I compare communism with communitarianism in terms of nine elements: moralism, perfectionism, liberalism, individualism, conservatism, localism, particularism, democracy, and radicalism. Communitarianism attempts to criticize liberalism from its outside, whereas communism overcomes it from its inside. Communitarians attempt to maintain a traditional community in a capitalist society, whereas communists attempt to transcend capitalism and liberalism from within and build a new society founded on the association. The liberal-communitarian debate is only a reproduction of the problem that Marx addressed and answered. Communitarian criticism of Marxism eventually contributed to illuminating the significance of the communist community.

Chapter 10 elucidates the characteristics of alienation theory by comparing it with justice theory. First, as a framework of normative theory, three points are discussed: idealism versus materialism, universalism versus relativism, and individualism versus socialism. From these

points, I compare the theory of justice with that of alienation. The alienation theory has a broader scope than the justice theory does. Next, I present the two-dimensional theory of alienation. The first and second dimensions take the perspectives of liberal and communist societies, respectively. In a capitalist society, justice is viewed as universal. Marxists do not transcendentally denounce justice but utilize it when opposing capitalism; this is the first dimension of alienation. However, Marxists do not intend that these values are valid from a communist society's perspective; justice is negated as an alienated idea; this is the second dimension of alienation. Therefore, the theories of alienation and justice do not conflict with each other; the justice theory can be characterized as a part of the alienation theory.

Chapter 11 concludes the book. Socialism as the extension of liberalism inherits the achievements of liberalism and extends it for the future; however, socialism as the negation of liberalism recognizes liberalism as an alienated idea and ultimately denies it. In this dialectical sense, socialism is characterized as the development of liberalism. My view on socialism can overcome the conflict between historical materialism and the theory of revolutionary subject. According to this view, if liberalism attempts to solve the contradiction that it contains, it must be transformed into socialism. Socialism, delineated by Marx, is a universal principle that includes liberalism. Every country and region in the world will realize socialism through the capitalist era. If the feature of liberalism is universality, socialism is an orthodox successor to liberalism with respect to this universality.

Tokyo, Japan — Satoshi Matsui

Notes

1. Liberalism has two contents. One content is a part of a superstructure that corresponds to capitalism as an economic structure; the other content is a normative principle of a social system that includes capitalism. In this book, liberalism generally denotes the latter.
2. Socialism has three senses. The first sense is the socialist notion that is the antithesis of liberalism. The second sense is social democracy in Western Europe, the antithesis of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union. The third sense is the first stage of a communist society in a broad sense. In this book, socialism refers to the first sense. For the third sense, see note 5.

3. Marxism includes the arguments of the successors of Marxism, but this book mainly employs this concept in the sense of Marx's ideas.
4. For an analytical Marxism, see Mayer (1994) and Roemer (1986). For a collection of papers on analytical Marxism, see Carverand Thomas (1995) and Ware and Nielsen (1989).
5. In the *Critique of Gotha Programme* (CW 24:75–99), Marx distinguishes between "the first phase of communist society" and "a higher phase of communist society." For brevity, I name the former socialist society and the latter communist society. See Lenin ([1917a] 1964).

Acknowledgments

This book is an English translation of my Japanese book, *Jiyu shugi to shakai shugi no kihan riron: Kachi rinen no marukusu teki bunseki* [Normative Theories of Liberalism and Socialism: A Marxist Analysis of Values] (Matsui 2012). This English version comprises one new chapter and other significantly revised chapters. Most chapters of the Japanese version consisted of published articles. The following publishers allowed me to reprint them: Koyo Shobo, Fukushima University, Otsuki Shoten, Senshu University, and Toyama University. I thank these publishers and editors for their permission to draw on the material in the book in the preparation of this English version.

I submitted this work as a doctoral thesis to Hitotsubashi University, which conferred me a doctorate degree in economics in 2015. I am grateful to Professor Naoki Yoshihara, Professor Reiko Goto, and Professor Takashi Shimazaki, who served on my thesis committee and gave me helpful advice.

I teach Marxist economics at a university in Japan. Japanese Marxism has various schools and theories such as the orthodox school, the Uno school, the civil society theory, the alienation theory, and the reification theory. The controversies among them formed my academic interest as a student. I owe my advancement to becoming a full-fledged researcher to the great Japanese Marxists. The works of analytical Marxism in the 1990s deeply inspired me. The seminal study in socialist normative theory is R. G. Peffer's (1990), *Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice*. My book is a

modest attempt to challenge Peffer's work. When I translated late G. A. Cohen's (1995) *Freedom, Equality, and Self-Ownership* into Japanese, he answered my questions with scrupulous care. The conclusion of this book differs from Peffer's and Cohen's, but both greatly influenced me. I am deeply grateful to them. Marcello Musto granted me the opportunity to publish this book. Kohei Saito helped me negotiate with the publisher. I sincerely appreciate them.

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CHAPTER 1

Socialism and Liberal Normative Theories

1.1 Introduction

Socialism as a project of human liberation is facing a serious crisis, and a fundamental reconstruction is crucial for its regeneration. It is indispensable to investigate values that are deeper than institutions such as the market or the state to envisage desirable socialism; this book explores the values of a socialist society.

Since the 1970s, in the liberal school, the normative theory has been reinstated, and an active debate has ensued. Liberal normative theories comprise welfare liberalism, neoliberalism, egalitarian liberalism, libertarianism, and communitarianism. In the socialist school, however, the normative theory was inactive. Although some liberals counted socialism as one of the positions on justice, socialism had little influence on the dispute regarding normative theory.[1] The socialist normative theory had not yet been established in socialism.

Why was normative theory stagnant in socialism? After the Second World War, the socialist countries guaranteed the minimum standard of living for citizens and developed economic power comparable to that of the West. To this end, Karl Marx's formula of historical materialism (CW 29:261–65) was utilized. Marxism's mission was to analyze the reality of capitalism objectively, and ethics and normative theory were avoided as

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bourgeois ideology. Therefore, in the domain of normative theory, the socialist school made few contributions.

However, under the influence of the resurgence of normative theory in liberalism, the socialist school also began to study normative theory actively. The potential need for socialist normative theory existed in the 1970s. In the socialist countries, economic growth was prioritized above all else, for which individual freedoms and rights were sacrificed. In the developed capitalist countries, the socialists began to seek an alternative system to the welfare state. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European state systems in the late 1980s further increased the demand for a new socialist system that would replace the existing socialism.

Today, diverse socialist systems, such as democratic socialism, market socialism, and self-management socialism, have been proposed. These proposals raise the question of why they could be labeled as socialist. If new systems are endorsed, fundamental socialist values must be presented. However, merely proposing the values that are to be satisfied by expected socialism is no more than a presentation of utopian theory. Socialism must be understood as an attempt to internally overcome the contradiction of capitalist society.[2] Liberalism is a normative principle of capitalism. Therefore, this chapter ponders socialist normative theory in comparison with liberal normative theory.[3]

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 has introduced the theme. Section 1.2 surveys the development of liberal normative theory. Section 1.3 discusses the relation between socialist and liberal normative theories. Section 1.4 summarizes the arguments of this chapter and presents challenges for socialist normative theory.

1.2 Development of Liberal Normative Theories

After the Second World War, the most influential liberal normative theory in advanced capitalist countries was welfare liberalism. Neoliberalism has challenged welfare liberalism since the late 1970s and has been the mainstream in developed countries since the 1980s. Egalitarian liberals questioned welfare liberalism from the left relying on the theory of justice, while libertarians condemned the egalitarian elements of the welfare state. Neoliberalism and libertarianism sometimes bear the same implication; however, I refer to the liberalism that emphasizes economic consequences as neoliberalism while referring to the liberalism that focuses on individual

ownership as libertarianism. Communitarians have collectively branded all four theories—welfare liberalism, neoliberalism, libertarianism, and egalitarian liberalism—as "liberalism" and started the liberal-communitarian debate. However, in my view, communitarianism respects the traditional community that continues to exist in capitalist society rather than attempting to change this society. Therefore, I recognize communitarianism as one of the liberal normative theories. The following is an overview of these five liberal normative theories.

1.2.1 Welfare Liberalism

The postwar advanced capitalist countries established the mixed economy system, social policy, and consensus politics on the basis of Keynesian economics, William Beveridge's (1942) idea, and interest-group liberalism, respectively. This system has been given various names, such as the "social state," "state monopoly capitalism" (Lenin [1917b] 1964), "Keynesian welfare state," and "the Fordist security state" (Hirsch 1991). In this book, I refer to the normative theory that supports this system as welfare liberalism.[4] Its purpose was to advance the welfare of individuals in line with economic growth and to guarantee income equality while being influenced by socialist ideology. In the 1950s and 1960s, this system led to a virtuous circle of economic, political, and cultural systems, such as high economic growth caused by an effective demand policy, the enhancement of social security grounded on high growth, and the attainment of the masses' loyalty.

When the low growth period started after the world depression in the 1970s, the failure of economic and social policies resulted in the "legitimation crisis."[5] The virtuous circle was converted into a vicious circle; the welfare state entered a time of crisis. Since the 1980s, developed countries have attempted to overcome the crisis in various ways, including corrections of the welfare state, neoliberalism, and left-Keynesianism; however, none was a decisive breakthrough. The failure of the welfare state in overcoming the crisis does not indicate that the present situation is optimal. The welfare state is exacerbating its contradictions in all aspects, including the economy, politics, and the natural environment. The transition to an alternative system is more urgent than ever. Various explanations have been proposed for the crisis of the welfare state. However, the prospects of alternative systems have not been presented because the normative principles of social systems are indefinite.

1.2.2 Neoliberalism

Under the low growth conditions of the 1970s, neoliberalism accused the welfare state of its big government. Neoliberal economists such as Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman (1980) alleged that Keynesian economic policy and egalitarian social policy caused the increase in fiscal expenditure and the rise of inflation in the welfare state. They espoused a laissez-faire policy and attempted to restore economic efficiency by expanding the functions of the market economy under a small government and by enforcing a competition principle. Neoconservative governments implemented neoliberal policies in developed countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan after the 1980s. Neoliberalism had a decisive impact on the transition to market economies in the developing and formerly socialist countries. However, the increase in government expenditure continued under the laissez-faire policy; the developed countries experienced the rise and collapse of the bubble economy. In the developing countries and the former socialist countries, the Big Bang strategy, which directly applied the neoclassical market model, failed.

The word neoliberalism implies that it is mainstream liberalism. However, freedom is respected in neoliberalism since the economic system that promotes free competition increases economic efficiency. Neoliberalism recognizes no intrinsic value in human freedom.[6] The essence of neoliberalism is economic liberalism because economic consequences are prioritized above all else. In the reinstatement of normative theory, neoliberalism eliminated the consideration of values other than economic efficiency and triggered an ethical blank. Neoliberalism remains an influential political ideology, even after its economic policy collapsed. However, neoliberalism is only one branch of liberalism.

1.2.3 Egalitarian Liberalism

In the early 1970s, John Rawls published *A Theory of Justice* ([1971] 1999). According to his theory, justice comprises two principles. The first principle requires that all citizens be granted equal rights to basic liberties; the second principle requires that social and economic inequalities be arranged to guarantee the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and fair equality of opportunity. Between the two principles, the first principle is prioritized by lexical order. As this logic demonstrates, Rawls's principle of justice places the liberty principle first and then respects the equality

principle as much as possible. It formulates the position of egalitarian liberalism that incorporates egalitarianism into liberalism.[7]

Rawls points out the utilitarian character of the welfare state. When his book was published in the early 1970s, the welfare state bore various problems. His theory of justice reflects this reality. He pinpoints the deficiencies of the welfare state in the dimension of value and criticizes utilitarianism, which sacrifices the rights of the minority to achieve the happiness of the majority. For the welfare state, making the majority happy is the top priority. However, the existence of a minority, particularly the poor, who are excluded from pursuing this goal, raised the following question: Can a society where such individuals are neglected be acknowledged as a fair society? The value that Rawls proposes against utilitarianism is justice. He justifies a redistribution policy that respects distributive justice. Rawls's principle of justice attempts to realize egalitarianism to the fullest under the premise of liberalism.

1.2.4 Libertarianism

Libertarian Robert Nozick (1974) opposes utilitarianism and egalitarian liberalism. Nozick's libertarianism is similar to Friedman's neoliberalism in that it is against the welfare state. However, unlike neoliberalism, for libertarianism, the pursuit of individual freedom is the highest purpose and not a means to realize other values such as economic efficiency.

Nozick inherits John Locke's ([1690a] 1988) theory of natural rights and proposes the historical entitlement theory about justice in holdings. Nozick rejects the end-state principles, such as utilitarian or egalitarian distributive justice, which apply certain patterns to the distribution. In addition, he refuses any extensive state with more functions than the maintenance of procedural rules because it infringes on individuals' rights. Nozick asserts that the redistribution policy by the big government violates individuals' rights of private property and that taxation on income renders individuals a means for others. His entitlement theory blames the welfare state for sacrificing individuals' rights. A bloated government that rules the welfare state breeds bureaucratic corruption, and its paternalistic social policy hinders individuals' autonomy. Thus, libertarians attack such deficiencies in welfare liberalism.

1.2.5 Communitarianism

The controversy between egalitarian liberalism and libertarianism reflects the divergence of their views on the welfare state at the fundamental level; however, both prioritize individual freedom and are within the framework of liberalism. After the 1980s, communitarianism, represented by Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), emerged. This trend further deepened the debate on liberalism by critically examining the premises of liberalism. Communitarianism respects the traditions and common good of the community and challenges utilitarianism and "deontological liberalism" (Sandel [1982] 1998, 1–14).

The cause of the rise of communitarianism is also observed in welfare liberalism. Communitarians propose that the problem of welfare liberalism is caused by human situations and not by politics or the economy. According to communitarians, the extension of the market economy and the bloated bureaucracy damaged the human relationships and isolated individuals, resulting in the loss of quality of life. Under these circumstances, liberalism adopted a value-neutral approach and formally defended the rights of the individual. This approach was not a solution. Communitarians cast doubt on utilitarianism, which views the desirable good to be welfare maximization, and deontological liberalism, which asserts that the right is superior to the good. Communitarians respect the tradition and common good shared by each community and propose the restoration of direct human relationships and the pursuit of excellence in personality. This communitarian argument differs from that of mainstream liberalism, which views human value as utility or right.

Although the communitarian critique of the welfare state was correct, the community that they proposed was unrealistic in a capitalist society. Liberals took the communitarian critique earnestly and incorporated considerations for the common good and personality into liberal theory. Some liberals boasted that they could enrich the idea of liberalism by integrating criticism from communitarianism. Consequently, they characterized the debate between liberals and communitarians as a process of the development of liberalism.

1.2.6 Identity Crisis of Liberalism

The preceding subsections have presented an overview of the controversy on the normative theory among liberal scholars. The controversies highlight the various issues such as welfare versus justice, liberty versus equality, and individual versus community. Although liberalism maintains the balance of conflicts under the welfare state, the intensification of the controversy demonstrates that the conflict becomes so severe that these balances can no longer be maintained. This escalation of ideological conflict reflects the identity crisis of liberalism.

1.3 Socialism and Liberal Normative Theories

1.3.1 Socialism and Liberal Normative Theories

This section addresses how socialism relates to the main normative theories of liberalism: welfare liberalism, neoliberalism, egalitarian liberalism, libertarianism, and communitarianism.

Welfare liberalism was supported by social democracy, which executed reformist policy. Social democratic parties have played a major role in the construction and management of welfare states, particularly in Western Europe. By contrast, Marxists branded the welfare state as "state monopoly capitalism" and have opposed it. The collapse of socialist countries in the late 1980s damaged social democracy and Marxism. With the rise of neoliberalism, social democrats opposed neoliberalism and suggested revitalizing the welfare state. Marxists stopped condemning the welfare state and instead began to defend it. Some Marxists ceased to strive for a socialist society and approved capitalism with a human face; to them, socialism signifies that individuals are equally entitled to the subsistence level under welfare state capitalism.

Neoliberalism is a common rival of social democracy and Marxism and is a normative theory that is the opposite of socialism. However, neoliberal attack on the extensive state and their assertion of market universality significantly impacted socialists who were confronted with the collapse of socialist states. The "Third Way" policy that emerged among social democrats in the 1990s attempted to broaden the scope of the market within the welfare state. Some Marxists also relinquished socialism that relies on the planned economy and acknowledged market socialism. They accepted the Austrian school's idea that the market is a spontaneous order; they abandoned government-led economic management and

obeyed market principles. In this respect, neoliberalism had a substantial influence on socialists.

The relation between egalitarian liberalism and socialism is also notable. Of the two principles of justice, Rawls prioritizes the first principle, which guarantees freedom equally, the second principle is radically egalitarian in that internal productive assets such as talent are equally distributed.[8] According to Dworkin, the basic assumption of Rawls's theory is not that individuals have a right to certain liberties but that they have "a right to equal respect and concern" (1977, 182). Furthermore, Dworkin proposes "liberalism based on equality" (1985, 205). Some socialists, such as Kai Nielsen (1985), insist that radical egalitarianism is the chief goal of socialism. Therefore, the difference between egalitarian liberalism and socialism must be explained.

Libertarianism presents some critical issues for the reconstruction of socialism. First, socialists have argued that "true freedom" can only be realized in a communist society; if that is the case, a question arises concerning how it differs from the liberty that libertarians respect. Some conservatives do not approve of Nozick's minimal state, and some libertarian insistences carry a New Left implication.[9] Furthermore, a school of left-libertarianism was formed in the 1990s.[10] Second, libertarians are defenders of the capitalist system because they believe private property rights to be inviolable. Libertarians believe that self-ownership enables private ownership. However, as G. A. Cohen (1995) revealed, the Marxist theory of exploitation also presupposes self-ownership. In socialist theory, how to position the concept of self-ownership is an unsolved problem, and in this respect, a sincere examination of libertarianism is required.

Communitarianism and communism aim for the different goals. Communism does not preserve the premodern community as it is and revives it at a high level in modern society, while communitarianism recommends the premodern traditional community. Therefore, the political position of communitarianism is difficult to determine. However, communitarianism and communism were originally the same ideas, and both value the concept of community. Many scholars who have represented communitarianism have had a close relation with Marxism. According to Marx's thesis that "the essence of man . . . is the ensemble of social relations" (CW 5:4), individual thinking and actions are determined by historically formed social structures. The theory of alienation that an

individual is alienated from species-being is also rooted in this idea. The communitarians also underscore human being's sociality. Besides, both communitarianism and communism question the priority of the right over the good and pursue human perfection.[11] The differences between them must be explicated.

Thus, the socialist normative theory has a close relation with each of the liberal normative theories. Clarification on how it differs from liberal normative theory is required to rebuild socialist normative theory. Socialists should not only judge that the identity crisis of liberalism indicates its limitations but also search for ways to overcome the crisis of liberalism from its inside.

1.3.2 Slogan of the French Revolution

Marx describes the slogan of the French Revolution as "Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham!" (CW 35:186) in *Capital* and rebukes each element with irony. Here he indicates that liberty, equality, property, and utility in the dimension of commodity circulation convert to the opposite in capitalist production. According to the conventional interpretation of the text, Marx denounces bourgeois liberty and equality and expects true liberty and equality to be realized in a communist society.[12] This interpretation is problematic in the following respects. First, in this interpretation, liberty and equality—the principles of commodity circulation—are the ideals of a communist society. However, if a communist society abolishes not only the capitalist economy but also the market economy, liberty and equality, which are the principles of the market economy, should not be fundamental values. Second, according to this interpretation, if true liberty and equality are realized in a communist society, then true property and utility should also be realized. However, no one claims that; if these principles are all "the laws of private property" (CW 29:64), all of these, including freedom and equality, must be discarded in a communist society.

In this manner, the socialists' view is divided as to whether the slogan of the French Revolution is liberal or socialist. The fundamental values of socialism constitute its identity. The ideological crisis of socialism is more severe than liberalism. Thus, the establishment of socialist normative theory is vital.

1.4 Summary

This chapter has contemplated the relation between liberalism and socialism in the dimension of value that underlies the social system. In liberal normative theory, neoliberalism emerged from the crisis of welfare liberalism, and disputes between egalitarian liberalism, libertarianism, and communitarianism became active. This situation demonstrates that liberalism is diversifying enough to lose its identity. Furthermore, the identity crisis of liberalism reflects the crisis of the welfare state since liberalism is the basic principle of welfare state capitalism.

The influence of the activation of the liberal normative debate led socialists to change their traditional attitude of neglecting normative theory. This change occurred because socialists were forced to reexamine the value of socialism in the process of exploring democratic socialist models that differ from Soviet-type socialism. However, how socialist normative theory relates to liberal normative theory is unclear. Socialists are uncertain about their evaluation of the slogan of the French Revolution. The identity crisis of socialism is more severe than that of liberalism. The values underlying the system must be elucidated to propose a socialist system that replaces capitalism; this is the task of socialist normative theory.

Notes

1. See Sterba (1988) and Kymlicka ([1990] 2002).
2. This book deals with socialism from the perspective of advanced capitalist countries. On another occasion, I will discuss socialism from the perspective of global capitalism.
3. My approach is influenced by the approach of C. B. Macpherson (1977), who defended the socialist retrieval of liberal democracy. See Cunningham (1987).
4. According to Sterba (1988), the welfare liberal conception of justice is endorsed by the left-wing of the Democratic Party in the United States. In Sterba's classification, welfare liberal justice includes both the utilitarian and contractarian perspectives; Rawls epitomizes the contractarian perspective (Sterba [1980] 1992). In my classification, however, Rawls's theory belongs to egalitarian liberalism. Therefore, Sterba's definition of welfare liberalism differs from mine.

5. See Habermas (1973) and Offe (1984).
6. See Barry (1986, 50).
7. For the word "egalitarian liberalism," see Lund (1997). Liberalism that respects egalitarianism is sometimes named liberal egalitarianism. For example, see T. Smith (2018). This term suggests a question of which one—liberal egalitarianism or socialist egalitarianism—is more radical egalitarianism. However, as detailed in chapter 5 of this book, I do not employ the term liberal egalitarianism because I do not recognize socialism as radical egalitarianism.
8. Rawls does not determine whether the society that embodies the two principles of justice more fully is "a property-owning democracy" or "a liberal socialist regime" ([1971] 1999, chap. 5). His justice theory is in the realm of liberalism in this respect.
9. According to Takeshi Sasaki (1984, 30), except for the belief in the market, Murray N. Rothbard (1973) and John Hospers (1971) are antipower, anarchist, and antiwar; they belong to the New Left in respecting individual's lifestyle.
10. For left-libertarianism, see Vallentyne and Steiner (2000).
11. Sandel (1996) advocates republicanism that encourages the cultivation of civic virtue through political participation. Fischer (2015) underlines the relation between Marxism and republicanism. However, I do not acknowledge republicanism as an independent normative theory because the content of republicanism is ambiguous; Sandel's republicanism is a variant of communitarianism.
12. For example, see Makino (2018).

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CHAPTER 2

Socialism and Moral Philosophy

2.1 Introduction

Socialist schools, especially analytical Marxism, began to debate normative theory with liberal schools in the 1980s. A normative theory of socialist values is currently evolving. However, some socialists do not agree on the existence of socialist normative and moral theories, and the debate on the definition of socialist moral philosophy continues. This book aims to explore the position of socialism in modern normative theory. The present chapter outlines the relation between socialism and moral philosophy to achieve this objective. This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2.1 introduces the theme. Section 2.2 classifies the theories of moral philosophy according to William Frankena and John Rawls. Section 2.3 overviews how the liberal normative theories surveyed in chapter 1 relate to moral philosophy. Section 2.4 employs R. G. Peffer's conceptual framework to examine the relation between socialism and moral philosophy. Finally, section 2.5 confirms that diverse moral theories underlie socialism.

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2.2 Theories of Moral Philosophy

A significant feature of contemporary social normative theory is that analytical moral philosophy provides a common framework. This section will review the concepts of analytical moral philosophy according to Frankena ([1963] 1973) and Rawls ([1971] 1999). In terms of their association, normative judgment is a superordinate concept for moral judgments.[1] Normative judgments can be divided into moral and nonmoral. Moral normative judgments deal with acts, human beings, and motives. "We should keep the contract" is an example of such a judgment. Nonmoral normative judgments concern decisions that are not moral per se, such as "That is a good car." However, nonmoral judgments incorporate adjudications of human goodness, such as "Pleasure is good in itself," and therefore relate to moral judgments.

Next, moral philosophy is grouped into the doctrines of teleology and deontology. Teleology prescribes that "the good is defined independently from the right, and then the right is defined as that which maximizes the good" (Rawls [1971] 1999, 21–22). According to teleology, rules governing individual's acts and social institutions that maximize certain nonmoral benefits are morally good, and as people must support them, they are morally right. Teleology is further divided into consequentialism and essentialism.[2] The theory of consequentialism evaluates actions and rules in accordance with their outcomes. Consequentialism is further categorized into utilitarianism, Pareto principle, and nonwelfarist consequentialism. Utilitarianism maintains that the pleasure or happiness of society must be maximized when the rightness of actions and institutions is judged. Utilitarianism has numerous variations; this book construes Jeremy Bentham's ([1789] 1970) classical utilitarianism as the representative of utilitarianism.[3] Classical utilitarianism is most properly delineated through three elements: consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking (Sen 1979, 463–64), wherein consequentialism evaluates all actions and institutions on the basis of consequences; welfarism requires only subjective benefits as a standard for the evaluation of consequences; and sum-ranking seeks to increase the total welfare. The Pareto principle, like utilitarianism, applies welfarism and consequentialism and utilizes Pareto efficiency, not sum-ranking. Pareto efficiency is an economic state in which the reallocation of resources to make an individual better off

inevitably makes at least one other individual worse off. Nonwelfarist consequentialism differs from utilitarianism in that it does not accept welfarism. It is, therefore, sometimes called objective consequentialism.

Essentialism emphasizes the degree to which the human essence is achieved.[4] Essentialism comprises perfectionism and virtue ethics; both philosophies respect *arete* and originate in Aristotle's thought.[5] Perfectionism values the full blossoming of human capability and the pursuit of human excellence. Virtue ethics contends that human beings should acquire certain desirable qualities or characters.[6] The two concepts differ from each other because perfectionism defines the human essence by capability, whereas virtue ethics defines it by character. Nonetheless, this book integrates perfectionism and virtue ethics into essentialism, given that their contrast is not significant to its aim.

The second moral theory is deontology, which "either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good" (Rawls [1971] 1999, 26). Deontology may be analyzed into pure and mixed.[7] Pure deontology provides that the rightness of action can be known without considering nonmoral good. Mixed deontology takes into account nonmoral good but supposes that the right act is not equivalent to the maximization of nonmoral good. According to this theory, the creation of nonmoral good ultimately follows deontological constraints. Immanuel Kant's ([1785] 1996) moral philosophy epitomizes deontology.

The above analysis of moral philosophy can be illustrated as the tree diagram depicted in Fig. 2.1.[8]

2.3 Liberal Normative Theories and Moral Philosophy

How do the liberal normative theories presented in the previous chapter relate to the system of moral philosophy? This segment addresses welfare liberalism, neoliberalism, egalitarian liberalism, libertarianism, and communitarianism.

Welfare liberalism is grounded in utilitarianism. In the nineteenth century, utilitarianism supported the idea of liberation through industrial capitalism and parliamentary democracy. In the twentieth century, the doctrine of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" ([1789] 1970, 14–15) played a progressive role as the founding notion of the welfare state. The study of the normative theory was reinstated after the



Fig. 2.1 Tree of moral principles

1970s through reflections on welfare liberalism, which prompted both high economic growth and its consequent defects. Rapid growth led to varied problems, such as the deterioration of the natural environment. The subsequent transition to low growth brought about issues such as the crisis of the welfare state and discrimination against minorities. The normative theory found utilitarianism at the root of the welfare liberalism that caused these problems.

Criticism of utilitarianism was directed toward three factors: consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking. Consequentialism ignores the fairness of the procedure through which the consequences are produced. Welfarism lacks the perspective of evaluating objective needs. Sum-ranking tends to sacrifice individual's rights for the benefit of society as a whole. The negative quality of utilitarianism threatened welfare liberalism. Such an objection to utilitarianism revived deontology and created new normative theories, such as communitarianism. The theory of justice presented values such as justice, fairness, rights, equality, and freedom. Communitarianism underscored the value of the common good. Thus, the normative theory of liberalism was revived from the crisis of welfare liberalism.

Neoliberalism and libertarianism are almost identical in supporting policies such as laissez-faire and small government. However, neoliberalism upholds consequentialism, whereas libertarianism embraces deontology. Neoliberalism exploits the Pareto principle; that is, it shares consequentialism and welfarism with utilitarianism, but it supports Pareto efficiency. Neoliberalism abandons the egalitarian aspect of utilitarianism by denying the comparison of welfare among individuals; therefore, it cannot prevent the growing economic inequality among individuals. The spontaneous order theory of the Austrian school, including Friedrich Hayek (1973–79), is another vital conception of neoliberalism. According to this belief, the market economy functions as a spontaneous order when it is unregulated because people can obtain the information and incentives and achieve efficient resource allocation. Neoliberals claim that their ideas are universal and unshackled by ideology, but their concepts presuppose such peculiar thoughts.

The positioning of egalitarian liberalism is somewhat complicated. Rawls published *A Theory of Justice* as an antithesis of teleological utilitarianism and situated his theory in deontology. However, Rawls adds a comment as follows: "It should be noted that deontological theories are defined as non-teleological ones, not as views that characterize the rightness of institutions and acts independently from their consequences. All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness" ([1971] 1999, 26). Although Rawls's theory is opposite to consequentialism, such as utilitarianism that seeks to maximize the total welfare, it accepts consequentialism that pursues justice from the perspective of nonutility terms.[9] Rawls's deontology belongs to the mixed type in that it does not exclude the consideration of consequences.

Libertarianism, as represented by Robert Nozick, is purely deontological. Nozick characterizes rights as "side constraints" to attain goals, not as aims for society as a whole. His theory stems from the Kantian principle of strict respect for individual rights (1974, 28–33). He also states that his entitlement theory is historical because it opposes the end-state standard that determines justice according to the consequent state. Entitlement theory does not need to evaluate the end state as long as justice in holdings is satisfied (150–53). Thus, libertarianism belongs to pure deontology.[10]

Communitarianism is teleological.[11] Charles Taylor (1975, 10) alleges that the mechanistic and atomic trends of the Enlightenment reduced orientation toward the final cause. Alasdair MacIntyre (1981, chap. 14)

insists that in Aristotle's ethics, individuals are joined into a community when they recognize *telos* as good. Michael Sandel warns against "a subject apart from and prior to its purposes and ends" "in a universe empty of *telos*" and highlights "the depth of opposition between deontological liberalism and teleological world views" ([1982] 1998, 175). Ronald Dworkin includes perfectionism, along with totalitarianism and utilitarianism, in "goal-based theories" (1977, 172). Essentialism is common to all communitarian theories.

To summarize, welfare liberalism and neoliberalism are categorized as consequentialism. Communitarianism endorses essentialism. Libertarianism is pure deontology, and egalitarian liberalism belongs to mixed deontology.

2.4 Socialism and Moral Philosophy

Peffer scrutinizes the relation between socialist normative theory and moral philosophy in *Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice* (1990), a book that accomplishes a comprehensive and seminal study of this theme. The present section not only inquires into the relation between socialist normative theory and moral philosophy with reference to the classifications presented in Peffer's book, but it also incorporates some of the author's own categorizations.[12] Normative theory and moral philosophy may be organized in the following ways: whether normative theory is accepted, whether moral theory is adopted, and whether moral theory is teleology or deontology. Teleology is divided into consequentialism or essentialism. Deontology is sorted into pure deontology and mixed deontology. Almost all theories in moral philosophy are concerned with the socialist normative theory.

The first question is "Does Marxism include a normative theory?" Loui Althusser negatively answers this question from his theory of ideology. He construes Marxism as "*theoretical anti-humanism*" ([1965] 2005, 229) that negates normative judgments in general. "Ethics . . . is in its essence ideology" (232). He contends that Marxism does not admit any ideology and does not contain any ethical or normative element. According to Peffer, Althusser defines Marxism as a descriptive-explanatory theory (Peffer 1990, 174). Thus, Althusser demonstrates the absence of normative propositions in Marxism. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels put the accent on the realistic nature of the communist movement. "Communism is for us not a *state of affairs* which is to be established, an *ideal*

to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the *real* movement which abolishes the present state of things" (CW 5:49). Marx and Engels referred to early socialism as utopian socialism and their own thoughts as scientific socialism. Later, in the golden age of scientism from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, Marxists boasted that propositions such as the law of breakdown of the capitalist system and the necessity of the socialist revolution were scientific laws. This tendency resulted in the refusal of normative theory in Marxism.

Scientism led to the neglect of the normative theory in Japanese socialist theories. Marxist economics in Japan is organized primarily into two schools of thought. Kozo Uno's ([1950–52] 1980) school demands the separation of theory and practice, and the orthodox school severely condemns the Uno theory and recommends the integration of theory and practice. In both cases, the intellectual domain that delves into value judgments is placed outside the framework of science, and the theoretical analysis of value is neglected. The normative theory has not been able to establish an independent field in Japanese socialist social sciences.

Does the emphasis on science necessarily imply the rejection of the normative theory? Although science usually indicates only positive science, normative science is also a scientific discipline. The normative theory that smoking too much is bad for your health and that you should refrain from smoking is not just a subjective opinion but a scientific argument. Marxists' stress on science does not necessarily entail the negation of normative theory.

The second question is "Does Marxism approve moral theory?" Peffer (1990, chap. 4) refers to two theories that deny the Marxist moral theory. The first group focuses on the definition of morality, and the second group uses Freudian or psychological notions of morality. For the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to discuss only the first group. Allen Wood questions the existence of morality in Marxism. According to Wood, the common idea that Marx's theory of alienation and self-realization constitutes the moral foundation of Marxism is quite mistaken. Why does Wood disapprove of morality in Marxism? Wood distinguishes between "moral" and "nonmoral" good. The former consists of "virtue, right, justice, the fulfillment of duty, and the possession of morally meritorious qualities of character," whereas the latter comprises "pleasure and happiness, things which we would regard as desirable and good for people to have even if no moral credit accrued from pursuing or possessing

them" ([1981a] 2004, 128–29). Wood insists that Marx's normative view is "nonmoral."

Frankena states the following about nonmoral judgments: "A study of these judgments is not, as such, a part of ethics or moral philosophy. But since it will turn out that a consideration of what is good (nonmorally) is involved in determining what is morally right or wrong, we must include a discussion of such value judgments anyway" ([1963] 1973, 10). Frankena includes judgments about nonmoral good in moral philosophy. As Peffer (1990, 182–83) explains, Wood's argument leads to the untenable conclusion that utilitarianism, which seeks to maximize nonmoral good, cannot be embraced in moral theory. Thus, the truth of Wood's assertion hinges on whether moral philosophy encompasses judgments about nonmoral good. Differences in opinion are insignificant if this point of contention is resolved (179).

Marx's attitude toward morality is expressed as follows: "The communists do not preach *morality* at all" (CW 5:247). Marx opposes moralism, which argues that morality should be respected more than other fields, such as the economy.[13] According to historical materialism, morality is part of the superstructure, and every society develops a morality that corresponds to its economic base. The morality that corresponds to the capitalist economic base is utilitarianism and deontology, whereas the morality that corresponds to the communist economic base is essentialism. As long as the subjects of social change are human beings, they naturally have some kind of morality. The individuals in a capitalist society have no choice but to rely on capitalist morality in transforming society. Moralism is contrary to historical materialism.

Due to Marx's reproach on Bentham (CW 35:605), most socialists believe that their position is the opposite of utilitarianism. However, some socialists, such as D. P. H. Allen, do describe Marx as a utilitarian. According to Allen, "their arguments are the kind used by utilitarians although not expressed in utilitarian vocabulary" (1973, 189). Allen bases his argument on Marx's assessment of the role of free trade and colonialism in the social revolution. Although free trade and colonialism inflicted harm on some workers, they ultimately advanced a social revolution and the working class's welfare. Allen interprets this logic as utilitarian.[14] Those who understand Marx as utilitarian positively evaluate the doctrine of utilitarianism. However, individual rights were suppressed for the utilitarian purpose of public welfare in the existing socialist countries. Some liberal scholars point out that Marx's moral theory is a kind

of utilitarianism and that Marxists must seriously accept the deontological critique of utilitarianism.[15] Moreover, communitarians such as MacIntyre conclude that Marxists have adapted their principles to "a utilitarian mould" (1960, 235). Historically, utilitarianism has been closely related to utopian socialism, collectivism, and reformist socialism. Thus, the relation between socialism and utilitarianism is complicated and remains unclear.

Richard Miller notes the commonality between Aristotle and Marx and acknowledges Marx's idea as nonwelfarist consequentialism.[16] "As against rights-based morality, both judge institutions by the kinds of lives they promote and judge proposed rights by assessing the consequences, of embodying them in institutions. At the same time, their general conceptions of the kinds of lives worth promoting are highly similar and emphatically opposed to utilitarianism. In short, as political philosophers they are non-utilitarian consequentialists" (1981, 323). According to Miller, Marx, similar to Aristotle, is neither a utilitarian nor a deontologist. Marx evaluates the social system from the viewpoint of how much it improves human well-being. However, Marx differs from utilitarians in that he does not reduce well-being to pleasure. Miller's nonutilitarian consequentialism can be labeled as nonwelfarist consequentialism since it rejects welfarism. Some scholars equate nonwelfarist consequentialism with perfectionism. However, essentialism, including perfectionism, refuses not only deontology but also consequentialism. Thus, I treat nonwelfarist consequentialism as an independent moral theory that exists between utilitarianism and essentialism.

Essentialism, which is composed of perfectionism and virtue ethics, is teleology that admits the objective good of the human essence. Alan Gilbert (1981) affirms that Marx's socialist normative theory is Aristotelian eudaimonism.[17] Marx and Aristotle "share a philosophical recognition of diverse intrinsic human goods including life, knowledge, friendship, political community, and the like. They contend that happiness (in Aristotle's terms, eudaimonia) stems from activities which realize or participate in these good, and that different kinds of happiness arise from diverse activities" (Gilbert 1984, 155–56). Gilbert rejects any consequentialist understanding of Marx, and, in this respect, he is different from Miller, who believes Marx to be a nonwelfarist consequentialist. Although Gilbert does not use the word essentialism, he recognizes Marx as an essentialist. As communitarianism espouses essentialism, the positioning of essentialism pertains to how socialists evaluate the

liberal-communitarian debate. The arguments of communitarians such as MacIntyre, Taylor, and Michael Walzer contain left-wing elements. Both communitarians and socialists are skeptical of atomic individualism and accentuate the sociality of personality formation. Therefore, the positioning of essentialism is crucial for socialist normative theory.

Peffer interprets Marx's moral theory as deontology. According to Peffer, Marx's moral theory is a mixed form of deontology instead of pure deontology. Marx's "moral theory, I suggest, is a *mixed deontological theory*, a theory of right action or obligation that recommends the promotion of one or more types of nonmoral good—freedom, human community, and self-realization in Marx's case—but holds that the criterion of right action is not simply the maximization of the nonmoral good" (1990, 80–81). Peffer (1990, 84) cites Rawls and Frankena as modern moral philosophers belonging to mixed deontologists. Peffer's argument is very persuasive because he investigated all normative theories; however, his rationales raise several questions.

First, of all the abovementioned moral theories, the only one that is not Marx's moral theory is pure deontology. Libertarianism, the moral theory of which is pure deontology, and Marxism are diametrically opposite ideas. However, mixed deontology occupies the closest position to pure deontology among the various moral theories. How can the distinction between pure deontology and mixed deontology be reflected in the gap between libertarianism and Marxism?

Second, Peffer contends that the moral theories of Marx and Rawls belong to mixed deontology and that there are "the *similarities* between Marx and Rawls" and that "their disagreements are based almost entirely on *empirical* rather than *evaluative* considerations" (1990, 368–69). According to Peffer, there is no essential disagreement between the moral theories of Marx and Rawls. Indeed, some scholars find socialist elements in Rawls's theory of justice, and Rawls himself suggests the applicability of his theory of justice to socialism ([1971] 1999, 247–48).[18] However, although Rawls's theory of justice respects egalitarianism, it champions classical liberalism in prioritizing individual freedom, and Rawls states that his theory rests on "political liberalism" (1993, xiv).[19] According to Peffer's claim, Marx's moral theory is equivalent to that of liberalism, after all.

Third, according to Peffer, "There is, in fact, no such thing as a specifically Marxist *moral theory*. There is, however, such a thing as a specifically Marxist *moral and social theory*" (1990, 433). Peffer's stance

of combining moral theory with empirical theory, rather than completing it alone, is certainly Marxist.[20] However, as will be discussed in this book, there is a discrepancy between liberal and socialist views on justice and other values; accordingly, I disagree with the view that both moral theories are identical.

2.5 Summary

This chapter first reviewed the classification of the theories of moral philosophy and then confirmed the moral theories to which liberal normative theory corresponds. Further, it pondered the relation between Marx's socialism and moral philosophy by referring to Peffer's work. This examination elucidated the diversity of the views on moral principles of socialism: the affirmation and denial of normative and moral theories, utilitarianism, nonwelfarist consequentialism, essentialism, and mixed deontology. The chapters that follow will present the author's perspective on the socialist normative theory by analyzing the values associated with liberalism and socialism: justice, liberty, equality, property, utility, essence, and community.

Notes

1. In this book, "ethical" and "moral" have the same meaning. "Ethics is a branch of philosophy; it is *moral philosophy* or philosophical thinking about morality, moral problems, and moral judgments" (Frankena [1963] 1973, 4).
2. Peffer (1990, 184) equates teleology with consequentialism. In my view, however, teleology is a broader concept than consequentialism since teleology is divided into consequentialism and nonconsequentialism. See T. Tanaka (2012, 71).
3. For variants of utilitarianism, see Eggleston and D. E. Miller (2014).
4. Nussbaum (1992) advocates Aristotelian essentialism, which aims to fulfill the basic human functions.
5. For the definition that essentialism comprises perfectionism and virtue ethics, see Sano (2010).
6. For virtue ethics, see Russell (2013).

7. See Frankena ([1963] 1973, 43–45) and Peffer (1990, 83). As mentioned later, Rawls ([1971] 1999, 26) does not acknowledge the existence of pure deontology.
8. See Shionoya's "tree of moral principles" (1984, 17).
9. See Shionoya (1984, 272–73).
10. Ayn Rand (1964, chap. 1) endorses teleological libertarianism. Rand's argument is questionable because it derives deontology that respects the inviolability of rights from teleology that believes each person's life to be the ultimate good. See Adachi (1991, chap. 8). Therefore, this chapter does not engage in Rand's theory.
11. Although Wallach (1987, 591) sorts communitarianism into teleology and nonteleology, this book deals only with communitarianism that espouses teleology.
12. In addition to Peffer, Lukes (1985, 87) splits Karl Marx's moral philosophy into three groups: deontology, utilitarianism, and perfectionism.
13. The Soviet Union encouraged "Marxist ethics" (Archangelski 1965). In the existing socialist countries, socialist relations of production were not formed. Nevertheless, the leaders of these countries attempted to build a socialist society by morality; the people did not follow the forced morality. One of the reasons existing socialism failed lies in moralism.
14. See Peffer (1990, 86). Allen's interpretation is probed in more detail in chapter 7.
15. For example, see S. Tanaka (1984, 212).
16. For the arguments that highlight the impact of Aristotle on Marx, see Gilbert (1984), Hurka (1993), Kain (1988), McCarthy (1990, 1992, 2003), Meikle (1985), Pike (1999), and Wilde (1998).
17. Burns (2005) equates Aristotle's ethics with Kantian deontology and judges that Marx's socialist normative theory resembles Aristotle in this sense. However, this interpretation is exceptional.
18. For example, see Edmundson (2017).
19. See Gray (1986, 41).
20. Peffer's (1990, chap. 10) conclusion is devoted to the comparison between democratic, self-managing socialism, modern capitalism, and state socialism. His intention of exploring moral theory is practical.

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CHAPTER 3

Justice

3.1 Introduction

Did Karl Marx condemn capitalism as unjust? The ongoing controversy over this question started in the 1970s, and since then, dozens of articles and books have been published on the topic.[1] The controversy emerged on account of the upsurge of interest in the theory of justice in liberalism. John Rawls ([1971] 1999) challenged utilitarianism and systematized liberalism from the standpoint of justice. Rawlsian liberalism profoundly influenced analytical Marxists, who attempted to reconstruct Marxist theory by introducing the idea of justice.[2] Such an attempt moved Marxism closer to deontological liberalism, of which justice forms the core. The crucial points in the controversy over the Marxist conception of justice were presented by the Tucker-Wood thesis, which argued that Marx condemned capitalism but not because he thought it was unjust. This thesis opposed justice-oriented Marxism; hence, the relation between Marxism and justice lay at the heart of the abovementioned controversy. This chapter scrutinizes the controversy and proposes a credible resolution.

This chapter is structured in the following manner: Section 3.1 has introduced the theme. Section 3.2 analyzes the concept of justice. Section 3.3 examines the content of the Tucker-Wood thesis. Section 3.4 presents Norman Geras's resolution of the controversy. Section 3.5 recon-

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siders Geras's resolution. Section 3.6 points out that opposing interpretations, namely, the justice and nonjustice interpretations, have a common feature, and it presents my proposal. Section 3.7 summarizes this chapter.

3.2 Concept of Justice

Justice is the core concept for this chapter and requires clarification. Historically, in ancient Greece, the concept of justice pertained not only to legality but also to the personality of a human being. Justice was thought to be inseparable from the common good and virtue.[3] However, the concept of justice has changed in modern times. Immanuel Kant defines justice in relation to the law: "A rightful condition is that relation of human beings among one another that contains the conditions under which alone everyone is able to *enjoy* his rights, and the formal conditions under which this is possible in accordance with the idea of a will giving laws for everyone is called public justice" ([1797] 1996, 450). Kant transformed the concept of justice into an individualistic principle, which regulates the relationship among individuals. As a result, justice was separated from the common good and virtue. The Kantian concept of justice became dominant in modern times.[4] Thus, the concept of justice that Marx addressed belongs to liberalism that supported individuals' rights.

3.3 Tucker-Wood Thesis

Kai Nielsen coined the phrase "the Tucker-Wood thesis." He writes, "The core of the Tucker-Wood thesis is the claim that Marx does not condemn capitalism or any other whole social formation for being unjust or for failing to promote any other moral conception or set of moral conceptions or moral ideals" (1981, 7). Nielsen explains that the gist of the Tucker-Wood thesis is that justice is not the standard by which Marx evaluates social systems. Historical materialism holds that a superstructure to which justice belongs corresponds to its economic base. Although a standard of justice can judge the policies and institutions within the social system, it cannot appraise the system itself from the outside. Therefore, according to Nielsen, the Tucker-Wood thesis argues that Marx condemns capitalism but not because of its injustice. Is Nielsen's understanding of the Tucker-Wood thesis correct?

Robert Tucker explains the attitudes of the founders of Marxism toward justice as follows: "Their condemnation of capitalism was not

predicated upon a protest against injustice, and they did not envisage the future communist society as a kingdom of justice" (1969, 36–37). Tucker offers three pieces of evidence in support of his thesis: "direct testimony from Marx and Engels bearing on the question, their analysis of capitalist exploitation of labor, and their picture of the post-revolutionary society" (37). The third piece is the most crucial for this chapter's perspective. Tucker states, "It should be abundantly clear that Marx does not envisage communism as a realm of distributive justice and that, although he does refer on this one occasion to the well-known formula on distribution according to needs, communism, in his conception of it, does not turn principally on distribution" (48). Tucker insists that Marx does not expect that a communist society will be rooted in justice.

Wood writes, "In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* Marx points out that the postcapitalist society itself will have different stages of development, to which different standards of right will correspond. And in the long run, of course, Marx believes that the end of class society will mean the end of the social need for the state mechanism and the juridical institutions within which concepts like 'right' and 'justice' have their place" (1972, 270–71). According to Wood, Marx foresees that the concept of justice will lose priority in communism.

As mentioned, according to Nielsen, the Tucker-Wood thesis states that Marx condemns capitalism but not because he thinks it is unjust. However, we have also observed that Tucker and Wood claim further that Marx anticipated a communist society where justice would lose priority. Thus, Nielsen's account of the Tucker-Wood thesis must be supplemented; the Tucker-Wood thesis comprises two following theses:

> Thesis A: Marx condemns capitalism but not because he thinks it is unjust.
> Thesis B: Marx expects the concept of justice to lose priority in communism.

3.4 Geras's Analysis and Resolution of Controversy

Geras conducted the most comprehensive analysis after surveying the vast literature on the controversy. He writes, "During the last decade or so, the keen interest within moral and political philosophy in the concept of justice has left its mark on the philosophical controversy of his work. It has left it in the shape of the question: Did Marx himself condemn

capitalism as unjust?" (1985, 47). Geras presents nonjustice and justice interpretations; according to the former, Marx condemns capitalism but not because he thinks it is unjust, and according to the latter, Marx condemns capitalism because he thinks it is unjust.[5] Geras then focuses on the nine following points of the controversy and applies them to the two abovementioned interpretations:

(1) Equivalent Exchange

Nonjustice interpretation: Marx says that the buying and selling of labor is equivalent exchange.

Justice interpretation: According to Marx, the buying and selling of labor is equivalent exchange only in the circulation process, not in the production process.

(2) Fair Distribution

Nonjustice interpretation: Marx must think that distribution in capitalism is fair as he criticizes the notion of "fair distribution" of the proceeds of labor (CW 24:84).

Justice interpretation: Marx discusses the capitalist exploitation of surplus value in terms of "*theft*" (CW 29:91). As "theft" denotes injustice, Marx contends that the distribution in capitalism is unjust.

(3) Transhistorical Standard

Nonjustice interpretation: According to historical materialism, if a mode of production changes, then the principle of justice, part of the superstructure that corresponds to the economic structure, also changes. Therefore, no transhistorical standard can evaluate the social system.

Justice interpretation: In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx suggests that a hierarchy exists in the distribution principle (CW 24:87). Hence, Marx believes in a transhistorical standard of justice that can assess the social system.

(4) Moral Realism and Antirealism

Nonjustice interpretation: In *The German Ideology*, Marx contends that morality, and any other ideology, cannot "retain the semblance of independence" (CW 5:37); his argument suggests that he is a moral antirealist who thinks that morality is subjective, not reliant on objective reality.

Justice interpretation: Historical materialism demands that the economic structure objectively determines the morality as part of the superstructure.[6] In this sense, Marx is a moral realist.[7]

(5) Income Distribution and Reformism

Nonjustice interpretation: Given Marx's pursuit of change in the relations of production, it is reformism to focus attention too narrowly on the income distribution.

Justice interpretation: Distributive justice also involves allocating means of production, an essential issue for revolution.

(6) Motivation for Revolution

Nonjustice interpretation: Adhering to moral notions such as distributive justice diminishes the motivation for the revolution.

Justice interpretation: An appeal to ethical norms or ideals is particularly significant in producing the motivation for the revolution.

(7) Juridical Principle

Nonjustice interpretation: Principles of justice are juridical notions. However, in a communist society where the state withers away, juridical principles lose priority.

Justice interpretation: Marx's concept of justice is not limited to juridical notions.

(8) Needs Principle

Nonjustice interpretation: Communism is beyond "the circumstances of justice" (Rawls [1971] 1999, 109), which implies that the needs principle cannot be explained by the concept of justice.[8]

Justice interpretation: What Marx predicts is repealed in communism is bourgeois rights, not rights in general.[9] In a society where the individual's right to self-realization is secured, justice is effective.

(9) Values Other than Justice

Nonjustice interpretation: When Marx denounces capitalism and designs a communist society, he employs general values such as essence and community rather than specific values such as justice.

Justice interpretation: If Marx is a historical relativist in terms of morality, then he should recognize not only justice but also other values as historically specific. Hence, concluding that only justice is historically specific is arbitrary.

After contrasting the nonjustice interpretation with the justice interpretation on the abovementioned points, Geras (1985, 70) selects the justice interpretation. "Marx did think capitalism was unjust, but he did not think he thought so." However, in my view, his solution is not without its difficulties. First, acknowledging that Marx did not think that capitalism was unjust is difficult. Marx is not an expert in moral philosophy; however, he is fully aware of his criticism of the idea of justice. Second, Geras opts for the justice interpretation despite the nonjustice interpretation having an advantage over its rival on some of the points. The justice interpretation does not have decisive persuasive power on all points. Third, Geras does not recognize that the Tucker-Wood thesis comprises two theses; he identifies thesis B with thesis A. As a result, Geras substantially insists that the justice interpretation rejects both theses and that the nonjustice interpretation accepts both of them. Therefore, Geras's proposed resolution is unsatisfactory. We must reconsider the problem and seek an alternative answer.

3.5 Reconsidering Nine Points

This section reexamines nine points from the viewpoint of the distinction between thesis A and thesis B. Points (1) and (2) are concerned only with thesis A because they do not mention justice in a communist society. Marx contends that relationship between capital and labor is unjust from the perspective of the production process, not from that of the circulation process. According to the exploitation theory, although

exploitation is difficult to find owing to free exchange between capitalists and workers, the relation between necessary and surplus labor in the production process is easily identified. Capitalism is founded on simple commodity production; in this system, independent simple commodity producers exchange products made by their labor, and the idea of property based on their labor is prevalent. From the viewpoint of simple commodity production, distribution in capitalism is unjust and capitalist acquisition of surplus labor is theft. Thus, concerning points (1) and (2), thesis A is not persuasive.

Similarly, points (5) and (6) also apply only to thesis A since they do not mention justice in the communist society. Marx insists that the distribution should not be taken seriously because emphasizing the distribution leads to reformism and the loss of motivation for revolution. However, if the distribution of the means of production is to be included, a change in the distribution will motivate revolution beyond reformism. Thus, concerning points (5) and (6), thesis A is not cogent.

Points (7) and (8) apply only to thesis B as they mention the juridical and needs principles in a communist society. Concerning point (7), the nonjustice interpretation holds that justice is a juridical principle supported by state power. Marx foresees that in a communist society, the state will die and that justice will eventually lose its significance in society. By contrast, the justice interpretation contends that justice is not limited to juridical concepts and that Marx has a nonjuridical concept of justice. Although viewing justice as a customarily formed morality is possible, it remains essentially power-based. Marx thus repudiates justice due to its power-based essence. Thesis B is consequently cogent about the point (7). As for (8), the justice interpretation contends that the needs principle in a communist society belongs to distributive justice and is fairer than the contribution principle in a socialist society. The nonjustice interpretation denies this claim. In a communist society, individuals achieve self-realization by meeting the needs of others. Their labor is "life's prime want" (CW 24:87), and they work voluntarily; the needs principle in the communist society does not belong to the category of distributive justice.[10] Thus, thesis B is plausible concerning point (8).

Points (3), (4), and (9) deal with historical materialism and theses A and B. In terms of point (3), the justice interpretation argues that Marx evaluates capitalist, socialist, and communist societies from the transhistorical standard. Marx states that the contribution principle in socialism is "advance" when compared with capitalist distribution but

a "limitation" when compared with communism (CW 24:86). For this reason, the justice interpretation asserts that Marx illustrates a hierarchy in the distribution principle and a transhistorical standard of justice. However, even if justice is a historical value, criticizing capitalism by appealing to justice is possible. As mentioned above, Marx acknowledges the capitalist acquisition of surplus value as unjust, but this fact does not necessarily indicate that Marx applies a transhistorical standard. Capitalist exploitation is condemned from the standard of property based on one's labor. This standard originates from simple commodity production and hence is historical. Marx criticizes capitalism by appealing to the historical standard. Whether justice is a transhistorical value does not affect the plausibility of thesis A. Accordingly, as to (3), whether thesis A is convincing cannot be determined. Next, thesis B is incompatible with the claim that justice is a transhistorical value. As justice eventually loses priority in communism, it cannot be a transhistorical value that offers a universal standard. Therefore, thesis B, which denies a transhistorical standard, is appropriate concerning point (3).

As to point (9), the nonjustice interpretation argues that Marx condemns capitalism from the perspective of values other than justice. However, condemning capitalism from the perspective of other values is compatible with doing so from the standard of justice. Capitalism can be denounced from the standard of justice and that of other values. Condemning capitalism by appealing to other values is independent of the truth of thesis A. Hence, whether thesis A is plausible concerning point (9) cannot be determined. Thesis B, however, is appropriate concerning point (9). When attempting to censure capitalism from the perspective of a communist society, appealing to a value other than justice, which relies on power, is required. As only power-independent values can exist within a communist society, justice eventually loses priority in a communist society. This reasoning demonstrates that thesis B is valid about (9).

Point (4) concerns both theses A and B and is the most difficult to examine. According to historical materialism, each superstructure is determined by its base. As morality belongs to the superstructure, it is also objectively determined by its base. Historical materialism demands that the superstructure, which includes morality, changes when the base changes, but this requirement does not negate the reality of the resulting morality. Although morality changes in accordance with historical development, it exists. Concerning thesis A, although the concept of justice

changes historically, it really exists in capitalism. The reality of justice enables capitalism to be criticized from the standard of justice. In this respect, the justice interpretation is appropriate. However, capitalism can also be censured by appealing to other values, which enables the standard against capitalism not to be justice. Whether morality exists and whether the morality that reproaches capitalism is justice are independent of each other. Consequently, determining thesis A's validity is not possible. As for thesis B, if moral realism is assumed to be correct, justice may or may not lose its priority in a communist society. Whether morality exists and whether the concept of justice loses priority in communism are different matters. Thus, determining thesis B's validity is also not possible.

Table 3.1 summarizes the abovementioned results.

The abovementioned results suggest that neither the justice nor the nonjustice interpretation can accommodate all nine points. The justice interpretation has the advantage in points (1), (2), (5), and (6), all of which concern thesis A. The nonjustice interpretation has the advantage in points (3), (7), (8), and (9), all of which relate to thesis B. How do I solve this puzzle?

Table 3.1 Nine points and theses A and B

	Thesis A (NJ)	Thesis B (NJ)
(1) Equivalent exchange	No (J)	—
(2) Fair distribution	No (J)	—
(3) Transhistorical standard	?	Yes (NJ)
(4) Moral realism and antirealism	?	?
(5) Income distribution and reformism	No (J)	—
(6) Motivation for revolution	No (J)	—
(7) Juridical principle	—	Yes (NJ)
(8) Needs principle	—	Yes (NJ)
(9) Values other than justice	?	Yes (NJ)

Yes or No indicates acceptance of theses A and B
(J) or (NJ) indicates whether the justice or non-justice interpretations are cogent with respect to theses A and B
"?" indicates that acceptance of the thesis is indeterminable
"—" indicates that the point has no bearing on the thesis

3.6 A Common Characteristic of Two Interpretations and New Proposal

The justice and nonjustice interpretations display different interests in the controversy. The nonjustice interpretation underscores that from the viewpoint of historical materialism, justice is part of the capitalist superstructure, and as such, it will not be the primary value in a communist society. The justice interpretation holds that the widely accepted ideal of justice can play a pivotal role in criticizing capitalism and that justice can be an effective weapon to overthrow capitalism. Both interpretations have their advantage and disadvantage. An advantage of the nonjustice interpretation is that it enables a proposal of the alternatives to the modern society by denying justice in communist society; its disadvantage is that it cannot provide a standard by which Marxists condemn capitalist exploitation. The advantage of the justice interpretation is that Marxists can apply the simple notion of justice to rebuke capitalism; its disadvantage is that it cannot acknowledge that the communist society is beyond justice. Above all, the justice interpretation cannot indicate the distinction between Marxism and liberalism, as justice is the primary value of liberalism.

The nonjustice interpretation denies that Marx condemns capitalism from the standard of justice and that he anticipates a communist society that realizes the ideal of justice. The justice interpretation affirms both claims. Thus, each interpretation strongly opposes the other. However, the two interpretations share a common characteristic, that is, an assumption that their attitude toward theses A and B should be identical. Is this assumption reasonable?

I propose denying thesis A and accepting thesis B. In other words, I contend that Marx condemns capitalism from the perspective of justice and expects that a communist society transcends justice.

When Marx maintains that relationship between capital and labor is essentially unfair, the standard of justice is grounded on capitalist society, not a communist society. As capitalism presupposes simple commodity production, it assumes that property is based on one's own labor. However, a capitalist society violates this principle. Thus, the exploitation theory is an internal critique.[11] In the socialist society, the contribution principle is prevalent. Socialism is fairer than capitalism because the former annuls exploitation arising from differences in the ownership of the means of production. This critique of capitalist exploitation is presented from

the viewpoint of a socialist society and is external since this critique is from outside of capitalism. The internal critique of exploitation from capitalist society and its external critique from socialist society overlap each other because socialist society achieves the principle of property based on one's labor, which is the foundation of capitalism. However, the external critique from the perspective of socialist society has limitations since this society contains remnants of its capitalist origins. In a communist society, the circumstances of justice cease to be general. This society denies the primary role of justice in society. Critique of justice from the viewpoint of the communist society is another external critique.

Accordingly, the Marxist critique of justice is threefold. First, it is an internal critique from the viewpoint of simple commodity production as the basis of capitalist society. Second, it is an external critique from the standard of justice in socialist society. Third, it is an external critique of justice from the perspective of communist society. The internal critique from the capitalist perspective and the external critique from the socialist perspective overlap each other because the standard inherent in capitalist society becomes the standard of justice in the socialist society, enabling justice to play a crucial role as a norm of social change. Marxists criticize capitalist society from the standard of justice, which will be achieved in the socialist society, but from the viewpoint of communist society, socialist society is denounced because it acknowledges justice as the dominant principle. Thus, the Marxist critique of justice has a multiplex and historical structure.

The following questions may be asked about my proposal: Is Marx's stance contradictory in employing justice to attack capitalism and rejecting justice when he designs communism? My answer is "No." When dealing with a capitalist society, it is contradictory to affirm justice on the one hand and deny it on the other hand; when envisioning a communist society, it is also contradictory to affirm justice on the one hand and deny it on the other hand. However, the criticism of capitalism and the envisaging of communism apply different normative standards. Therefore, Marx's attitude is consistent.

As mentioned above, the Marxist stance on justice comprises three dimensions. Marxists do not offer all dimensions simultaneously but offer the appropriate type that corresponds to the stage of development. Marx writes, "Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve" (CW 29:263). Although communist society will transcend justice, Marxists appeal to the justice that is dominant in the capitalist society and

persists in the socialist society. Socialists' immediate task is to abolish capitalist society and construct a socialist society that rests on justice. After the economic structure and superstructure of socialist society mature sufficiently and communist society is built, justice will be overcome.

3.7 Marxism and Justice

This chapter has investigated the controversy over Marx's conception of justice, referring to the Tucker-Wood thesis, which comprises two theses, A and B. According to thesis A, Marx condemns capitalism but not because he thinks it is unjust, and according to thesis B, Marx expects the concept of justice to lose priority in communism. On the basis of the distinction between these two theses, I reexamined Geras's nine points and elucidated that neither the justice nor the nonjustice interpretation accommodates all nine points. Although the justice and nonjustice interpretations are in opposition, they share a common feature: an assumption that the attitude toward theses A and B should be the same, that is, either accept or reject both.

I have established that their presupposition has a problem. In my opinion, thesis A should be denied, and thesis B approved. Marx condemns capitalism from the standard of justice but does not expect that a communist society prioritizes the idea of justice. Historical materialism argues that the standards of evaluation that belong to the superstructure change according to changes in the base. Marx adopts the idea of justice when he condemns capitalist society and designs socialist society but rejects it when he proposes a communist society. Justice can be applied to criticize the exploitation in a capitalist society and establish the contribution principle in a socialist society.[12] However, from the perspective of a communist society, individuals ruled by justice are divided and alienated; hence, justice loses priority in this society.

The liberal-communitarian debate on the question of justice versus the common good resurfaced the problem that Marx addressed within the nineteenth century. Both sides discussed from confined perspectives, ignoring the stages of social development; hence, they could not but select either justice or the common good. Although analytical Marxists contributed largely to introducing the concept of justice into Marxism, they did not recognize the limitations of this concept. Communitarians had the advantage of highlighting these limitations but did not appreciate

the role of justice in social change. As I have demonstrated, the notion of justice in Marxism must be appraised from a multiplex and historical viewpoint.

Notes

1. For the discussions on Marx and justice, see Geras (1985, 1992). For the subsequent arguments, see the following: Burns (2005), Castellana (1993), G. Cohen (1995, 2000, 2008, 2009, 2011), Daly (1996, 2000), DiQuattoro (1998), Gorr (1995), Graham (1992), Kellogg (1998), McCarney (1992), Morris (2009), Rawls (2007), Vincent (1993), and White (1996).
2. For analytical Marxism, see Roemer (1986).
3. See Aristotle ([n.d.] 1915).
4. According to Michael Sandel ([1982] 1998, 1–14), Rawls inherits Kantian deontological liberalism.
5. Geras uses the expression "the 'anti-justice' interpretation" (1985, 72). This expression is problematic because Marx does not endorse injustice but denies that it is the primary principle in a communist society. Instead, I employ the phrase "the nonjustice interpretation".
6. Geras describes the claim of the nonjustice interpretation as follows: "It is not consistent with his views on ideology that Marx should have found a capitalist society to be unjust by reference to historically quite general norms of justice" (1985, 51). As Geras characterizes the justice interpretation in point (4) as moral realism (58), the theory of ideology on which the nonjustice interpretation relies corresponds to moral antirealism. In other words, Geras concludes that moral antirealism is incompatible with transhistorical standards. However, in my view, historical relativity of morality and reality of morality are independent issues. Therefore, whether moral antirealism is incompatible with transhistorical standards cannot be determined.
7. Gilbert (1984) characterizes Marx as an Aristotelian moral realist.
8. The notion of the circumstances of justice was introduced by David Hume ([1739–40] 1978. bk. III, pt. II, sec. ii) and was later developed by Rawls ([1971] 1999, 109–12).
9. See Arneson (1981, 216).

10. Geras comments on the distributive principle in a communist society: "It is only because Marx obviously regards need and effort as morally more appropriate, in a word *fairer*, criteria of distribution than individual endowment" (1985, 61). However, in my view, as the individual in a communist society acts voluntarily, an effort is not a criterion of distribution.
11. Buchanan and Lukes introduce the concept of internal and external critiques. Buchanan (1982) divides Marx's critique of capitalism into internal and external critiques. He further divides the external critique into an alternative conception of justice and a nonjuridical evaluative conception. Lukes (1985) recognizes the three types of critique.
12. See Sweet (2002, chap. 2).

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CHAPTER 4

Liberty

4.1 Introduction

The relation between Marxism and the concept of liberty is complex.[1] Karl Marx sharply condemns liberty in a capitalist society and describes the communist society as "the true realm of freedom" (CW 37:807). George Brenkert (1983), a Marxist, insists that the basic value of Marxism lies in liberty. However, Isaiah Berlin (1969) asserts that the cause of the suppression of civil liberties in the Soviet-type socialist countries can be found in the Marxist concepts of liberty.[2] He claims that the Marxist concepts of liberty differ from its liberal concepts and necessarily leads to the suppression of civil liberties.[3] By contrast, Charles Taylor (1979a), a communitarian, condemns the Marxist concepts of liberty for possessing the same flaw as the liberal concepts that seek absolute liberty. The relation between Marxism and liberty has been discussed frequently in the Marxist school.[4] Nevertheless, the following points have not yet been fully resolved: How do the Marxist concepts of liberty relate to its liberal concepts? Is the pursuit of liberty the ultimate goal of Marxism? Do the Marxist concepts of liberty necessarily result in the suppression of civil liberties? Unless these questions are answered, the position of liberty in Marxism remains ambiguous. If Marxists endorse a communist society, they must expound on the position of liberty in this society.

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Therefore, this chapter proposes a solution to the question of how liberty is positioned in Marxism; for this purpose, it considers the Marxist concepts of liberty by comparing it with the liberal concepts of liberty and examines criticism from communitarianism. Section 4.1 has introduced the theme. Section 4.2 contemplates the structure of the liberal concepts of liberty. Section 4.3 analyzes the concept of liberty in Marxism by dividing it into three concepts and clarifies its contents. Section 4.4 investigates the liberal accusation that the Marxist concept of liberty leads to the suppression of civil liberties. Section 4.5 responds to the communitarian allegation that the Marxist concept of liberty pursues absolute liberty just as those of liberalism do. Finally, section 4.6 elucidates the position of liberty in Marxism on the basis of the aforementioned considerations.

4.2 Liberal Concepts of Liberty

4.2.1 Liberalism and Liberty

Liberty is the most fundamental value in liberalism; however, other concepts, such as neutrality and equality, have been proposed as its central values.[5] Why are the basic values of liberalism so diverse? The answer is that liberalism is ultimately an inconsistent idea and thus cannot be established as a consistent normative theory. When liberty is the fundamental normative principle in a society of pure liberalism, such a society cannot be universalized. The subject of liberty in liberalism is a free individual. Individuals in a pure liberal society can act with absolute liberty. However, a society in which individuals attempt to advance their self-interests and treat others only as a means to procure their desired results is, as Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1991) observes, in a state of the war of all against all. In this society, only the minority who monopolizes power can enjoy liberty, and the majority live in dire conditions. Such a situation without any cooperation or order cannot be called a society. In other words, a purely liberal society cannot be established.

Therefore, a compromise is devised to secure negative liberty in the private spheres of individuals by concentrating the powers in the hands of the state and safeguarding them equally.[6] This compromise is accompanied by the harm principle that J. S. Mill ([1859] 1977) articulated, according to which individuals are free to act as long as they do not encroach on others' same rights. The idea embodied in this principle is the origin of modern liberalism. Liberalism is a normative theory that

inherently incorporates values other than liberty and is established only in an impure form. However, although liberalism abandons demand for positive liberty, it aims to maximize individual absolute liberty in the form of negative liberty; thus, liberty is undoubtedly the fundamental value of liberalism.

4.2.2 Subject, Constraint, and Purpose

The most commonly adopted framework for discussing the concept of liberty is the dichotomy proposed by Berlin (1969), namely, positive and negative liberties.[7] Liberals acknowledge the former as the only concept of liberty to be respected, whereas socialists attempt to achieve both. From the viewpoint of liberals, socialists' attempts must fail, and they cannot guarantee negative liberty. By contrast, from the viewpoint of socialists, it is not enough to guarantee only negative liberty to solve the problems of a capitalist society, and it is possible to realize both liberties. The dichotomy is effective in elucidating the point of conflict between liberalism and socialism.

Gerald C. MacCallum (1976) maintains, however, that any concept of liberty necessarily has a triadic relation between subject, constraint, and purpose, wherein a *subject* is free from a *constraint* in pursuing his or her *purpose*.[8] According to MacCallum, no essential difference lies between positive and negative liberties, as they both share a triadic relation; they differ in their contents of subject, constraint, and purpose. He challenges Berlin's dichotomy because it only emphasizes the distinction between the two liberties and diverts attention from the similarities between them. The purpose of this chapter is to reconstruct the Marxist concepts of liberty through a dialog with liberalism. Berlin's dichotomy, which irradiates only the contrast between the two, is insufficient as a conceptual device, and hence, I adopt MacCallum's theory of triadic relation. However, as Berlin's dichotomy is sometimes useful for comparing the liberal concepts of liberty with the Marxist concepts of liberty, I accept the dichotomy when necessary. In this section, I review the structure of the liberal concepts of liberty from the perspectives of subject, constraint, and purpose.

The subject of liberty in liberalism has two characteristics. The first characteristic is individual versus group. In liberalism, the subject of liberty is limited to an individual.[9] As in Marx's concept of regulative liberty, which I will deal with later in the next section, it is logically possible to recognize society as a collective subject. However, liberalism

limits the subject of liberty to an individual because when liberty of a group is allowed, individual liberty and collective liberty sometimes conflict with each other. As a result of prioritizing the latter, individual liberty is suppressed.[10] The second characteristic is the empirical self versus the rational self; the former is the present self as it is, and the latter is the self as an ideal. In liberalism, the concept of the rational self, which is separated from the empirical self, is not accepted. The self that exists at present is the only self that lives by one's choice. Liberals believe that the empirical self may be subjugated to the rational self if the latter is recognized as the subject of liberty.

With respect to the constraint of liberty, the liberal concept of liberty possess the following characteristics. A constraint represents an externally imposed force on an individual's private sphere. There are three main theories that specify the contents of restrictions: a theory of spontaneous order, a principle of self-ownership, and antitotalitarianism. According to Friedrich Hayek's theory of spontaneous order, the order is a rule formed spontaneously from the interaction of individuals, and the power to interfere arbitrarily by violating the sphere defined by this rule is a constraint. In Robert Nozick's principle of self-ownership, the power invading the private sphere protected through ownership is a constraint. In Berlin's antitotalitarianism, the power to impose what is supposed to be a good life from the outside on an individual's life as an empirical self is a constraint. In any case, there is a private sphere to be protected by the individual, and the power to intervene in it from the outside is a constraint. Negative liberty expresses freedom from such external forces. Individual liberty is, therefore, not limitless. The extent to which an individual may act freely is limited to what does not infringe on the same liberties of others; this is the harm principle, which assumes that an individual can act freely as long as he or she does not invade others' liberties.[11]

As MacCallum indicates, any liberty is the liberty to do something and assumes a certain purpose. The question is what determines the scope of the purpose. The theory of spontaneous order limits the purpose to the extent of observing this order. The principle of self-ownership limits the purpose to the extent of not trespassing on private property. Antitotalitarianism limits the purpose to the extent of personal preferences held by the empirical self. In other words, the pursuit of a purpose beyond these limits is not permissible; thus, the purpose of the liberal concepts of liberty is limited. Therefore, the difference between liberalism and Marxism with respect to the purpose of liberty does not depend on whether it exists but on how its scope is set.

4.2.3 *Civil Liberty and Absolute Liberty*

The liberal state guarantees civil liberties in return for the people's transfer of power to the state. However, first, as underscored by Marxists,[12] because civil liberty is founded on the private property system and the market economy, individuals' survival is not guaranteed under total laissez-faire.[13] Second, in liberalism, it is sufficient to ensure negative liberty equally to individuals, and cooperation among individuals is not the goal; consequently, cooperation among individuals decreases. Third, as the state and capital can monopolize the information disseminated to individuals, liberal society tends to become an administered society. Liberalism focuses on the rule of law, but laws that suppress civil liberties can be formulated because capitalists control the legislature.

Liberalism is inclined to ensure individuals' absolute liberty. Taylor explicates complete freedom that is grounded on individual self-reliance in liberalism. "Complete freedom would be a void in which nothing would be worth doing, nothing would deserve to count for anything. The self which has arrived at freedom by setting aside all external obstacles and impingements is characterless, and hence without defined purpose" (1979a, 157). Liberals want a pure liberal society where absolute liberty is realized. However, as liberals admit that such a society results in a state of war, they recommend that people should secure their private spheres and maximize absolute liberty within it. Thus, liberals have abandoned extending absolute liberty beyond their private spheres. Although liberals have not succeeded in achieving absolute liberty, they still seek it by securing negative liberty in the private spheres.[14]

4.3 Marxist Concepts of Liberty

Unlike the liberal concepts of liberty, its Marxist counterpart has a structure that combines multiple concepts. The Marxist concepts of liberty are classified into two categories: regulative liberty and personal liberty. Personal liberty is further divided into two concepts: developmental liberty and communal liberty. Marx does not explicitly explain these concepts, but I extracted them analytically from Marx's texts. In the following sections, I elaborate on regulative liberty and personal liberty from the perspectives of subject, constraint, and purpose.

4.3.1 *Regulative Liberty*

In the chapter on the trinity formula in *Capital*, Marx presents the distinction between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom as follows:

> Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilised man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. (CW 37:807)

Two types of liberty are discussed here.[15] The first type is regulative liberty, which is in the realm of natural necessity and can be acquired by regulating "metabolic interaction between man and the earth" (Marx [1867] 1976, 637). Its rational regulation provides the resources for human activities.[16] As Marx refers to the exchange of goods as "the social metabolism" (CW 29:292), human labor mediates the metabolic interaction between nature and human beings. As labor is socially organized, metabolic interaction also requires social regulation. Therefore, a society gains liberty by recognizing the laws of nature and society and by regulating the metabolic interaction with nature. The subject, constraint, and purpose of regulative liberty are explained in the following manner. The subject of this liberty is not an individual but a "socialised man, the associated producers" (CW 37:807), namely, society as a whole. It is society as a collective subject, not individuals, that recognizes and regulates nature and society. The constraints on regulative liberty are that the laws cannot be recognized and that the disturbance of the metabolic interaction cannot be prevented. For example, destruction of the natural environment occurs when human beings are not completely aware of the mechanisms of the natural environment and cannot regulate the balance between production, consumption, and disposal. The purpose of regulative liberty is to recognize the laws in nature and society and regulate the metabolic interaction with nature.

Friedrich Engels writes, "Freedom therefore consists of the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity" (CW 25:106). This sentence provoked the criticism that the Marxist concepts of liberty lead to the suppression of civil liberties.[17] Indeed, the expression "the control over ourselves and over external nature" is misleading. Marx states that human beings regulate or control the metabolic interaction with nature; thus, the object regulated is neither human beings nor nature but the metabolic interaction with nature. If the balance of the metabolic interaction is lost, it will result in an environmental or an economic crisis that eventually threatens human liberty. Regulative liberty is acquired by regulating the metabolic interaction with nature to avoid such situations. In regulative liberty, society as a collective subject regulates the metabolic interaction; an individual's personal liberty in the society is not addressed. However, the following problem still persists: How can I relate regulative liberty to personal liberty?

4.3.2 Personal Liberty

Before explaining the realm of necessity in the chapter on the trinity formula, Marx writes, "In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production" (CW 37:807). What Marx mentions here is liberty in the realm of freedom, that is, personal liberty for individuals to freely develop their abilities in a community. This liberty corresponds to the concept that Marx refers to as personal freedom in *The German Ideology*: "Only within the community has each individual . . . the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the community" (CW 5:78).

Personal liberty has two aspects. First, it enables individuals to develop their potential. This aspect is the same as the "development of human energy which is an end in itself" (CW 37:807) in the realm of freedom, and I call this aspect developmental liberty in personal liberty.[18] Second, liberty can be obtained through community; that is, an individual's developmental liberty is not possible by acting independently of the community but by cooperating with others in the community. Thus, developmental liberty is always conditioned by the community, and I



Fig. 4.1 Three concepts of liberty

label this aspect as communal liberty in personal liberty.[19] Analysis of personal liberty demonstrates that it comprises two aspects: developmental liberty and communal liberty.[20] The relation between regulative liberty, developmental liberty, and communal liberty is presented in Fig. 4.1.

The subject of developmental liberty is the individual, and its constraint is the insufficient amount of personal resources to fulfill his or her potential. The suppression of civil liberties by political powers and the exploitation of surplus value by capital cause individuals to have insufficient free time and resources to fulfill their potential. Its purpose is that individuals develop their potential through free activities. The subject of communal liberty is the individual. Marx writes, "It is as individuals that the individuals participate in it" (CW 5:80). Its constraint is that individuals are so divided that they cannot collaborate or interact; this is also an alienated situation. Its purpose is to ensure that individuals cooperate with one another and interact to develop their potential.

4.3.3 Relations Among Marxist Concepts of Liberty

The Marxist concepts of liberty share an organic structural association with each other. First, I contemplate the relation between regulative and personal liberties. Regulative liberty enables society as a collective subject to regulate the metabolic interaction with nature as a premise of personal liberty. If a person wants personal liberty through self-realization, he or

she must provide more resources with fewer working hours; thus, human beings must increase labor productivity and expand liberty to regulate the metabolic interaction. The stage of social development affects the degree of regulative liberty, which affects the degree of personal liberty.

As stated above, liberty in the realm of necessity and liberty in the realm of freedom correspond to regulative liberty and personal liberty, respectively. As for the temporal order between the realms of necessity and freedom, Marx writes that "beyond" (CW 37:807) the realm of necessity, the realm of freedom will commence; therefore, the latter becomes possible after the former is realized. Regulative liberty is realized earlier than personal liberty.[21] From the viewpoint of social development, regulative liberty and personal liberty are central in a socialist society and a communist society, respectively. However, as the ultimate goal of Marxism is to realize the communist society, personal liberty occupies the more valuable position. In terms of value, personal liberty outweighs regulative liberty. Thus, regulative liberty is the first in order in time, and personal liberty is the first in order in value.

It is not unreasonable that the orders of time and value are reversed. For example, if an individual cannot achieve an ultimate goal but can obtain the condition for it at present, the individual will realize the condition first. In this case, the condition is ahead of the ultimate goal in time, but the ultimate goal is, in terms of value, more intrinsic than the condition. This type of thinking is often observed in historical materialism. The Marxist's ultimate goal is human beings' flourishing. However, the material conditions must be satisfied first. The temporal priority is to fulfill the basic material conditions; only then can human development be achieved. When we compare the fulfillment of material conditions in the realm of necessity with human beings' flourishing in the realm of freedom, the material conditions are satisfied first in time. However, in terms of value, human beings' flourishing in the realm of freedom outweighs the fulfillment of material conditions in the realm of necessity.[22]

The relation between regulative liberty and personal liberty should be understood in the same manner. When regulative liberty is compared with personal liberty, the former comes first in time, but the latter surpasses the former in value. The superiority of personal liberty over regulative liberty in value prohibits regulative liberty from restricting personal liberty. In Marxist-Leninism, regulative liberty has been understood as if it were the essence of liberty, partially because Engels accentuated regulative liberty. Critics of Marxism who have deemed Soviet-type socialism as the

embodiment of Marxism view regulative liberty as the core of the Marxist concepts of liberty and have attacked it; they misunderstand the Marxist concepts of liberty.

As mentioned above, personal liberty has two aspects: developmental liberty and communal liberty. Marx stresses that personal liberty is complete only when communal liberty is added to developmental liberty. In *The German Ideology*, Marx writes, "In the previous substitutes for the community, in the state, etc., personal freedom has existed only for the individuals who developed under the conditions of the ruling class, and only insofar as they were individuals of this class" (CW 5:78). Marx admits that personal liberty, although imperfect, is possible in a liberal society. In liberalism and, particularly, in egalitarian liberalism, personal liberty, which consists solely of developmental liberty, can be realized to some extent. However, communal liberty is obtained through community and can never be fully realized within liberalism. As for the relation between developmental liberty and communal liberty, the former precedes the latter in time in the sense that developmental liberty is possible to some extent even in the absence of communal liberty; as communal liberty is indispensable to perfect personal liberty, it surpasses developmental liberty in value. Figure 4.2 is a diagram of the order in time and value of regulative, developmental, and communal liberties.

I reexamine the relation between developmental liberty and communal liberty in terms of civil liberty and absolute liberty. In a communist society, as communal liberty outweighs civil liberty, the latter can no



Fig. 4.2 Order in time and value of the Marxist concepts of liberty

longer sustain its exclusive privileges; however, this does not indicate that the repression of civil liberty is acceptable in this society. "A community of free individuals" (CW 35:89) creates communal liberty when the people voluntarily open their private spheres to society and ensure the protection and substantiation of civil liberty. Utopian socialism sought to create an ideal communist society outside the existing liberal society. Marxist socialism, beginning with the individuals who live within a free society and the institutions that support it, aims to gradually develop the conditions that render a communist society possible.

Marx has consistently championed civil liberties, including freedom of the press, since the commencement of his social activities. Moreover, he recognizes that the protection of civil liberties is not a compromise with liberalism but that it is essential for developmental liberty. He advocates freedom of the press and states the following: "The writer does not at all look on his work as a *means*. It is an *end in itself*; it is so little a means for him himself and for others that, if need be, he sacrifices *his* existence to *its* existence" (CW 1:175). Freedom to express opinions is essential for human self-realization and a fundamental condition of developmental liberty. Even mere formal civil liberties should be thoroughly protected because they form the foundation for developmental liberty. Therefore, the superiority of communal liberty over civil liberty never leads to the suppression of civil liberty.

If personal liberty consists only of developmental liberty, it pursues absolute liberty as the liberal concept of liberty does. However, the Marxist concept of personal liberty is not limited to developmental liberty. In a communist society, the state withers away, and justice and rights lose their statuses as the fundamental principles of society. Therefore, the liberal principle of equal distribution of civil liberties does not play a central role. The essential alternative to civil liberty is communal liberty. In this concept of liberty, individuals expand their developmental liberty through collaboration with others. As a private sphere is converted into a communal sphere, the absolute liberty maintained there ceases to exist. Marx describes human beings in the following manner: "As a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a *suffering*, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants" (CW 3:336). A human being can exist only in nature and community. As communal liberty implies that nature and community restrict human beings, it denies absolute liberty. *In this sense*, liberty cannot be the ultimate goal of Marxism.

4.4 Suppression of Civil Liberties

Liberal scholars assert that the suppression of civil liberties in the existing socialist countries essentially originated in the Marxist concepts of liberty. Liberals limit the concept of liberty to its negative freedom from external interference and present varied forms of negative liberty. This section discusses three views on negative liberty: spontaneous order, the principle of self-ownership, and antitotalitarianism. It also examines the allegation that a concept of collective subject is responsible for repressing of civil liberties.

4.4.1 Spontaneous Order

Hayek points out that Marx's constructivism "produced the totalitarianism of the twentieth" ([1952] 1979, 399) century. "Constructivist rationalism" is "a conception which assumes that all social institutions are, and ought to be, the product of deliberate design" (1973–79, vol. 1, 5).[23] He defines liberty as "that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as is possible in society" (1960, 11). Like Berlin, Hayek defends only the concept of negative liberty, emphasizing freedom from *intentional* harm by others. There is no infringement of liberty if others unintentionally harm an individual.

Hayek makes this claim from his theory of spontaneous order. Society is not built from scratch; instead, it is a spontaneous order formed through a chain of acts committed by innumerable people. Languages, traditions, common laws, and markets inherited by humanity may be cited as examples of such spontaneous order. Individual liberty is best secured within such a stable spontaneous order, which signifies a kind of rule that constrains diverse individuals' free actions. The restrictions are applied fairly to everyone and are not intentionally imposed by any specific person. Such limits, therefore, do not trespass upon the negative liberty of individuals; the individuals are granted more liberty thanks to the rules of spontaneous order than in scenarios without it.

Hayek states, "The extent to which particularly Karl Marx was completely unaware of the manner in which appropriate rules of individual conduct induce the formation of an order in the Great Society is best seen when we inquire what made him speak of the 'chaos' of capitalist production" (1973–79, vol. 3, 169–70). According to Hayek, constructivists such as Marx destroyed spontaneous order to acquire more freedom

and forced the construction of an artificial social system. However, regardless of their competence levels, the elite members of society cannot construct a system that satisfies every aspect of individual preferences as effectively as spontaneous order does. Therefore, state authorities must minutely monitor the actions of people. The result is a totalitarian state that oppresses individual liberty.

Hayek equates the state-led, centrally planned economic structure with Marx's vision of a communist society and criticizes it. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe established a centrally planned economy controlled unilaterally by state bureaucrats in a top-down manner. Such an economic system necessitates a national bureaucracy that monopolizes the entirety of information and authority. This economic system caused the totalitarianism that oppressed civil liberties. In Hayek's perspective, therefore, a planned economy that Marx envisioned is essentially totalitarian.

However, Marx does not envisage a Soviet-type, centrally planned economy. He describes the communist state as "a society composed of associations of free and equal producers, carrying on the social business on a common and rational plan" (CW 23:136). Such a society is not a centralized system driven by a state bureaucracy but by a multidimensional arrangement of various associations. Each association designs its plan, and the network of associations prepares and executes the larger, society-wide design through their consultations. The communist society jointly controls the economy organized through a bottom-up design process. Therefore, the administrators cannot suppress civil liberties in a communist society.

Hayek opposes "passively accepting institutions as they are" ([1944] 1991, 13) and explains as follows: "The attitude of the liberal toward society is like that of the gardener who tends a plant and in order to create the conditions most favorable to its growth must know as much as possible about its structure and the way it functions" (14). Hayek does not deny all planning and regulation and acknowledges the need to fully recognize the structures and functions of social systems and to establish the most suitable conditions for their development. Accordingly, he cannot dismiss Marx's concept of liberty on the grounds that it presupposes design or control.[24]

As for the relation between Hayek's theory of spontaneous order and civil liberties, companies are the private property of capitalists in a laissez-faire market economy. The capitalists govern their companies from the

top-down and can restrict civil liberties such as their workers' political activities. Besides, capitalists can dominate people's lives through law and administration by controlling state organizations through bribes or donations. In this situation, political activities against capitalist interests are restricted, and citizens' civil liberties are violated. Hayek's standard of liberty is concerned only with whether social order is artificially constructed and not with protecting individual freedoms. Therefore, his concept of liberty cannot demonstrate why the spontaneous order on which this concept relies does not result in the denial of civil freedoms. Thus, Hayek's criticism that Marx's concept of liberty leads to suppressing civil liberties is unconvincing.

4.4.2 Principle of Self-Ownership

Robert Nozick's (1974) critique of Marx's concept of developmental liberty rests on the principle of self-ownership, "which says that each person is the morally rightful owner of his own person and powers, and, *consequently*, that each is free (morally speaking) to use those powers as he wishes, provided that he does not deploy them aggressively against others" (G. Cohen 1995, 67). Nozick disapproves of the concept of developmental liberty because self-ownership, the core of negative freedom, is denied as a consequence. Developmental liberty implies that individuals are free to choose the activities that enable their self-realization; therefore, any individual must gain access to the resources indispensable to conduct the desired activities. However, a liberal society encompasses inequalities of resource distribution among individuals, and some individuals cannot attain adequate access to resources to conduct the activities required for their self-realization. For everyone to enjoy developmental liberty, resources must be equally allocated. Therefore, a socialist government allocates the basic resources to the poor by imposing heavy taxes on the rich.

Nozick states, "From the point of view of an entitlement theory, redistribution is a serious matter indeed, involving, as it does, the violation of people's rights" (1974, 168). According to Nozick, a socialist state forces rich citizens to work as slaves and exploits their private property; they are denied the right to own themselves. The infringement of citizens' self-ownership is tantamount to depriving them of their civil liberties.[25] Socialism violates the self-ownership of individuals through redistributive taxation and suppresses the civil liberties of individuals. Socialists should

take Nozick's challenge seriously. Is the suppression of civil liberties inevitable under socialism?

It must first be ascertained whether self-ownership can be established as an inviolable right. The institution rooted in the principle of individual self-ownership demands a proviso that another person's self-ownership must not be invaded. This condition is a type of harm principle that plays an essential role in defense of negative liberty or the freedom of not having one's rights violated by others.[26] Self-ownership cannot be established as a general rule in a society if a person's self-ownership violates another individual's similar right.

Then, can the negative liberty of self-ownership satisfy the harm principle? From the Marxist standpoint, the harm principle is inapplicable to the principle of self-ownership. Marx discusses the human right to freedom in *On the Jewish Question*. "It is a question of the liberty of man as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself" (CW 3:162). Since monads possess no extensions, they cannot harm others. Human beings, however, are not monads. Individuals harm others by their occupation of a certain amount of space on the earth. Accordingly, the harm principle does not hold. Some might perceive that such an assertion is extreme. However, Nozick's denunciation of redistributive taxation also depends on the extreme insistence that even a small tax on the rich renders them partial slavers. Thus, the proponents of the principle of self-ownership cannot repudiate the Marxist response as extreme.

4.4.3 Antitotalitarianism

Berlin labels the Marxist idea of communal liberty as a "social freedom" and contends that it leads to totalitarianism.[27] He writes, "Yet it is not with individual liberty, in either the 'negative' or in the 'positive' senses of the word, that this desire for status and recognition can easily be identified. It is something no less profoundly needed and passionately fought for by human beings—it is something akin to, but not itself, freedom; although it entails negative freedom for the entire group, it is more closely related to solidarity, fraternity, mutual understanding, need for association on equal terms, all of which are sometimes—but misleadingly—called social freedom" (Berlin 1969, 158). Berlin's concept of social freedom seems to approximate my concept of communal liberty. He distinguishes social freedom from negative or positive liberty just as I differentiate between the concepts of developmental and communal liberty.

Berlin deduces as follows: When an individual self is divided into an empirical lower self and an authentic higher self, the acquisition of true freedom entails overcoming the former and assimilating to the latter. A division among individuals then results, and those who remain the lower self are separated from those who achieve the higher self. When those who have attained a higher level of self come to represent society as a whole, they force their lofty ideals on people who remain at the lower level. When some people want to be recognized by their society as citizens, they feel that they have obtained social recognition or public freedom by subordinating themselves to the authority that represents their society. Totalitarianism is justified in this manner, and such a situation exists in socialist countries where communist leaders and bureaucrats promote ideological control and education. Citizens are instructed that their acceptance of the authority amounts to their acquisition of true freedom. Individuals' civil liberties are thus suppressed. Berlin insists that citizens must refuse social freedom to prevent all kinds of intrusions into their private sphere.

However, in a society without communal liberty, people are deprived of horizontal communication; mass media unilaterally supply information to individuals, and the state can manipulate information as it wishes. Civil liberties will be suppressed in the long term.[28] A Soviet-type socialist state became a totalitarian society due to the loss of communal liberty.[29] Berlin overlooks the significance of the exchange of ideas among diverse individuals. Therefore, he directly links cooperation within community to totalitarianism.

Individuals cooperate and interact with each other by using their communal liberty. The constraint on communal liberty is a situation of alienation in which individuals are divided. When the exchange of ideas among individuals is discontinued, and people become alienated from each other, some elites who claim to represent society can hinder individuals' self-actualization in the name of social freedom. It is the lack of communal liberty that gives rise to the repression of civil liberties. Therefore, Berlin's censure of communal liberty is unfounded.

4.4.4 Collective Subject

After a detailed scrutiny of most of Marx's works, Andrzej Walicki determines that they tend to suppress civil liberties. "Marx, whatever his intention, systematically eliminated both the legal and economic safeguards of liberty, thereby preparing the way for a society in which the scope of control embraces all spheres of human life. Such a system of total control deserves to be called totalitarian" (1985, 43). Why does Walicki equate Marxism with totalitarianism? He characterizes Marx's concept of freedom as follows: "Speaking most generally, freedom for him was the triumph of subjectivity over objectivity, the liberation of man from the domination of things, both in the form of 'blind' physical necessity and in the form of reified social relations" (1984, 220). According to Walicki, there are two forms in which objectivity dominates human subjectivity, namely, natural necessity and reified social relations. Marx's goal is the liberation of human subjectivity from the control of this objectivity. Of the conceptions of liberty presented in this chapter, Walicki exaggerates the role of regulative liberty. As described above, the collective subject regulates the metabolic interaction with nature as a central goal of this concept of liberty.

If the Marxist concept of liberty is only regulative, the possibility of individual liberty being suppressed in favor of regulative liberty cannot be denied. However, the Marxist concepts of liberty are not limited to regulative liberty: the notion of personal liberty protects individual liberty from regulative liberty. Although regulative liberty is undoubtedly an aspect of the Marxist conceptual construction of liberty, it is only a prerequisite for personal liberty. Personal liberty is fundamental to the conception of freedom in a communist society, and it is superior in value to regulative liberty.

Walicki, who is familiar with Marx's oeuvre, does not neglect to refer to both the regulative and personal forms of liberty. "While he thought of 'true freedom' as presupposing individual freedom, he persisted in seeing the species as the subject of freedom; in other words, he was concerned not so much with individual freedom as with the 'liberation' of the superior capacities inherent, as he thought, in the species nature of man" (1984, 239). According to Walicki, Marx values collective liberty over individual liberty even in the dimension of personal liberty; Marx is not as interested in individual liberty as in the liberation of capacities inherent in human species-being.

Walicki does not sufficiently understand the Marxist concept of species-being. In this concept, individual consciousness can transcend its finite individuality and freely establish a cooperative relationship. Individuals decide on their own to build their collaborative associations. Therefore, personal liberty emanates from the individual subject. Developmental liberty represents the autonomy through which individuals actualize themselves according to their preferences, and communal liberty reflects the individual decision about whether or not to cooperate; there is thus no opportunity for the collective subject to become the principal player.[30] The liberty of the collective subject is not a goal in the dimension of personal liberty. Walicki (1995) endeavors to grasp Marx's entire theory of liberty but does not adequately comprehend its internal structure.

4.5 Absolute Liberty

This section ponders critique from the communitarian perspective that the Marxist theory of liberty is fatally defective since it demands absolute liberty. Taylor finds the notion of absolute liberty lurking not only in the liberal concept of liberty but also in Marx's concepts of liberty. Taylor states, "For Marx himself, early and late, held to a terribly unreal notion of freedom in which the opacity, division, indirectness and cross-purposes of social life were quite overcome. It is this picture of situationless freedom which underlies the unviable synthesis of expressivism and scientism" (1979a, 153). The Enlightenment attempted to control nature and society through science and technology. Expressivism originated in the movement called *Sturm und Drang* as a protest against the Enlightenment. Expressivism holds that human beings can achieve the highest fulfillment through activities to express themselves in nature and society. According to Taylor, although the Enlightenment and expressivism are incompatible, Marx attempts to force them to be compatible. Consequently, his concept of liberty is "situationless freedom" (153) or "complete freedom" (157). This concept is the same as the absolute liberty requested by liberals. Thus, Taylor accuses Marx of concealing the desire for absolute liberty in his concepts of liberty. Below, I respond to Taylor's evaluation of Marx's concepts of liberty. The Enlightenment and expressivism correspond to regulative liberty and personal liberty, respectively; I investigate them according to this classification.

4.5.1 *Regulative Liberty*

Taylor writes, "The fact is that from the beginning, his position was a synthesis between the radical Enlightenment, which sees man as capable of objectifying nature and society in science in order to master it, and the expressivist aspiration to wholeness" (1979a, 146). According to Taylor, Marx assumes that the rational control of nature and society as objects leads to human freedom. Taylor finds fault with Marx's concept of regulative liberty. Hayek asserts that regulative liberty led to the suppression of civil liberties. However, Taylor criticizes regulative liberty since it attempts to acquire absolute freedom. He has in mind the situations in Soviet-type socialist states, where scientific management for nature and society has become the self-purpose. The state controls the details of people's lives. Taylor discovers the notion of absolute liberty in regulative liberty.

The Marxist concepts of liberty aim to expand the liberty of humanity as a whole by recognizing the necessity and law in nature and society more profoundly and rationally regulating the metabolic exchange between them. However, for Marxists, regulative liberty is a mere means of realizing personal liberty. If the conditions for achieving personal liberty are fulfilled, the pursuit of regulative liberty ends even when not maximized. Thus, Taylor's accusation that Marx is attempting to maximize regulative liberty is not valid.

4.5.2 *Personal Liberty*

Expressivism is the idea that human beings reach the highest fulfillment of themselves through expressive activities. It corresponds to the concept of personal liberty that human beings obtain the liberty of self-realization in a cooperative relationship. According to Taylor, the moral theory of Immanuel Kant belongs to the Enlightenment, but there is a deep affinity between Kant's theory and expressivism. "The expressive theory points us towards a fulfilment of man in freedom, which is precisely a freedom of self-determination, and not simply independence from external impingement. But the highest, purest, most unpromising vision of self-determining freedom was Kant's" (1979a, 5). Kant's concept of moral freedom is self-control by rational individuals independent of empirical sensibility (Kant [1788] 1996) and belongs to the Enlightenment. It is also positioned in expressivism because it aims for self-fulfillment through self-control. According to Taylor, Kant adopted

both Enlightenment and expressivism; furthermore, Marx attempts to unify the two doctrines.

Taylor begins to discuss Marx's concept of personal liberty in terms of developmental liberty. He presumes that Marx's concept of developmental liberty has its origin in Kant's concept of freedom as autonomy.[31] "As transposed by Hegel and again by Marx, the Kantian aspiration to radical autonomy turns into the idea that human nature is not simply a given, but is to be made over. To be integrally free man must reshape his own nature" (1979a, 156). Here, Taylor discusses developmental liberty because he does not refer to the communal aspect of personal liberty, only to the developmental aspect of human nature. For Kant, moral freedom is to constantly fight the empirical self that is subordinate to natural tendencies and establish an autonomous life grounded on reason. In moral freedom, which is integrated with expressivism, a person with a will attempts to control his desires. Marx's concept of developmental liberty inherits this expanding trend of Kant's concept of moral freedom. Marx extends developmental liberty by combining it with regulative liberty. The result is the notion that human beings achieve developmental liberty by transforming their nature. This notion is a type of absolute liberty. To realize absolute liberty, the Soviet-type socialist countries encouraged ideological movements in which individuals transform themselves into social human beings, as typically observed in the Cultural Revolution in China. Taylor construes developmental liberty as the idea that absolute liberty can be obtained by completely reshaping human beings.

However, in Marx's developmental liberty, rational self cannot order the empirical self to abandon the sensibility. Marx writes, "The abolition of private property is therefore the complete *emancipation* of all human senses and qualities, but it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes have become, subjectively and objectively, *human*" (CW 3:300). The social system determines human beings' sensibility because they are not only active but also passive. As people living in a capitalist society necessarily possess the sensibility corresponding to it, people cannot obtain socialistic sensibility in this society. The purpose of the socialist movement is not to change the sensibility but to create objective conditions to enable developmental liberty by abolishing private ownership. Marx describes members of communist society as those who freely achieve self-realization. Communist society "makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning,

fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind" (CW 5:47). They can secure their freedom not because they struggle with the empirical self but because the social system enables them to achieve their self-realization while behaving as they like. Taylor dismisses the empty absolute liberty and recommends "situated freedom" (160). However, Marx proposes a type of situated freedom. In this respect, Taylor's allegation that Marx's concept of developmental liberty is absolute liberty is not valid.

Taylor insists that absolute liberty lurks in Marx's idea of communal liberty. "But if one probes deeper, it seems that the problem never arose for Marx because he had an extremely simple-minded view of the transition. The revolution would abolish bourgeois society and hence the laws of its operation, and a united class of proletarians would take over and dispose freely of the economy which it inherited" (1979a, 149). Taylor contends that Marx's idea of communal liberty creates the illusion that "leap into untrammelled freedom" (149), that is, absolute liberty in which the relationships among individuals become completely transparent, is possible. According to Taylor, Marx expects that in a communist society, communal relationships among people are complete, and there is no conflict; Marx ignores the complexity of society. One of the causes of the failure of the socialist movement is the optimism that this conflict-free society is easily realized. The governments of existing socialist countries have declared that a people's democracy has been established without contradictions, and they have abused it as an excuse for rejecting parliamentary and multiparty democracy. The leaders have boasted that the people voluntarily participate in politics and work and that a conflict-free society has been established. The ideal of a conflict-free society, although impossible in practice, has played the role of concealing the contradictions in reality by being presented as a goal easily achieved.

However, in my view, Marx does not state that every conflict in communist society will be overcome. "The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of existence—but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism" (CW 29:263–64). Marx foresees that major conflicts rooted in economic structure, such as class conflicts, will disappear in capitalist societies but does not predict that all conflicts will disappear. Instead, he suggests that

conflicts that do not derive from economic structure persist in a communist society. Individuals willingly deepen their relationships with others in this society. If this is the case, conflicts of interest will occur, and a situation will arise in which a person views others as constraints. In this society, individuals will attempt to resolve such conflicts through discussion. However, if the conflict is serious, it may not be readily resolved through consultation. In this case, the conflict will be maintained as a necessary condition for activating communal liberty. Thus, not all conflict in a communist society is eliminated, and eliminating all conflict is not a social goal.

Marx writes as follows: "As a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a *suffering*, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants" (CW 3:336). "Only within the community has each individual . . . the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the community" (CW 5:78). In Marx's idea of communal liberty, exchange among people becomes more active, and individuals not only act vigorously within the community but are also constrained by others' actions. Consequently, differences and conflicts between individuals emerge, leading to discussions within the community. Through this process, each individual's value changes, and communal liberty promotes developmental liberty. Marx stresses that cooperation is essential for personal liberty because he understands a relation between communal liberty and developmental liberty in this manner. Taylor does not fully recognize Marx's concept of communal liberty and therefore misunderstands personal liberty. Thus, Taylor's condemnation is invalid.

4.6 Marxism and Liberty

This chapter has investigated the Marxist concepts of liberty by comparing them with the liberal concepts of liberty. Liberalism attempts to maximize individual freedom. It has no consistency as a normative theory of the social system because society falls into a state of war if liberalism is practiced thoroughly. Therefore, contemporary liberalism intends to abandon positive liberty and to secure civil liberties as negative liberty. However, as liberalism maximizes absolute liberty within negative liberty, the fundamental value of liberalism is still liberty.

Marxist concepts of liberty are divided into regulative liberty and personal liberty, the latter of which comprises developmental liberty and

communal liberty. The subject of regulative liberty is a society, and the subject of personality liberty is an individual; the former comes before the latter in time, but the latter is superior in value. As for the relation between developmental liberty and communal liberty, the former is a freedom that can be realized to some extent even in a liberal society, but personal liberty becomes sufficient only when developmental liberty is combined with the communal liberty possible in a communist society.

Liberals assert that the oppression of civil liberties in Soviet-type socialist states derives from the Marxist theory of liberty. Liberals reject positive liberty and defend only negative liberty. However, the attempt to protect individuals' private sphere by the harm principle has failed, and liberal critique of Marx based on such an attempt has also failed. Other liberals accuse the collective nature of the concept of regulative liberty as a source of repression of civil liberties. However, this accusation is flawed because it misinterprets regulative liberty as the essence of the Marxist theory of liberalism. Marx's theory of liberty recognizes the protection of civil liberties to be an essential condition of personal liberty.

Communitarians allege that Marxists avid for absolute liberty, namely, empty freedom. However, in the relation between regulative liberty and personal liberty, personal liberty occupies an essential position. In personal liberty, communal liberty constrains developmental liberty. Therefore, the allegation that the Marxist theory of liberty is eager for absolute liberty cannot be accepted. Marxist communism denies absolute liberty. *In this sense*, liberty cannot be a Marxist slogan.

Notes

1. I postulate that liberty and freedom are interchangeable concepts.
2. The concept of civil liberty employed in this chapter corresponds to the liberties that are equally distributed by the first principle of John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* ([1971] 1999, 53).
3. For criticism from liberalism against the Marxist concepts of liberty, see Berlin (1969), Cranston (1967), Gray (1986), Hayek ([1952] 1979, 1973–79), Nozick (1974), Popper (1945, 1957), Sowell (1963), and Walicki (1983, 1985, 1995).
4. Representative literature on the Marxist concepts of liberty includes the following: Brenkert (1979, 1983), G. Cohen (1988, 1995), Cornforth (1968), Dawydow (1962), Easton (1981),

Lewis (1957, 1972), Macpherson (1973), O'Rourke (1974), Screpanti (2007), Selsam (1943, chap. 7), and Stiehler (1973).

5. As the most fundamental value of liberalism, Ackerman (1980) and Dworkin (1985) present neutrality and equality, respectively.
6. *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* mentions the following: "To guarantee the rights of man and the citizen requires a public force; this force is therefore instituted for the benefit of all, and not for the personal advantage of those to whom it is entrusted" (Van Kley 1994, 2).
7. For discussions of Berlin's dichotomy, see Baldwin (1984), M. Cohen (1960), Gray (1989, 1996), MacFarlane (1966), Macpherson (1973), Pettit (1989), and Swift (2006).
8. For discussions of MacCallum's theory of triadic relation, see Baldwin (1984) and Swift (2006).
9. Capitalist enterprise is formally a juridical person but is substantially an organization. Although capitalism is based on individual subjects, it admits a collective subject.
10. In utilitarianism, a variant of liberalism, the promotion of public welfare is the primary goal of a society. The subject who enjoys welfare is the public at large. Although liberals question the Marxist concept of a collective subject, liberalism must adopt the concept of the collective subject if it addresses public welfare. Liberalism is inconsistent in this respect.
11. As mentioned later, this assumption does not hold for Marxism.
12. See Macpherson (1973).
13. As stated earlier, civil liberties in this chapter refer only to individuals' fundamental human rights and do not include capitalist liberty. However, in the case of capitalism, a derivative form of liberalism, capitalist liberty is added to civil liberties, and civil liberties become a mere formality.
14. For Taylor's criticism of Berlin's concept of negative liberty, see Taylor (1979b).
15. Friedrich Engels contrasts the kingdom of necessity with the kingdom of freedom. "Man's own social organisation, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by nature and history, now becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have hitherto governed history pass under the control of man himself . . . It is the humanity's leap from the kingdom of

necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (CW 25:270). Both "kingdom" and "realm" (CW 37:807) are *Reich* in *Marx-Engels-Werke*. What Engels calls a kingdom of freedom is a stage of development at which human beings can recognize the laws of external forces and consciously control those forces, and it falls under Marx's concept of the realm of necessity. Therefore, the contents of the realm of freedom differ between Engels and Marx.

16. Resources here indicate everything necessary for human activities, including not only material goods but also services and free time.
17. Engels writes in *Dialectic of Nature*, "Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly" (CW 25:461). By reading this part, we can correctly understand Engels's intentions. To recognize and apply the laws of nature while being conscious that individuals are a part of nature is called "control." However, this usage is different from the usual sense of the word "control." Thus, I do not adopt it to avoid misunderstanding.
18. C. B. Macpherson (1973, 95–119) proposes the concept of "developmental liberty." He analyzes Berlin's positive liberty (PL) into three concepts.

> PL^1: Ability to live in accordance with one's own conscious purposes.
> PL^2: Coercion, by the fully rational or by those who have attained self-mastery, of all the rest.
> PL^3: The democratic concept of liberty as a share in the controlling authority.

Macpherson's concept of developmental liberty covers PL^1 and excludes PL^2. My concept of developmental liberty is roughly equivalent to that of Macpherson.

19. Communal liberty roughly corresponds to PL^3 in Macpherson's classification.
20. According to Elster, "In the Marxist tradition, self-realization is the full and free actualization and externalization of the powers

and the abilities of the individual" (1986, 101). Actualization is developing and deploying one's powers and abilities, and externalization is externalizing them socially, not privately. My concept of developmental liberty roughly corresponds to actualization, and communal liberty corresponds to externalization.

21. However, the understanding that personal liberty becomes possible only after the complete realization of regulative liberty is mistaken. This understanding cannot respond to Walicki's (1984, 237) criticism that civil liberties are curbed until the full achievement of regulative liberty. The temporal order suggests that personal liberty becomes possible on the basis of regulative liberty. As a part of personal liberty, civil liberties can be sufficiently guaranteed even at low levels of achievement of regulative liberty. This explanation is similar to the logic that the needs principle is partially realized even before the higher phase of a communist society.
22. Karl Popper (1957) sharply rebukes Marx's historicism. However, he sufficiently understands the relation between the two realms as follows: "Although he recognized that the material world and its necessities are fundamental, he did not feel any love for the 'kingdom of necessity', as he called a society which is in bondage to its material needs. He cherished the spiritual world, the 'kingdom of freedom', and the spiritual side of 'human nature', as much as any Christian dualist; and in his writings there are even traces of hatred and contempt for the material" (1945, 314).
23. Constructivism in this chapter is differently defined from constructivism in chapter 10.
24. Hayek's denunciation of Marx centers on the theory of planned economy, and the theory of alienation is hardly addressed.
25. Left-wing libertarians such as Vallentyne (2000) share an egalitarian orientation with the leftists. Left-wing libertarians argue that private ownership of external assets, such as means of production, cannot be justified, but they defend private ownership of internal assets such as labor power as it is essential to personal liberty.
26. John Locke presents the proviso justifying the original acquisition of land by an individual: "For this *Labour* being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others" ([1690a] 1988, 288). Nozick weakens Locke's proviso and proposes as follows: "A process

normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened." (1974, 178). Nozick applies his proviso not to internal assets but only to external assets because he believes that private ownership of internal assets is a priori established. However, from the Marxist perspective, Nozick's perception is mistaken.

27. I employ the concept of totalitarianism in the sense of a regime in which state power forcibly mobilizes people for political purposes in all spheres.
28. Arendt ([1951] 1994) contends that the origin of totalitarianism lies in the lack of voluntary cooperation and interaction among individuals.
29. According to Swift (2006, 67–68), instrumental republicans encourage active public participation in politics to defend negative liberty.
30. The collective will formed through communal liberty provides regulative liberty whose subject is collective. However, the subject of communal liberty is an individual.
31. For a comparison between Kant's and Marx's theories of freedom, see Kain (1988).

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CHAPTER 5

Equality

5.1 Introduction

Equality is generally portrayed as the core idea of socialism. Libertarian Friedrich Hayek describes the purpose of socialism as follows: "It may mean, and is often used to describe, merely the ideals of social justice, greater equality and security which are the ultimate aims of socialism" ([1944] 1991, 24). According to Hayek, the socialist goal is equality.[1] Karl Marx (CW 6:321) indicates that the pioneers of communism are from within the bourgeois revolution, mentioning the Levellers during the British Civil Wars and François-Noël Babeuf during the French Revolution. They view equality as the essential principle of their movement. Modern socialists also acknowledge equality as a fundamental objective. "Socialists believe in equality as an end. . . . It rests on a moral judgment. Any and every human being has as much right as anyone else to whatever gives value to human life" (Jay 1962, 4).[2] Douglas Jay, a social democrat, calls himself a socialist, and from the standpoint of defending the welfare state, positions its basic idea as equality. From the birth of socialism to the present day, and from its proponents and opponents alike, the basic idea of socialism has seemed to be equality.

When liberalism is compared with Marxism, a general understanding is that the former upholds freedom and the latter endorses equality.[3] However, the relation between Marxism and egalitarianism is rather

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complicated. Libertarianism belongs to liberalism in a broad sense. Libertarians such as Hayek are undoubtedly opposed to egalitarianism. However, egalitarian liberalism, represented by John Rawls ([1971] 1999) and Ronald Dworkin (2000), vigorously promotes egalitarianism.[4] Will Kymlicka describes the stances of liberalism and Marxism on equality as follows: "It is standardly supposed that Marxism is egalitarian, indeed more egalitarian than liberalism, further to the left. . . . But it is not immediately obvious what room there is to the left of Rawls's version of liberal egalitarian justice, since it too rejects the prevailing ideology, and accepts inequalities only if they work to the benefit of the least well off" ([1990] 2002, 176). Kymlicka suggests that liberalism may be no less thorough than Marxism with respect to egalitarianism.

More crucially, the assessment of equality has not been fully established in Marxism, which is the most significant trend in socialism. First, Marx takes a two-sided attitude toward egalitarianism. On the one hand, Marx opposes inequality as follows: "A *different form* of activity, of labour, does not justify *inequality*, confers no *privileges* in respect of possession and enjoyment" (CW 5:537). Differences in the ability of individuals to work do not justify inequality in remuneration. Marx highlights that inequality is linked to privilege, and here, he takes an egalitarian attitude. On the other hand, he does not put importance on the eradication of inequality: "Instead of the indefinite concluding phrase of the paragraph, 'the elimination of all social and political inequality,' it ought to have been said that with the abolition of class distinctions all social and political inequality arising from them would disappear of itself" (CW 24:92). Socialists' essential goal is the abolition of class, not the termination of inequality. Of course, the abolition of class eliminates inequality, but it is only an offshoot.[5] Marx attacks Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, for whom "the good, the supreme good, the real practical aim, is *equality*" (CW 6:172). Marx refuses to prioritize equality as the highest goal and is passive about egalitarianism. Thus, Marx takes a two-sided stance on egalitarianism, leading to a debate between the equality interpretation, which holds that Marx is egalitarian, and the nonequality interpretation, which argues that Marx is not egalitarian.[6]

The equality interpretation is represented by Kai Nielsen (1985), who advocates radical egalitarianism.[7] Marx proposes a slogan: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!" (CW 24:87). Nielsen names this slogan the Communist Principle and writes, "For someone who accepted the Communist Principle as such a guiding ideal,

and accepted Marx's analysis, he could and, I believe, should, accept the principles of justice—the principles of distribution—of some form of what I have called radical egalitarianism" (1989, 92). According to Nielsen, the pursuit of the Communist Principle leads to more thorough egalitarianism than egalitarian liberalism does.

The proponents of the nonequality interpretation are Richard Miller and Allen Wood.[8] Miller contends that although Marx does not deny the idea of equality, he does not adopt it as the ultimate standard. Marx endorses the contribution principle in a socialist society. Miller states, "Marx's case for these arrangements and standards is that they would enhance people's lives, not that they would conform to some ultimate standard of equality" (1984, 19). Miller lists four types of equality: distributive, rights-based, attitudinal equality, and standards of impartiality. However, "all of these prove inadequate as ultimate bases for decision in the face of inescapable conflicts in class-divided societies" (20). Miller asserts that Marx does not deny equality but also does not position it as an ultimate objective.

Wood underlines Marx's nonegalitarian character more than Miller does. According to Wood, Marx is not an egalitarian: "On the basis of the texts, I think we must regard Marx as an opponent of the ideal of equality, despite the fact that he is also and not any the less an opponent of all forms of social privilege and oppression" (1981, 196). According to Wood, Marx is against setting equality as the final goal.

In this manner, libertarians and social democrats understand that the basic idea of socialism is equality. Nonetheless, some egalitarian liberals doubt that Marxists are more egalitarian than egalitarian liberals, and some Marxists insist that Marxism is not egalitarian. On the one hand, Marx denounces inequality in the economic distribution in capitalist societies in the theory of exploitation, proposes a socialist society grounded on the contribution principle and a communist society founded on the needs principle, and consistently promotes egalitarianism. On the other hand, however, he does not advocate egalitarianism and makes some negative statements about it. What is the reason for this seemingly contradictory position? This chapter explores the positioning of egalitarianism in Marx's theoretical system, comparing it with the egalitarianism pursued by egalitarian liberals. Section 5.1 has introduced the theme. Sections 5.2–5.5 explain why Marx takes a negative attitude toward egalitarianism while promoting it in substance. Section 5.6 presents my

views on the relation between Marx and egalitarianism, based on the aforementioned observations.

5.2 Equalization and Socialization of Resources

5.2.1 Definition of Concepts

This section investigates the relation between Marx and egalitarianism from the viewpoint of the equalization and socialization of economic resources.[9] According to Marx's historical materialism, economic structure underlies the social system. Therefore, the subject of egalitarianism in social change is economic resources, which comprise productive assets and means of consumption; productive assets are further categorized into means of production or external assets and talent or internal assets.[10] Methods of allocating these economic resources are equalization and socialization. The equalization of resources signifies that they are equally distributed among individuals; the socialization of resources implies that individuals socially own them.[11] This section examines the relation between the equalization and socialization of economic resources in future societies by comparing Marxism with liberalism.

5.2.2 Socialization of Productive Assets

When Marx designs the postcapitalist society, he focuses on the possession of external assets. In a socialist society, external assets are not equally distributed but jointly owned. In a capitalist society, capitalists occupy external assets, and workers are excluded from their possession. One of the alternatives to this economic system is to allocate privately owned external assets equally. Notably, in socialist movements in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Proudhon faction, who advocated for an equal distribution in a private property system, was influential.[12] However, Marx's goal in the transition from a capitalist society to a socialist society is not to equalize the private ownership of such external assets but to have people jointly own them. "All the means of labour must be socialised, so that every man had a right and the means to exercise his labour power" (CW 21:396).[13]

Marx acknowledges that the alternative possession of external property comprises two things: equalization and socialization. He then selects the socialization rather than the equalization of external assets.[14] Marx allows

the contribution principle in income distribution while promoting socialization in the distribution of external assets in the socialist society that follows a capitalist society. The contribution principle is bourgeois in that its foundation is the idea of property based on one's labor. Marx writes as follows: "What we are dealing with here is a communist society, not as it has *developed* on its own foundations, but on the contrary, just as it *emerges* from capitalist society, which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges" (CW 24:85). In a socialist society, the socialization of external assets in the economic structure has been achieved, but the idea that the individuals' abilities, namely, internal assets, belong to individuals remains in the superstructure. Thus, Marx allows the private ownership of internal assets in the form of a contribution principle.

However, Marx deems private ownership of internal assets to be alienation. In a political economy, Marx writes, "This *external, mindless objectivity* of wealth is done away with, with private property being incorporated in man himself and with man himself being recognised as its essence" (291). Political economy does not limit wealth to external things but renders labor power completely private property by its commoditization. In a capitalist society, individuals are free to exercise their rights as the owners of labor power. In this case, equality implies that individuals' rights to private ownership of their internal assets are guaranteed equally. Still, it does not signify that the amount of distribution is also guaranteed equally. However, what Marx opposes is not that the amount of privately owned internal assets is not evenly distributed but that the internal assets are privately owned.

Marx expects that a communist society will emerge when the superstructure of the socialist society perfectly corresponds to the socialization of external assets and the influences of capitalism disappear. He defines communism as "the *positive* transcendence of *private property* as human self-estrangement" (CW 3:296). The communist society eliminates private ownership, which includes that of internal assets. This society abolishes the contribution principle and adopts the needs principle. Even if individuals have little talent for work and hence provide little work, they receive distribution accordingly if they have great needs. Additionally, even individuals who have many talents for work and hence bring great benefits do not receive much distribution unless they have great needs. Therefore, this society abandons the principle of property based

on one's labor and shares internal assets *substantially*. Thus, Marx selects the socialization, not the equalization of productive assets.

5.2.3 Socialization of Means of Consumption

In the socialist society in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, the unequal distribution of means of consumption is largely decreased by the contribution principle. In the communist society, the unequal distribution of the means of consumption is even further decreased by the needs principle. However, Marx prioritizes the socialization of means of consumption over the equalization of means of consumption. He explains the deduction of means of consumption after mentioning the deduction of means of production from total social product. They are "*the general costs of administration not directly appertaining to production*," "*that which is intended for the common satisfaction of needs*," and "*funds for those unable to work*" (CW 24:85). According to Marx, the *Gotha Programme* deals exclusively with the individual distribution of means of consumption, but before that, the goods publicly consumed in society should be deducted, and only then can the individual distribution be discussed. Whether the means of consumption are individually distributed or used under social administration depends on the nature of the means of consumption. Those goods and services consumed privately, such as foods and nursing care, are suitable for individual distribution, and those consumed publicly, such as park and sanitation, are suitable for joint consumption under social administration.

As for a means of joint consumption, Marx states, "From the outset this part grows considerably in comparison with present-day society and it grows in proportion as the new society develops" (CW 24:85). In his vision of the future society, the share of public use in the total amount of means of consumption tends to increase as society develops. Marx assumes that public consumption takes precedence over individual consumption and that the share of public consumption increases with social development. In this respect, socialization is prioritized over equalization in the means of consumption.

5.2.4 Comparison with Liberalism

To clarify the distinction between socialization and equalization of resources in Marx's theory of future society, I compare it with the

proposal of liberalism. Liberalism seeks equalization of resources, not its socialization.[15] Libertarianism leaves everything to the market economy in a capitalist society, opposes government intervention, and agrees that external and internal assets are unequally distributed.[16] Left-libertarianism allows the unequal distribution of internal assets while advocating the equal distribution of external assets.[17] Additionally, egalitarian liberalism advocates equal distribution of internal assets, arguing that not only the unequal distribution of external assets but also the unequal distribution of internal assets are morally unjust. Equality of internal assets is an ex post compensation for inequality of internal assets. Thus, the scope of egalitarianism in liberalism has broadened from external assets to internal assets. Table 5.1 illustrates how the equalization of resources in liberalism is compared with the socialization of resources in the socialist and communist societies proposed by Marx.

Liberalism attempts to distribute opportunities equally among individuals. The transition from libertarianism to egalitarian liberalism indicates that the opportunities to be equally owned become more substantial than formal, and the equally distributed assets are expanded from external assets to internal assets.[18] Consequently, the means of consumption are more equally distributed.[19]

Table 5.1 Normative theories and distribution

	Productive assets		Means of consumption
	External assets	Internal assets	
Libertarianism	Unequal distribution	Unequal distribution	Unequal distribution
Left-libertarianism	Equalization	Unequal distribution	Equalization
Egalitarian liberalism	Equalization	Equalization	Further equalization
Socialism	Socialization	Unequal distribution	Socialization
Communism	Socialization	Socialization	Further socialization

In Marxism, the development from capitalism to socialism to communism aims to increase social ownership and utilization, from external assets to internal assets to means of consumption. Some of the means of consumption are applied for personal purposes, and their distribution should be equalized as much as possible. However, enlarging the portion used jointly reduces the share of personal consumption. What is important is the conflict between equalization and socialization. Equal private ownership and social ownership are incompatible with each other. Choosing socialization in the allocation of productive assets and means of consumption indicates discarding the equalization of their private ownership.

This section probed the relation between Marxism and egalitarianism from the perspective of the equalization and socialization of economic resources. Using the concepts of egalitarianism and communism, the equalization of resources corresponds to egalitarianism, and socialization corresponds to communism.[20] Marxists' choice of socialization rather than equalization demonstrates that communism takes precedence over egalitarianism. This priority structure is the first reason Marxism's attitude toward egalitarianism is negative.

5.3 Equality of Opportunity and Condition

5.3.1 Definition of Concepts

This section contemplates the relation between equalization and socialization from the viewpoint of equality of opportunity and equality of condition. First, I define the concepts crucial to understand this argument. Equality of outcome is usually contrasted with equality of opportunity. Under equality of opportunity, the difference in effort causes an unequal outcome, which is legitimate inequality. In contrast, equality of outcome is unfair since it equalizes this fair inequality. Liberalism and socialism uphold equality of opportunity and equality of outcome, respectively. Socialism, which tolerates unjust equality of outcome, therefore, cannot gain support. This understanding is prevalent today.[21]

However, equality of opportunity should be contrasted with equality of condition, not equality of outcome.[22] Strictly speaking, equality of outcome and equality of condition differ from each other.[23] In equality of outcome, people receive equal opportunity under certain criteria, and

if the outcome is unequal, it is equalized. Equality of condition leads to equality among people when their situations are unequal independent of equality of outcome. For example, when individuals who receive the same amount of initial assets participate in a competition for income and the result is income inequality, equality of outcome equalizes income at the end of the competition. However, even if equality of outcome is achieved, some individuals, for example, may suffer from unfavorable conditions on account of having a chronic disease, despite receiving equal income. Others may become impoverished due to losing their equally distributed income. In these cases, equality of outcome has been achieved, but equality of condition has not. If the outcomes are equal, they may approach but do not exactly match the equality of condition because equality of condition is measured in terms of conditions independent of the relation between opportunity and outcome. Socialism pursues equality of condition in this sense, not equality of outcome. Therefore, the aforementioned common understanding is incorrect.

5.3.2 Equalization and Equality of Opportunity and Condition

Equalization promotes equality of opportunity. The transition from libertarianism to left-libertarianism and egalitarian liberalism extends the range of economic opportunities that should be equally distributed from external to internal. This expansion of equality of opportunity enlarges opportunities from formal to substantive. In a capitalist society premised on private ownership, a tactic that starts with formal equality of opportunity and approaches substantive equality of opportunity is practical. However, liberalism is satisfied with equality of opportunity and does not demand equality of condition because it intends to hold individuals responsible for the consequences. No matter how much the scope of opportunity is widened in terms of equality of opportunity, once equality of opportunity is guaranteed, the outcome is a matter of individual responsibility. Society provides no ex post guarantee, and the inequality of the outcome will be viewed as appropriate. Therefore, achieving equality of condition is impossible, no matter how much the content of opportunity is enriched.

5.3.3 Socialization and Equality of Opportunity

Liberalism attempts to advance equality of opportunity through equalization, whereas Marxism attempts to achieve equality of opportunity as much as possible through socialization. The principle of a simple commodity production that forms the basis of the capitalist society is property based on one's labor. In this society, small producers who possess labor and external assets combine these factors of production to supply products to the market and receive a reward proportional to the labor they provide. Property based on one's labor is guaranteed equally. However, in capitalist relations of production, where labor power is bought and sold as a commodity, opportunities for possessing external assets are not equally allocated. Consequently, the right to dispose of goods produced by wage workers who own no external assets and only labor powers resides in the capitalist who owns the external assets. Workers receive only the necessary product of labor as wages, and the capitalist acquires the surplus product. Therefore, distribution according to labor cannot be established.

In a socialist society, inequality in a capitalist society is corrected by the contribution principle. "Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society—after the deductions have been made—exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his individual quantum of labour . . . The right of the producers is *proportional* to the labour they supply" (CW 24:86). This society confiscates capitalists' external assets, all of which are treated as social property. This revolution eradicates capitalist exploitation. In this society, the contribution principle dominates, and equalization is realized in the sense of equal reward for equal work because each person receives a reward proportional to the labor he or she provides. Thus, the Marxist theory of exploitation and socialist society defends equality of opportunity in that they eliminate inequality in remuneration caused by the unequal ownership of external assets.

Despite advocating the contribution principle in a socialist society, Marx points out its unequal nature. "This *equal* right is still constantly encumbered by a bourgeois limitation . . . it tacitly recognises the unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity of the workers as natural privileges. *It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like every right*" (CW 24:86). Although equality is advanced as a result of the socialization of external assets in a socialist society, private ownership of internal assets still exists. The distribution of individuals' internal assets

is unequal as long as they remain in their natural state. Furthermore, as this distribution system deems individuals to be perfect workers, it cannot implement equal distribution to people with less labor power. The amount of work performed among individuals is different, but it is not their responsibility. Inequality in labor power should not justify inequality in remuneration. These unequal rights that accompany the "bourgeois limitation" of a socialist society are resolved by the needs principle in a communist society as the deepening of equality of opportunity.[24] In this society, unequal ownership of internal assets cannot lead to unequal rewards. This society further promotes equality of opportunity in terms of eliminating inequality in reward due to unequal ownership of internal assets and equalizing access to internal assets.

5.3.4 Socialization and Equality of Condition

Marx points out the problems inherent in the equality of opportunity as follows: "Right by its nature can exist only as the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) are measurable by an equal standard only insofar as they are made subject to an equal criterion, are taken from a *certain* side only, for instance, in the present case, are regarded *only as workers* and nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored" (CW 24:86–87). Marx contends that equality of opportunity, even if perfect, cannot fulfill equality of condition because, as mentioned above, the core of equality of opportunity lies in making the starting line equal and then allowing the outcome to be unequal. Inequality of outcome undermines equality of condition. Even if access to internal assets is equalized, some misfortune will result in inequality. Equality of opportunity, however thorough, cannot achieve equality of condition.

Marx proposes the socialization of resources to ensure equality of condition. As mentioned above, this proposal leads to the socialization of external and internal assets and increases the proportion of socialized means of consumption. Even if some misfortune leads to inequality of outcome, and hence a situation in which equality of condition is not fulfilled, as most resources are socialized, individuals in an unfortunate situation receive compensation until equality of condition is achieved. The socialization of resources enables all members of society to receive the necessary portion at any time; as a result, equality of condition is realized. Equality of condition is guaranteed whenever some members are in

an unfortunate situation in their lives, that is, whenever they have great needs, regardless of their past contributions or responsibilities. When resources are socialized, both the lucky and unlucky can freely utilize the resources. Thus, equality of condition is made possible by socialization.

5.3.5 Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Condition

If individuals are viewed only from the aspect of workers, and access to internal assets is equalized, it is reasonable to measure each person's contribution in terms of the amount of work and accordingly reward them. The combination of equality of opportunity and the contribution principle reaches a fairly high degree of equality of opportunity by realizing equal access to internal assets.

However, Marx indicates that even if each person's talents are assumed to be the same, inequality of condition occurs because the degree of needs differs by their health conditions or dependents' existence. Marx writes, "To avoid all these defects, right would have to be unequal rather than equal" (CW 24:87). If equality of condition grounded on the needs principle is guaranteed, individuals receive different rewards for the same amount of work. Thus, a communist society where the needs principle is dominant achieves equality of condition.

When the equal access to internal assets combined with the contribution principle is compared with equality of condition combined with the needs principle, two types of equality conflict with each other. Equality of condition determines the degree of equality by the criteria of individual needs at present, independent of opportunity and outcome. From the perspective of equality of opportunity, receiving the same reward for the same work is an equal right, and different rewards for different amounts of work are justified; the demand for equality of condition is a demand for unequal rights.

Capital describes how capitalists, as buyers of labor, claim the right to extend working days, and workers, as its sellers, claim the right to shorten working days. "There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides" (CW 35:243). When two rights conflict with each other, resolving them through the framework of rights is impossible. This situation has the same logical structure as the argument that deciding the equality, which is superior by the criterion of equality, is impossible when two types of equality are opposed to each other. Just as private property

rights and social rights are both rights, and the conflict between them cannot be resolved by the framework of rights alone, whether equality of opportunity or equality of condition is superior cannot be determined by the criterion of equality alone.[25]

Since equal opportunities provide equal rewards for the same work, equality of opportunity is one type of egalitarianism. This egalitarianism is consistent with the requirement of liberalism in that an independent individual is responsible for the consequences of their deed. By contrast, Marx does not recognize equality of condition as the development of equality of opportunity and treats equality of condition and equality of opportunity as heterogeneous types of equality. Ultimately, Marx chooses equality of condition over equality of opportunity. The equality of condition adopted by Marx's proposal is not egalitarian in that it allocates different rewards for the same work but is egalitarian in that it enables everyone to obtain an equal living condition. This egalitarianism is consistent with the spirit of communism.[26] The living conditions of individuals affect the common interests of all community members. The purpose of this egalitarianism is to provide equal living conditions so that people can help each other. In a community with substantial inequality in conditions among members, there is no basis for cooperation. Equality of conditions among members is required to build a communist society.[27]

The socialization adopted by Marx leads to equality of opportunity, but ultimately, the equality of condition prevails over equality of opportunity. The standard for his comparison between the two is not egalitarianism but communism. Marx does not recognize equality as the ultimate goal but the condition for community. This consideration is the second reason for Marxists' reluctance to employ egalitarianism as a banner.

5.4 Equality without Community

As mentioned in the previous section, the standard for choosing equality of condition over equality of opportunity in a communist society is communism rather than egalitarianism. However, if a society that embodies equality of condition is possible only by egalitarianism, is it a desirable society? In this section, this problem is addressed. Suppose that equality of condition among individuals is achieved only through equalization as pursued by liberalism and that equality of condition can be prioritized over equality of opportunity. If such a society existed, it would

be the best society from the viewpoint of egalitarianism. Is this a desirable society from the viewpoint of communism as well? If the supreme principle is egalitarianism, a society that achieves equality of condition would be the most desirable. However, Marx's answer is "No." In *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, he condemns the equality of wages that Proudhon demands: "Indeed, even the *equality of wages*, as demanded by Proudhon, only transforms the relationship of the present-day worker to his labour into the relationship of all men to labour. Society is then conceived as an abstract capitalist" (CW 3:280). Even if the equality of salaries Proudhon requires is achieved, individuals view work only as a means of earning wages, not for their self-realization. They are only competing with each other; such a society is still alienated.[28]

The essential part of Marx's socialist normative theory is the alienation theory. Alienation is a situation wherein people are divided and unable to cooperate with one another, and what they create reversely dominates them (CW 5:47). Even when the equality of condition is fully guaranteed, if there is no cooperation among people and each person is in an isolated situation, it is insufficient from the viewpoint of communism. Marx states, "Crude communism is only the culmination of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding from the *preconceived* minimum" (CW 3:295). Crude communism is a society of universalized private ownership. Under private property, individuals work to obtain their means of life. In this case, others' wealth causes envy, leading to a desire to be equal to others. The desire for equality under private ownership arises because the division of individuals' labor limits their purpose to the chase for their self-interest and excludes the promotion of others' interests. Even if equality of condition is achieved through equalization, there should be no substantial change in the alienated situations described in this case. Even when a society is realized wherein equality of condition among individuals is fully guaranteed, if there is no community among them, it is an alienated society.

Equality is a prerequisite for cooperation. In a society where conflicts between classes occur and people are divided by competition even among the same classes, the pursuit of community is difficult. Eliminating class conflict and ensuring that people are on equal terms are necessary conditions for the formation of community. However, equalization does not necessarily lead to the development of community. Equality is a precondition for community, but it is insufficient to overcome alienation. For the establishment of a communist society, a communal relationship must

be realized among people. Abolition of alienation can only be achieved when egalitarianism is combined with communism.

Related in this respect are the debates on luck egalitarianism.[29] Some egalitarian liberals elaborate on the equality of opportunity from the perspective of luck and responsibility. Their sophisticated egalitarianism is in line with the tradition of liberal individualism. Elizabeth Anderson labels this type of radical egalitarianism as "luck egalitarianism" (1999, 289) and charges that the individualistic orientation of distributive justice erodes civic solidarity.[30] Luck egalitarianism presupposes the idea that the individual bears the portion attributable to individual responsibility. Therefore, as a result of specifying the scope of the individual's responsibility, he or she must apply for compensation even if humiliated as a citizen. Such egalitarianism undermines solidarity among citizens. Anderson's critique is instructive in pondering the relation between Marxism and egalitarianism. Alienation is a phenomenon in which what people create reversely dominates them due to lack of their interaction. The idea of equality is a social construct. As a result of pursuing equality as a self-objective, even if equality of opportunity and equality of condition are achieved, the situation leading to weakening community is alienated. The criticism of luck egalitarianism is similar to Marx's theory of alienation, which highlights the individualistic limits of egalitarianism.

Even if equality of opportunity is advanced through the pursuit of radical egalitarianism and equality of condition is realized, the society will become alienated if communism is not involved. This observation is the third reason for Marxists' reluctance to pursue radical egalitarianism.

5.5 Equality for Community

This section deals with the position of equality in communism. As mentioned earlier, equality of conditions among members is a prerequisite for a communist society. Since equality provides the condition for this society, Marx upholds it when he opposes capitalist society and designs communist society. However, Marx does not recommend egalitarianism, for example, in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*: "And they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal" (CW 24:86–87). Marx describes inequality among individuals as a matter of course. From this context, the term "unequal" is not used in the sense of the diversity of individuals' personalities but implies inequality in individual conditions.[31]

Thus, the inequality of condition exists among individuals in a communist society. How can Marx's intention be understood?

Socialist and communist societies differ in the positioning of equality in the principle of distribution. The contribution principle in a socialist society prescribes the distribution where the influence of the capitalist society remains and labor is still only a means to improve their well-being. This principle does not consider the difference in labor ability, and the inequality of distribution is accepted. By contrast, in a communist society, labor becomes "life's prime want" (CW 24:87). This society adopts the needs principle: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!" (CW 24:87).[32] In a communist society, not only is the inequality of distribution due to the difference in labor ability annulled, but the equality of condition is achieved through the needs principle.

However, a communist society allows unequal conditions. Everyone in this society enjoys sufficient living conditions and finds self-realization in providing their labor to increase the other's well-being. An individual's goal is not an equal standard of living but human perfection through cooperation.[33] Suppose that the well-being of voluntary contributors is at the average level of society. They first improve the below-average situations of others and beyond that may improve the others' situation even by reducing their own well-being below the average. For the contributors, a decline in their well-being is well complemented by an increase in their self-realization.[34] In such cases, the administrative officers attempt to provide the contributors with subsidies so that their level of well-being can maintain the average. However, if the contributors refuse to receive the subsidies and insist that they are satisfied at a level lower than the average, they cannot be forced to receive them. Consequently, inequality of condition persists.

To understand this situation, imagine a family as the smallest unit of a community. When family members sit around the table for a meal, food is distributed according to their needs. If the parents disregard their own needs and provide their children with more food, the family members' conditions become unequal. However, since the parents achieve greater self-realization through such voluntary actions, the resulting inequality of condition will not necessarily be corrected. An individual in a communist society increases their degree of self-realization by improving the well-being of others. Even if their own well-being decreases as a result, this situation is satisfying for them.[35] Inequality of condition that an

individual does not desire must be corrected immediately according to their request. By contrast, inequality of condition resulting from people's voluntary actions pursuing self-realization need not be forcibly corrected. This type of inequality of condition can occur in a communist society.

Equality of condition ensures that the necessary condition is guaranteed equally regardless of the labor contribution of individuals. A communist society guarantees equality of condition to all. However, individuals' conditions become unequal as a result of their voluntary actions, and this type of inequality of condition is permitted.[36] Accordingly, equality of condition loses its relative significance.[37] This consequence is the fourth reason Marxists' attitude toward egalitarianism is negative.

5.6 Marxism and Equality

5.6.1 Evaluation of Controversy

I reconsider the controversy between the nonequality and equality interpretations. First, the nonequality interpretation challenges a vague intuition that "Marxism is egalitarian" and proposes a review of the relation between Marxism and egalitarianism. This interpretation can be highly evaluated in this respect. However, the nonequality interpretation does not recognize that the communist society cannot be achieved by severing Marxism and egalitarianism. For the establishment of communism, equal relationships between members of society, deepening the equality of opportunity, and achieving equality of condition are indispensable. The nonequality interpretation ignores the role that egalitarianism plays in the formation of communism and thus does not present a realistic path for community formation and remains at the same level as utopian socialism.

Second, the nonequality interpretation avoids the practical question of what equality Marxism should propose in the transition from a capitalist to a socialist society. Marx proposes the contribution and needs principles, but they require further refinement. Egalitarian liberalism has been most vigorously engaged in the elaboration of egalitarianism. Marxists should utilize these results. The final choice of nonegalitarianism is compatible with the temporary adoption of egalitarianism. However, the nonequality interpretation denies the role of equality in the Marxist theory and therefore neglects to refine the Marxist theory of equality. Thus, the nonequality interpretation has defects.

The equality interpretation enabled a dialog between Marxism and egalitarian liberalism by focusing on the egalitarian aspect of Marxism. The debate on egalitarianism has been held mainly within liberalism, and Marxists' participation in the debate can elucidate the positioning of Marxism in egalitarianism. However, the equality interpretation reduces Marxism to egalitarianism. If Marxism is recognized as a type of egalitarianism, the question of what the distinction is between Marxism and liberalism arises. A possible answer to this question would be the argument that Marxism is more egalitarian than liberalism. However, this response has two drawbacks.

First, the theory of radical egalitarianism has been proposed by egalitarian liberals. For example, Rawls's idea of natural talents as a common asset (Rawls [1971] 1999, 87) can be construed as more egalitarian than Marxism because it denies the principle of self-ownership that Marx's theory of exploitation assumes. Marxists must explain whether liberalism can deny the principle of self-ownership and whether the denial of this principle is compatible with the theoretical system of liberalism. However, liberals certainly proposed radical egalitarianism, and finding a distinction between liberalism and Marxism in the radicality of egalitarianism is difficult.

Second, I question whether making Marxism radical egalitarian is consistent with Marxism. As I have demonstrated, Marxism consistently champions egalitarianism as long as egalitarianism contributes to communism, but when egalitarianism conflicts with communism, Marxism prioritizes communism. Although adopting radical egalitarianism is valid as long as it does not conflict with communism, prioritizing egalitarianism over communism indicates relinquishing Marxism. John Roemer, an analytical Marxist, wrote the following in 1985: "It is not at all clear how analytical Marxists will differ from non-Marxist philosophers like Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, and Amartya Sen, who may be more vigorous in their opposition to utilitarianism and welfarism than are certain Marxists. I mention this simply to indicate that the lines drawn between contemporary analytical Marxism and contemporary left-liberal political philosophy are fuzzy" ([1985] 1986, 1441–42). According to Roemer, the boundary between analytical Marxism and egalitarian liberalism is blurred. In 1994, Roemer acknowledged further that "many members of the school, as the 1980s progressed, found it increasingly inaccurate to characterize their work as Marxist" (1994b, x). The main reason analytical Marxism lost its Marxist character is that it had reduced Marxism to egalitarianism in

the process of deepening equality of opportunity. The limitation of the equality interpretation is explicit.

Thus, neither the nonequality interpretation nor equality interpretation comprehends Marxism's multilayered stance on egalitarianism.

5.6.2 Welfare State and Egalitarianism

The relation between Marxism and egalitarianism is crucial in discussing egalitarianism in modern welfare state capitalism. The government in charge of the welfare state has defended egalitarianism. However, after the 1970s, not only conservatives but also some ordinary citizens opposed the welfare state, which fell into crisis. This is because the state bureaucrats did not understand that egalitarian policies would only be effective when combined with respect for the community.

The conflict between libertarianism and egalitarian liberalism and the communitarians' intervention reflects this complex situation. Libertarians refuse egalitarianism, whereas egalitarian liberals pursue egalitarianism compatible with liberalism. Communitarians allege that both are premised on individualism and that egalitarianism achieved by egalitarian liberalism cannot overcome alienation from the community. However, communitarians abandon individualism and egalitarian results and can only suggest a return to conservatism.

Marxists champion equality not because it is the ultimate goal but because it is a condition for building a community; they approve of egalitarianism in harmony with communism. The present welfare state is essentially capitalist, and the transition to communist society is not a straightforward task. However, the formation of community and hence, communism is crucial even in the welfare state. Thus, an accurate understanding of Marxists' position on egalitarianism is essential in deliberating the egalitarian reform in modern welfare states.

Notes

1. Robert Nozick, another libertarian, also criticizes the egalitarian nature of socialism: "The socialist society would have to forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults. . . . Any distributional pattern with any egalitarian component is overturnable by the voluntary actions of individual persons over time" (1974, 163–64). According to Nozick, although the welfare states and socialist

societies implement egalitarian redistribution, the egalitarian distribution will eventually collapse if its members freely trade their resources. Therefore, if such a society attempts to maintain the original egalitarian distribution, it must continuously intervene in transactions between its members, thereby severely constraining individuals' economic freedom.

2. See Robson (1976, 51). However, he questions Jay's definition of equality.
3. See Vincent ([1992] 2010, chap. 4).
4. For the overview of the liberal theory of equality, see Casal and Williams (2008) and Wolff (2007).
5. See Churchich (1990, 244).
6. The nonequality interpretation does not contend that Marx is an antiegalitarian in favor of inequality but that he is a nonegalitarian in the sense that he does not place the highest value on equality.
7. Analytical Marxists reconstruct Marxism in an egalitarian manner. See Arneson (1989, 1994), G. Cohen (1995, 2000, 2009, 2011), Roemer ([1982] 1986; 1994a), and Wright (1994).
8. For other works of the nonequality interpretations, see Churchich (1990, 1994) and Markovic (1974).
9. For equality of resources, see Dworkin (2000, chap. 2).
10. For external and internal assets, see Roemer (1988, 148–71).
11. Social ownership is classified into the form in which the member can freely utilize the object and the form in which the members' agreement is necessary for its utilization. However, as the distinction between these forms does not substantially affect the theme of this chapter, they are treated collectively as social ownership.
12. At the First International, Marx confronted the Proudhon faction that wanted to maintain peasants' ownership of small lands (CW 21:393).
13. Despite Marx's negative opinion on the equal distribution of productive assets, I suppose that it can be one of the intermediary social systems between capitalist and socialist societies. Marx underscores the distinction between himself and his contemporary socialists and therefore excludes their proposals. However, the difference is tactical, not essential. Marx anticipates "a political transition period" (CW 24:95) between capitalist and socialist societies. Today, various alternatives are available in envisioning socialism.

14. Recognizing that the means of production belong to the producers only in two forms, namely, "the individual form" and "the collective form," Marx insists that the latter should be adopted (CW 24:340).
15. One of the liberals' grounds for supporting the equalization of productive assets is that socialization necessarily results in authoritarianism. To this allegation, Bottomore objects that "the greatest possible decentralization of political authority" can prevent authoritarian tendencies in a collectivized economy (1964, 132). See Rees (1971, chap. 6).
16. Libertarianism should be described exactly as "right-libertarianism," but this book follows the convention and expresses it as "libertarianism."
17. For left-libertarianism, see Vallentyne and Steiner (2000).
18. In the debate over the "Equality of What," which occurred in this process, the following theories were proposed and contributed greatly to the elaboration of egalitarianism: equality of social primary goods (Rawls [1971] 1999), equality of resources (Dworkin 2000), equality of basic capabilities (Sen 1985), equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson 1989), and equal access to advantage (G. Cohen 1989).
19. Liberalism does not distinguish between means of production and means of consumption, but the deepening equality of opportunity leads to the equality of means of consumption.
20. Communism usually implies the social ownership of means of production, but this book adopts a broader definition, that is, a doctrine that endorses community or human cooperation.
21. For example, see Friedman and Friedman (1980, chap. 5).
22. Richard Tawney contrasts equality of opportunity with equality of condition (Tawney [1931] 1964, chap. 3). For more on Tawney's concept of equality of condition, see Baker (1997, 63) and Terrill (1973, 128).
23. For details, see Baker (2005).
24. Marx foresees that unequal opportunities in access to internal assets and unequal conditions deriving from different needs are simultaneously resolved in the communist society. However, these two inequalities are logically different issues. Therefore, I deal with them separately.

25. Westen (1982) insists that the standard of equality is empty and that for equality to have any significance, it must be complemented by some external standard.
26. G. Cohen discusses the relation between the egalitarian principle and the community principle. "The community principle constrains the operation of the egalitarian principle by forbidding certain inequalities that the egalitarian principle permits" (2009, 12).
27. For the argument that equality should be respected to cultivate a sense of community, see Baker (1987, chap. 4).
28. See Churchich (1990, 100).
29. For luck egalitarianism, see Knight (2009), Lippert-Rasmussen (2016), and Segall (2016).
30. Anderson (1999) characterizes her position as democratic equality. Kymlicka ([1990] 2002, 195–99) labels democratic equality as social equality and compares egalitarian liberals' distributive equality with social democrats' social equality; the former focuses on the distribution of material resources and the latter on individuals' social relationships. In my opinion, as social democrats have implemented income redistribution in welfare states, this contrast is problematic. The conflict between distributive equality and social equality should be recognized as a conflict between egalitarianism separated from communism and egalitarianism combined with communism.
31. Markovic (1974, chap. 7) opposes radical egalitarianism because he supposes that it leads to social uniformity. In my opinion, his argument overlooks the fact that equality of condition is compatible with diversity of personality. For Markovic's censure, see Nielsen (1985, 57–60); however, I disagree with Nielsen's radical egalitarianism. For the issues of egalitarianism and uniformity, see Rae et al. (1981). I do not support radical egalitarianism, but not because it brings social uniformity.
32. "Want" in "prime want" and the "needs" in "according to needs" are both *Bedürfnis* in German. If labor is an object of want, it may be an object of needs. However, as can be seen from Marx's proviso concerning the needs principle that "insofar as it relates to enjoyment in its narrower sense" (CW 5:537), the objects of needs do not involve labor.

33. Sypnowich (2003) raises the question of how to integrate egalitarianism with perfectionism and concludes that egalitarianism, which has been refined by liberalism, requires Marxist perfectionism and conversely, the former is necessary for the latter. My view is different from hers.
34. This situation can be described as self-realization through commitment if the concept of commitment (Sen 1982, chap. 4) is adopted. However, Sen's argument is within liberalism, which presupposes the circumstances of justice. Marx's communist society is beyond these circumstances and hence, out of Sen's framework.
35. Some may insist that few individuals try to improve the condition of others even if their condition deteriorates. However, even individuals in modern society more or less have such motives. Communism is a movement to gradually increase the opportunities for such motives to be realized through changes in the economic structure.
36. Nozick writes, "Any distributional pattern with any egalitarian component is overturnable by the voluntary actions of individual persons over time" (1974, 164). By contrast, in a communist society, equality of condition is not maintained on account of the members' voluntary contribution to improve others' conditions.
37. Inequality of condition in a communist society is different from the inequality of outcome derived from equality of opportunity. In the inequality of outcome, a request for its rectification by a person whose situation has deteriorated is rejected. Inequality of conditions that can arise in a communist society occurs when the contributors' conditions decline and they do not ask for correction.

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CHAPTER 6

Property

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the Marxist conception of property with reference to labor and the ownership of the means of production. Karl Marx ridicules the slogan of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* by calling it "Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham" (CW 35:186). What *property* is mentioned in this slogan? Marx writes, "The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property" (CW 6:498). Under the private property system, a capitalist who owns the means of production exploits the surplus value produced by the workers, thereby increasing his private property. As workers' wages are limited to the amount they require for sustenance, they remain proletarians forever. Therefore, socialists condemn a capitalist society wherein a capitalist privately acquires the products and advocate a communist society wherein the people socially acquire the products. Marx's theory of property provides the rationale for the individual's acquisition of products. The individuals who can acquire the products comprise members of a community, direct producers, and not exploiters such as capitalists. The factors of production consist of labor power and the means of production. Accordingly, Marx's theory of property can be roughly classified into two types.

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The first type is the theory of labor (TL), which argues that the title to acquire a product lies in direct labor. Marx's criticism of capitalism and his vision of a postcapitalist society are grounded on TL. The theory of inversion of the law of appropriation, which is presented in chapter 24 of volume 1 of *Capital*, follows the principle of property based on one's labor. The exploitation theory, which insists that the capitalists exploit the surplus value produced by the workers' labor, presupposes that the workers are the legitimate owners of the products. The contribution principle in a socialist society holds that individuals receive a share in proportion to the work they provide. In a communist society, labor power is socially applied; therefore, products are socially produced and acquired by workers as a group.

The second type is the theory of ownership of the means of production (TOMP), according to which the ownership of the means of production entitles the owner to acquire the product. In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx rebukes the Lasallian theory of the right to the whole produce of labor. He explains in "Forms Preceding Capitalist Production" in the *Grundrisse* that in a society dominated by "original *property*" (CW 28:415), members can obtain products not because they have provided their labor but because they are the owner of the means of production. The goal of the communist revolution is to render the means of production social property. In communist society, as working hours are reduced, and work is ultimately eliminated, labor cannot be the reason for obtaining products.

Marx applies both TL and TOMP; his attitude may appear to be inconsistent. Accordingly, I investigate the seemingly conflicting attitudes of Marx. Section 6.1 has introduced the theme. Section 6.2 probes the adoption of TL by Marx. Section 6.3 inspects Marx's espousal of TOMP. Section 6.4 examines why Marx employs both TL and TOMP.

6.2 Definition of Property and Labor

This section defines the concepts applied in this chapter. When a subject owns an object, the subject can freely utilize and dispose of it. Marx states that free workers are in a state of "lack of property" (CW 28:426) or are "propertyless" (427), indicating that workers do not own any means of production. An unowned object, for example, the air, is not owned by any subject.

When the concept of property is classified by its subject, it is divided into private property and social property. Private property is exclusively owned by an individual. Social property is owned by society. Samuel von Pufendorf ([1688] 1964) classified social property into negative social property and positive social property. This chapter relies on his classification.[1] When a member of society employs and disposes of negative social property, this member need not obtain the other members' permissions. Marx often mentions the concept of "individual property" (CW 35:751), which is negative social property. Although individual property is social property, individuals enjoy free access to it.[2] When a member of society uses positive social property, that member must obtain the other members' consent.[3] Negative social property and nonownership are conceptually close: the former limits the use of individuals outside the society, and the latter does not.

Economically, the objects of property are divided into products, the means of production, and labor power. Who receives the product is the most important. When a product is private property, the owner can acquire it exclusively. When a product is a social property, all members of a society own it. When a product is a negative social property, all members are free to make use of it. For example, public goods such as roads are negative social property. When the product is positive social property, all members' consent is required. For example, access to socially produced public housing requires social consent. When a means of production, such as a factory, is private property, the owner can employ it exclusively. When a means of production is negative social property, all members of a society are free to utilize it. For example, individuals may feed grass to sheep without the other members' permission. When a means of production is positive social property, the other members' approval is required. For example, individuals must obtain permission from the community for the grass they feed to sheep. Socialists have a common understanding of the ownership of the means of production, but not of the ownership of the labor power. If labor power is private property, the owner, namely, the worker, may freely dispose of his or her labor power without the others' consent. When labor power is a social property, society determines how the worker exercises it. When labor power is a negative social property, the society formally decides how to treat it, but the worker can decide how to actually deal with it. When labor power is a positive social property, society actually determines how the worker applies labor power.

Socialization of production is "the process whereby many dispersive production processes are fused into one social production process" (Tomizawa 1974, 61). The socialization of production comprises the socialization of the means of production and the socialization of labor. The socialization of the means of production denotes the "*process of changing the mode of use* of the means of production" (61).[4] Socialization of labor is "a concept indicating changes in the form of labor corresponding to changes in the form of the means of production" (62). Socialization and social ownership are different concepts. Socialization can occur without social ownership; social ownership does not necessarily lead to socialization.

TL holds that the right to acquire a product lies in labor. The principle of property based on one's labor asserts that direct workers are entitled to the product. This principle is a variant of TL. If labor power is socially owned, the society is entitled to the products. TL usually proposes the principle of property based on one's labor, but property based on *social* labor also falls under TL. By contrast, TOMP argues that ownership of the means of production entitles the owner to obtain a product. When the means of production are socially owned, they are divided into negative and positive social properties.

In this chapter, as I ponder the relation between property and labor, I must also explain the concept of labor. Labor is the involuntary engagement by individuals in economic activities, especially production, for their survival or that of their society. Labor is "toil and trouble," as Adam Smith ([1776] 1979) describes it (30). Although individuals seek more free time with less labor, they have no choice but to engage in labor. By contrast, when individuals voluntarily engage in economic activities with intrinsic motivation, they do not perform labor. Economic activity, especially production, does not necessarily denote labor. For example, when an individual's hobby is fishing, and he or she distributes the fish as food to neighbors, fishing is a free activity, not labor. The two elements of production are usually defined as labor power and the means of production. Labor power exists throughout history as labor is the consumption of labor power. However, if voluntary economic activity is not included in labor as mentioned above, labor power deviates from the two elements.

6.3 Theory of Labor

John Locke ([1690a] 1988), the Father of Liberalism, employed TL as a rationale for private property. However, the socialists also adopted TL.[5] Ricardian socialists claimed that workers had the right to obtain all the labor products because all the sources of products were labor.[6] The theory of the right to the whole produce of labor is founded on the principle of property based on one's labor in simple commodity production. In this society, the direct producers acquire the entire value added.

As described later, Marx criticizes the theory of the right to the whole produce of labor in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, but he uses the concept of property based on one's labor in *Capital*. He discusses the inversion of the law of appropriation. "At first the rights of property seemed to us to be based on a man's own labour . . . Now, however, property turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to appropriate the unpaid labour of others or its product, and to be the impossibility, on the part of the labourer, of appropriating his own product" (CW 35:583). Simple commodity producers who own the means of production sell their products for the prices. The principle of property based on one's labor is established because producers receive rewards for the value added they produce. However, in the conversion of surplus value into capital, the capital exchanged for labor power is the fruit of workers' unpaid labor. The value added produced by workers comprises not only wages but also surplus value. Workers cannot acquire property based on their labor, and capitalists can acquire property grounded on workers' unpaid work. In this theory of the inversion of the law of appropriation, the principle of property based on one's labor in simple commodity production is set as the standard, and this principle becomes the opposite through the conversion of surplus value into capital.

At the core of *Capital* is exploitation theory, according to which capitalists exploit surplus value produced by workers; its theoretical premise is TL. In the purchase and sale of labor between capitalists and workers, capitalists possess the means of production, whereas workers own no means of production, only labor. Production requires both labor power and the means of production. In the purchase and sale of labor power, capitalists provide the means of production, and workers provide labor power. According to the advocates of capitalism, this trade is founded on

mutual agreement. Production is undoubtedly impossible without capitalists' means of production, but capitalists cannot produce without workers' labor. The capitalists and workers then negotiate and reach an agreement in which the workers receive wages, and the capitalists receive profits. There is no injustice in the receipt of profits by capitalists.

TL rejects this explanation. Advocates of capitalism take for granted that capitalists own the means of production and workers only own their labor power. However, in simple commodity production, all individuals hold their means of production and exercised their labor power to obtain all value added. In this economy, only workers who are direct producers can acquire all value added. However, through primitive accumulation, direct producers were forcibly separated from the means of production, which thus made them proletarians. The advocates of capitalism completely ignore this process. In the purchase and sale of labor power in a capitalist economy, capitalists and workers trade on mutual agreement, but workers never want such an exchange and are forced to agree. In other words, from the workers' viewpoint, the products of surplus labor should belong to the workers, but the workers must surrender them to the capitalists due to the forced agreement.[7] From the principle of property based on one's labor, Marx labels surplus labor "unpaid labor" (CW 35:534) after considering the entire process from simple commodity production to the formation of a capitalist economy through primitive accumulation.[8]

Marx divides the communist society into two stages in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme* and characterizes the first phase, namely, socialist society, in the following manner: "The individual producer receives back from society—after the deductions have been made—exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his individual quantum of labour" (CW 24:86). The socialist society has experienced the socialization of labor and the means of production in a capitalist society. Moreover, as this society has completed a transition period under the proletarian dictatorship, private ownership of labor and the means of production has been abolished. In the relations of production, the transformation of labor and the means of production into social ownership have been completed. Nonetheless, social ownership of labor and the means of production are in a negative form, and the principle of property based on one's labor remains in the superstructure. There is a gap between changes in the relations of production and changes in superstructure. Therefore, workers

contribute to production by freely using their labor power and the means of production, and they receive rewards in proportion to their labor.[9]

The same argument is presented in chapter 32 of volume 1 of *Capital*. "The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era" (CW 35:751). Capitalism started with the principle of property based on one's labor in simple commodity production but eventually led to the denial of this principle. A socialist society restores this principle. As the means of production and labor power are already socially owned in a socialist society, private ownership of them is impossible. In this society, however, the means of production and labor power are negative social property. The workers enjoy free access to the means of production and can exercise their labor power as they wish. That is why Marx describes this situation as the reestablishment of "individual property." In a socialist society, the principle of property based on one's labor is realized further than in a capitalist society.[10]

In a capitalist society, "centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour" (CW 35:750) proceeds. Machinery "operates only by means of associated labour, or labour in common. Hence, the co-operative character of the labour process is, in the latter case, a technical necessity dictated by the instrument of labour itself" (CW 35:389). Unlike in simple commodity production, machinery is operated not by individuals but by group cooperation in a large-scale industry; thus, labor also strengthens its social character. The product cannot be treated as a direct producer's individual achievement. According to TL, a social application of labor power in a communist society becomes possible on the premise of the socialization of labor in a capitalist society. Marx discusses the application of labor power in a communist society in chapter 1 of volume 1 of *Capital*. He proposes "a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour power of the community" (CW 35:89). In a communist society, labor power is socially utilized. Therefore, the products also are social products from the beginning. Here since labor is socially employed, products are socially acquired. As aforementioned,

the socialization of labor has progressed under large-scale industry. In a communist society, the working class as a group regains surplus products that capitalists exploited from them; labor power is socially used, and products are socially produced. That the social application of labor power is the cause of the social production of products indicates that social labor can be a basis for the social acquisition of products. In this respect, TL can explain the social acquisition of products in the communist society.[11]

Thus, TL clarifies the mechanism of exploitation in capitalist society and presents the rationale of individual acquisition of products in a socialist society and social acquisition of products in a communist society.

6.4 Theory of Ownership of Means of Production

This section deals with TOMP adopted by Marx. In *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx denounces the Lasallian theory of the right to the whole produce of labor. "Labour is not *the source* of all wealth. . . . And insofar as man from the outset behaves towards nature, the primary source of all instruments and objects of labour, as an owner, treats her as belonging to him, his labour becomes the source of use values, therefore also of wealth" (CW 24:81). The theory of the right to the whole produce of labor presupposes independent producers in simple commodity production. In the case of an independent producer, all the value added is owned by that person. Ricardian socialists cited this fact as a rationale to regain all value added from the capitalists. As aforementioned, Marx also advances the exploitation theory that capitalists exploit unpaid labor from workers. However, Marx asserts that labor is not a source of all wealth but a source of use value only when a human being is the owner of the means of production. Here Marx relies on TOMP, not TL.

Marx's TOMP is indicated in the "Forms Preceding Capitalist Production" in the *Grundrisse*. He analyzes original property that existed before private property appeared.[12] Original property is "abstract and general provisions of precapitalist property, including forms that workers as a means of production associate with other means of production (slavery and serfdom)" (Nakamura 1977, 12). Thus, original property applied to every system from the primitive community to the feudal society before the spread of simple commodity production.[13] The theory of original property clarifies the historical specificity of property based on labor and

demonstrates the possibility of the three stages of human history: original, private, and social property.[14] "The labourer relates to the objective conditions of his labour as to his property; this is the natural unity of labour with its physical prerequisites. Hence the labourer has an objective existence independent of his labour" (CW 28:399). Individuals possess object conditions of labor in the capacity of members of the community. The products obtained from them are, therefore, the members' property. Individuals, whether they work or not, possess the object conditions of labor and the products thereof.[15]

In a society dominated by original property, the ownership of land is grounded on the owner being a community member; the social relation of the community completely determines the ownership. The acquisition of products is derived from the intentional control of the means of production, including land. This situation contrasts with the Lockean theory of private property based on individuals' labor separated from social relations. As the means of production is the positive social property in the society dominated by original property, even those who do not work are the owners of the means of production and are entitled to receive the products. In a personal dimension, labor and survival are separated. However, in a social dimension, due to the low productivity level, labor and survival are not separated and labor for survival is inevitable. The purpose of labor "is the maintenance of the individual proprietor and his family as well as of the community as a whole" (CW 28:399). Labor power must be provided to sustain society as a whole. The amount and content of labor are socially determined. Individuals are embedded in society in the initial stage of the primitive community, and they must provide labor to sustain the community. In a society dominated by original property, labor power is the positive social property.

As labor is indeed social property in the society dominated by original property, labor is the ground for the social acquisition of products. However, labor power becomes social property since the means of production are social property. The ultimate reason for the social acquisition of products is not labor but the ownership of the means of production. Social ownership of the means of production precedes social ownership of the labor power and not vice versa. Social ownership of labor power denotes that individuals who do not directly work are also considered to have indirectly exercised labor power. Therefore, although labor power is socially owned, that does not indicate that direct labor is the basis for acquiring products. TL contends that products are socially

acquired since labor is socially owned. This theory does not hold for original property.

As described earlier, in a capitalist society, the development of productive forces causes the socialization of production, that is, the socialization of the means of production and labor, and exploitation becomes a relationship between classes rather than between individuals. In a communist society that has experienced capitalism, labor is socialized directly. The individuals "are posited as [social] property, as the organic social body in which the individuals reproduce themselves as individuals, but as social individuals" (CW 29:210). In a communist society, with the socialization of labor, labor is indeed performed not by the individual worker but by the working class; the fruits of labor are less attributable to individual workers, and the relation between the fruits of labor and workers loosens further. In a capitalist society, the reproduction of labor power is no longer an individual process but a social process. Which type of concrete useful labor is required depends on consumer preferences. As production expands, the socially formed part of preferences becomes more critical. If this is the case, the individuals who contributed to the production of goods include not only the workers as direct producers but also those involved in the reproduction of labor power and the formation of preferences.

Marx holds that labor must become not only social labor but also universal labor so that human beings can overcome the alienation of labor and enjoy "really free work" (CW 28:530). "Universal labour is all scientific labour, all discovery and all invention." (CW 37:106). Thanks to the development of productive forces, the worker "stands beside the production process, rather than being its main agent" (CW 29:91). Universal labor renders labor less necessary for manufacturing products. Generally, both labor and the means of production contribute to the development of productive forces. However, the development of the means of production by science and technology rather than the development of labor has greatly contributed to the formation of universal labor.

Furthermore, alienated labor is abolished in a communist society. Marx discusses the relation between private property and labor in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844*. The "*subjective essence* of *private property—private property* as activity for itself, as *subject*, as *person*—is *labour*" (CW 3:290). To abolish private property, the Proudhonians advocated "annulling of capital" (CW 3:316). By contrast, Marx maintains that as long as labor forms the subjective essence of private property,

communists should not stop at the "annulling of capital" but advance to the "abolition of . . . labour itself" (CW 5:77). The labor to be eliminated includes alienated labor, that is, wage and private labor.

What about labor in general that is not alienated? For the following reasons, the communist movement also nullifies the labor that is not alienated. In *The German Ideology*, Marx writes, "The proletarians, if they are to assert themselves as individuals, have to abolish the hitherto prevailing condition of their existence (which has, moreover, been that of all society up to then), namely, labour" (CW 5:80). He proposes that proletarians must abolish labor in general because human beings should increase their free time. "The shortening of the working day is its basic prerequisite" (CW 37:807). The purpose of reducing and eradicating labor is for individuals to self-actualize in their free time. Marx consistently pursues the abolition of labor from his early to late time.

For human beings to survive, production is indispensable, and for that, someone must work. However, they can eradicate labor. As aforementioned, in a capitalist society, labor has become universal labor. As a result of increased productivity, the proportion of labor in production has declined. The current capitalists' request for basic income is owing to the present situation that the increase in productivity is so high that the traditional circle of labor, wages, income, and consumer demands has ceased to work. No matter how rich a capitalist may become, the business will not be viable if no one buys the goods. Capitalists attempt to generate consumption demand by directly providing individuals with income whether they work or not. This phenomenon indicates that the system of earning income through labor is hindering the development of productive forces. The development of capitalism is leading to the abolition of labor.

Marx expects that labor becomes "life's prime want" (CW 24:87) in a communist society. In this society, individuals have advanced beyond the stage where they must involuntarily work to help society survive and have become able to maintain society through voluntary activities. Labor has become not a means but an end, and individuals have become more willing to work than in the previous stages. However, if labor becomes a goal, it should be called a free activity rather than labor, according to the aforementioned definition of labor. This free activity is described in *The German Ideology* in the following way: In a communist society, "society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish

in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind" (CW 5:47). Such voluntary activities can no longer be called labor. The voluntary, free economic activities of individuals enable the reproduction of society as a whole. As labor is abolished, it cannot be the basis of the property.

Although Marx does not classify a communist society further, I divide it into two stages: the early stage when labor is vital for the survival of society and the late stage when labor is abolished.[16] As the productive forces increase in a capitalist society, labor power and the means of production become socially applied. This socialization of production in a capitalist society enables the social ownership of the means of production and, hence, the labor power in a communist society. In a society dominated by original property, the means of production were socially owned. Consequently, labor power was socially owned; however, the means of production and labor power became privately owned on account of increased individualization of production through the development of productive forces. In a communist society, by contrast, as a result of the socialization of production accompanied by the development of productive forces, the means of production and labor power are socially owned. In a capitalist society, labor is socialized and generalized, and labor ceases to be the main factor in production. The communist society inherits this result. In the early stage of communism, social labor grounded on positive social ownership of the labor power is crucial for the survival of society and the realization of the needs principle. However, as the productive forces increase in the late stage, labor shrinks, eventually becoming defunct. Although the social ownership of the means of production remains, the social ownership of the labor becomes a dead letter. Labor is no longer the reason for obtaining products since it has already been abolished.

Marx presents two arguments against TL. One argument is the social ownership of labor power. From Locke to Ricardian socialism, TL focuses on individuals who own labor power; by contrast, Marx contends that labor is inherently owned by society. Social ownership of labor power implies that individuals who do not work are formally exercisers of labor. This notion is a denial of TL that holds that only each individual who works directly is entitled to obtain the product. The second argument is the socialization, generalization, and abolition of labor through the development of productive forces. The eternal truth for TL is that the

two major production factors are labor and the means of production. By contrast, Marx foresees a society where the abolition of labor is possible. In Marx's vision, as productive forces continue to increase in the late stage of communist society, labor becomes unnecessary. The voluntary economic activities of individuals fulfill all the members' needs. In this stage, labor in general is abolished, and TL that views labor as the source of ownership becomes entirely unfounded.

6.5 Marxism and Property

Marx employs both TL and TOMP. Is his theoretical system contradictory? Some scholars have discovered a theoretical disconnect between the early and late phases of Marx.[17] In his middle phase, Marx accepted TL when he wrote volume 1 of *Capital*. In his early phase, he deployed TOMP in his early phase and in the alienation theory in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844*. This theory also appeared in his later phase, such as in his description of "the realm of freedom" (CW 37:807) in *Capital* and his scathing comment on the Lasallian theory of the right to the whole produce of labor in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*. Hence, we cannot account for the difference in Marx's attitude by the phases of his life.

According to Friedrich Engels, Ricardian socialists relied on the principle of labor based on one's labor and "fought the bourgeoisie with its own weapons" (CW 36:17). Thus, is Marx's censure of capitalism from the perspective of this principle an attack on the bourgeoisie with the bourgeoisie's weapons? No, that is not true. Marx adopts this principle not because he intends to utilize the bourgeois argument against them but because it functions as a principle in real economic processes in simple commodity production, capitalist society, and socialist society.

I contemplate the relation between TL and TOMP from the viewpoint of historical materialism. The first societies dominated by original property were primitive communities. These societies had only enough productive forces to sustain their members' lives. Due to the small amount of surplus products, the gap between the rich and the poor had not emerged. Members of the community, whether they had worked or not, received products in their capacity as the owners of the means of production. Labor and survival were separated in the personal dimension but not in the social dimension due to low productive forces. Labor power was socially owned, and those who could work had to provide their labor to

society. As labor was always social, the members had no notion of property based on individual labor. In this society, labor power was socially owned since the means of production were socially owned, and it was the positive social ownership of the means of production that ultimately guaranteed the social acquisition of the products.

As agricultural settlement expanded and productive forces increased beyond the primitive community, surplus products continued to be produced and monopolized by some members. As a result, a hierarchy occurred. This situation was the stage of the agricultural community described in "Forms Preceding Capitalist Production." From the three forms of the agricultural community, the secondary forms of slavery and feudalism developed. Although primitive communities and the subsequent forms of society differed in class relations, they shared original property. In the society dominated by original property, from the primitive community to the three forms of agricultural communities, as productive forces developed, production changed from a social to an individual form, and ownership changed from a social to a private form. The development of productive forces destroyed original property.

In the feudal era, the land rent developed from the labor rent to the product rent and the money rent, and as a result, the productive forces gradually increased. The independence of direct producers was also enhanced. At the end of the feudal era, simple commodity production expanded. In this form of production, independent producers who owned the means of production produced the goods by their own labor. All the value added became the producer's property, and the principle of property based on one's labor was established. This situation provided the foundation for the theory of the right to the whole produce of labor and TL. However, throughout the era of primitive accumulation, labor and the means of production were violently separated: individuals without the means of production became workers, and those with them became capitalists. This process led to capitalism.

In a capitalist economy, the socialization of production and the socialization and generalization of labor advanced founded on the development of productive forces. In the late stage of capitalism, productive forces have reached a level that potentially fulfills the basic needs of all members of society. Thus, contrary to original property, labor and survival are partially separated in the social dimension but not in the personal dimension due to private property. In this society, capitalists exploit surplus value from value added, unlike in simple commodity production. However,

this society is similar to simple commodity production in that the direct producer is the owner of labor power. Property based on one's labor is a principle of the market economy, which is the foundation of capitalism. Marx indicates that in the exploitation theory and in the theory of inversion of the law of appropriation, property based on one's labor is converted into property based on the other's labor. Thus, the rationale for the worker's acquisition of the product in this society is TL.

In a socialist society, labor power is socially owned as a result of the social ownership of means of production.[18] Labor power is socially applied, but workers make individual use of their labor on account of their negative social ownership. As products are distributed according to the contribution principle, income inequality remains. The principle of property based on one's labor that has underpinned the capitalist society persists. Marx describes the acquisition of products in this society as the reestablishment of individual property (CW 35:751). The principle of property based on one's labor is actually realized. Nonetheless, it is not a reproduction of an economy where each producer acquires all value added, as in simple commodity production. Certain parts are deducted from all the products for the individuals who cannot work. They acquire the product as the owner of the means of production. The principle of property based on one's labor is partially denied, and the right to the whole produce of labor does not hold. Thus, the rationale for the individual's acquisition of the product in this society is TL and TOMP.

The productive forces of the early stage of communist society require individuals' involuntary labor for their survival and the application of the needs principle. Labor power is positive social property, and individuals must work for the survival of society. The idea of individual ownership of the labor power disappears. Labor and survival are separated in individual dimension but not yet completely separated in social dimension. Labor power is positive social property as it is in a society dominated by original property; however, what guarantees the social acquisition of the products is not the social ownership of the labor power but the social ownership of the means of production. Therefore, only TOMP is effective, and TL is no longer effective at this stage. As productive forces have sufficiently developed in the late stage of communist society, all the members of a community can maintain a basic standard of living through some members' voluntary productive activities. Whether individuals have engaged in economic activities does not affect their survival. Labor, the economic activity aimed at maintaining survival, is abolished. When labor

disappears, the ideas of labor power and its ownership are eliminated, not because the possession of labor power is refused, but because there is no labor power as an object of possession. As labor is abolished, the connection between labor and survival individually and socially dissolves. This situation entirely nullifies the basis for TL. Thus, the rationale for the individual's acquisition of the product in this society is only TOMP.

The relations between social systems and objects of property are indicated in Table 6.1.

Marx deploys TL to oppose capitalism and to envision a socialist society. At the end of the feudal era, simple commodity production expanded to some extent, and independent farmers emerged. They owned the means of production and earned income by selling products produced by their labor, where the principle of property based on one's labor functioned. As the capitalist economy developed from a market economy, this economy at least formally affirms TL. However, Marx asserts that the capitalist economy effectively dismisses TL and a socialist economy realizes TL. Although TL holds that it can explain social property in a communist society, Marx does not employ TL in the explanation of communist society.

Marx adopts TOMP in his analysis of original property and communist society. In a society dominated by original property, members of the community acquired products not by their labor but in the capacity of

Table 6.1 Social systems and types of property

Type of property / Social system	Means of production	Labor power	Product	Rationale for the acquision of product
Priminitive communism	Social (Positive)	Social (Positive)	Social (Positive)	TOMP
Simple commodity production	Private (Direct producer)	Private (Direct producer)	Private (Direct producer)	TL
Capitalist society	Private (Capitalist)	Private (Worker)	Private (Capitalist)	TL
Socialist society	Social (Negative)	Social (Negative)	Social (Negative)	TL and TOMP
Communist society (Early stage)	Social (Positive)	Social (Positive)	Social (Positive)	~~TL~~ and TOMP
Communist society (Late stage)	Social (Positive)	No	Social (Positive)	TOMP

owners of the means of production. Although social ownership of the means of production resulted in the social ownership of labor power, the latter did not provide a reason for the social acquisition of products. In a communist society, the means of production become social property. Founded on the socialization of the means of production and the socialization and generalization of labor in a capitalist society, labor power also becomes social property. However, as further development of productive forces leads to the abolition of labor, labor will no longer be the rationale for the social acquisition of products. Social ownership of the means of production is the only ground for the social acquisition of products. Therefore, Marx does not apply TL in the explanation of communist society. The denial of TL in a communist society is not because Marx wants to abrogate it but because it is a historical reality.

In conclusion, historical materialism can explain the changes in the relation between labor and the means of production by focusing on the correspondence between productive forces, relations of production, and superstructure. Marx's acceptance of TL in some cases and TOMP in the other cases reflects the historical development of society, not a logical contradiction or rhetorical counterargument.

Notes

1. My usage does not wholly follow Pufendorf's definition.
2. Friedrich Engels explains in *Anti-Dühring* that individual ownership extends "to the products, that is, the articles of consumption" (CW 25:121). This theory has long been commonly accepted. Hirata (1969), who represented civic society theory in Japan, insisted that "individual property based on common ownership" (109) also applies to the means of production and continues to exist from a socialist society into a communist society. His theory led to widespread controversy.
3. This dichotomy approximates G. Cohen's (1995) distinction between common ownership and joint ownership.
4. In the Marxist terminology, socialization of means of production includes social ownership of means of production. For example, see Tomizawa (1974, 61). However, this chapter excludes social ownership of means of production from the socialization of means of production to distinguish them. Therefore, this chapter uses

the notion of "socialization" in a narrower sense than the other chapters.

5. Beer writes, "The doctrine that labour is the title to property and the source of value was destined to be made into the main weapon of socialism, although Locke himself used it in a contrary sense, trying to prove the legitimacy and justice of private property" (1919, 56–7).
6. See Ellerman (1992, 54–5). Concerning the theory of the right to the whole produce of labor, see Menger ([1899] 1970).
7. On this point, see G. Cohen (1988, chap. 13).
8. G. Cohen (1995, 146–47) reveals that Marx's exploitation theory is based on the principle of self-ownership. The principle of self-ownership provides "that each person is the morally rightful owner of his own person and powers, and, *consequently*, that each is free (morally speaking) to use those powers as he wishes, provided that he does not deploy them aggressively against others" (67).
9. G. Cohen (1995) calls this principle "socialist proportionality principle" (123).
10. In a socialist society, the principle of labor based on one's labor is not perfectly achieved because the necessary deductions are made before the distribution to individuals.
11. However, as mentioned below, Marx does not apply TL as the basis for the social acquisition of products in the communist society.
12. Watanabe emphasizes the significance of the theory of original property. "Marx's theory of original property attempted to grasp the historical conditions under which nonownership, which was opposite to private ownership, was established by discussing various forms of community where individuals were not propertyless" (2002, 136).
13. Marx labels "the earliest form" (CW 28:400) of original property as "the Asiatic form" (407). However, the description in the opening part of "the earliest form" is that of "a naturally evolved community" (400) before the settled life and corresponds to a primitive community; see Watanabe (2005, 27). Therefore, "the earliest form" includes a primitive community.
14. Historical materialism views the economic systems before capitalism from the perspective of class and divides them into three systems: the primitive community, the slavery system, and the feudal system. By contrast, the theory of original property in the

Grundrisse integrates these systems as the forms preceding capitalism. The *Grundrisse* (CW 28:95) divides human history into three stages; TL corresponds to the second stage, and TOMP corresponds to the first and the third stage.

15. Asami explains the position of producers in the theory of original property. "Marx indicates that in the society dominated by original property, the producer is not defined abstractly as a mere worker, but as a subject that willingly controls the production process as the owner" (1986, 42).
16. This book labels the first phase and the higher phase of communism in the *Critique of Gotha Programme* as a socialist society and a communist society, respectively. Here I further divide the communist society into its early and late stages.
17. Althusser ([1965] 2005, 13) points out that an "epistemological break" existed between early Marx's humanism and late Marx's scientism. Hiromatsu (1969) indicates that Marx's paradigm shifted from the early alienation theory to the late reification theory.
18. The egalitarian liberal society advocated by Rawls ([1971] 1999) allocates labor power not socially but equally.

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CHAPTER 7

Utility

7.1 Introduction

This chapter clarifies the Marxist position on utilitarianism. Most Marxists view utilitarianism as a defense of capitalism. For example, Kiyoshi Miki, a prominent Japanese Marxist philosopher, writes, "Marxism does not argue that all acts should fulfill the material desire and seek personal happiness. Marx fiercely attacks the hedonistic and utilitarian idea and always despises it" ([1927] 1966, 43). With the introduction of Marxism in Japan, materialism was sometimes assumed to be pursuing material pleasures. However, Miki insists that such an understanding is mistaken and that Marxism is entirely different from utilitarianism; moreover, many contemporary Marxists share Miki's view.

Karl Marx is critical of Jeremy Bentham, for instance, calling him the "the arch-Philistine," "that insipid, pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the ordinary bourgeois intelligence of the 19th century," and "a genius in the way of bourgeois stupidity" (CW 35:605). However, it is difficult to confirm that Marx's condemnation against Bentham provides a systematic critique of utilitarianism. Thus, it is problematic to draw simplistic conclusions that Marx completely denies using utilitarianism or that Marxism and utilitarianism are entirely opposed to each other.

From outside Marxism, John Maynard Keynes claims that Marxism and utilitarianism are similar.[1] "It was this escape from Bentham, joined

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with the unsurpassable individualism of our philosophy, which has served to protect the whole lot of us from the final *reductio ad absurdum* of Benthamism known as Marxism" ([1938] 1972], 446). Young Keynes, influenced by the nonhedonism of G. E. Moore ([1903] 1993), asserts that Bentham's hedonism is responsible for the moral corruption of the contemporary society and considers Marxism, based on materialism, an extreme form of Benthamite utilitarianism.

From the New Left's perspective, which is closely related to Marxism, Alasdair MacIntyre, now a leading communitarian, contends that utilitarianism has pervaded traditional Marxists. "Marxists have in the past crippled themselves intellectually by adapting even their Marxism to a determinist, mechanistic mould and consequently to a utilitarian mould" (1960, 235). MacIntyre alleges that Marxism displays a vulnerability to utilitarianism and concludes that Marxism is a version of utilitarianism.[2] Thus, the view that Marxism is the same as utilitarianism is supported not only by anti-Marxists but also by scholars sympathetic to Marxism. The current controversy is thus somewhat complicated.

Bentham's utilitarian principle has operated as a central normative theory in the justification of modern liberalism. Moreover, it has played a prominent role in guiding the social reformations, influencing several socialist movements, and creating the welfare states. Although utilitarianism has been heavily criticized by the deontologists, of which John Rawls ([1971] 1999) is a central theorist, it remains a fundamental normative theory in the justification of modern welfare states.

Consequently, if contemporary socialists attempt to overcome welfare state capitalism while combating the trenchant attacks from neoliberals, a clarification of the socialist stance on utilitarianism becomes crucial. However, as mentioned earlier, the relation between Marxism, which is the largest school of thought in socialism, and utilitarianism is unclear. Therefore, this chapter clarifies how Marxism appreciates utilitarianism. Using only Marx's texts makes it difficult to determine the relation between Marxism and utilitarianism; this chapter adopts a structural approach to analyze his theories.

This chapter is organized in the following manner: Section 7.1 has introduced the theme. Section 7.2 defines utilitarianism. Sectiton 7.3 considers three interpretations concerning Marx's stance on utilitarianism. Section 7.4 introduces the idea of the stages of social development in this study. Finally, section 7.5 presents my understanding of the relation between Marxism and utilitarianism.

7.2 Definition of Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is a term with a broad meaning but has no established common definition. As this chapter explores the relation between Marxism and utilitarianism, establishing a definition of utilitarianism in advance is crucial. Bentham provides a definition, "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government" ([1789] 1970, 11–12). The utilitarian principle aims to maximize the happiness of individuals and society as a whole. Utilitarianism is often mistaken as a form of egoism; however, utilitarianism is a social normative theory that aims to harmonize the interests of individuals and society from the perspective of liberalism and individualism.

Utilitarianism can be divided into the principle of individual acts and that of the policy of the government.[3] This classification creates two versions of utilitarianism: moral utilitarianism, according to which individuals should act in a utilitarian manner, and political utilitarianism, according to which the social systems should be designed and operated on the basis of utilitarianism. Since this chapter examines Marx's evaluation of utilitarianism in opposing capitalism and designing a socialist society, political utilitarianism is the primary concern of this chapter.

Amartya Sen (1979) describes utilitarianism as comprising three features: consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking. Consequentialism judges the rightness or wrongness of an act, rule, or institution from the viewpoint of its consequence. The opposite of consequentialism is deontology, which judges the rightness or wrongness of an act, rule, or institution, grounded on a principle of justice. Regarding the criterion of well-being as a consequence, consequentialism is divided into welfarism based on the subjective standard and nonwelfarism based on the objective standard.[4] Welfarism assumes subjective welfare to be the most notable consequence. As for an index of welfare, sum-ranking adds up the individual's welfare and judges a society in terms of the total amount of welfare. Other indices include the Pareto efficiency and the maximin principle. Nonwelfarism contends that the essential consequence is the formation

of objective states, namely, good health, perfection, or the realization of one's capabilities. Objective list theory is a typical form of nonwelfarism.[5] This chapter views classical utilitarianism as the epitome of utilitarianism.

7.3 Three Interpretations

As mentioned earlier, among Marxists, the relation between Marxism and utilitarianism remains a topic of debate. The utilitarian interpretation holds that Marxism is a form of utilitarianism. The nonutilitarian interpretation argues the opposite and is further divided into two understandings: the deontological and essentialist interpretations. Consequently, there are three interpretations: utilitarian, deontological, and essentialist. The three interpretations debate the relation between Marxism and utilitarianism. In this section, these interpretations are discussed.[6]

The most famous proponent of the utilitarian interpretation is D. P. H. Allen (1973, 1974, 1980). Allen proposes that Marx is a utilitarian.[7] "Their arguments are the kind used by utilitarians although not expressed in utilitarian vocabulary. . . . It is possible, I believe, to show that the arguments which support their moral judgments are utilitarian in all but name" (1973, 189). As mentioned above, utilitarianism comprises three elements. According to Allen, Marxism contains all of them.[8]

Allen asserts that Marx is a consequentialist; textual grounds for this interpretation are as follows: "The Protective system in these days is conservative, while the Free Trade system works destructively. It breaks up old nationalities and carries antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie to the uttermost point. In summary, the Free Trade system hastens the Social Revolution. In this revolutionary sense alone, gentlemen, I am in favor of Free Trade" (CW 6:465). Based on this text, Allen states that "for Marx the essence of morality consists in doing acts of the greatest intrinsic moral value, that is to say, those conducive to building socialism" (1973, 190). Free trade is not a short-term interest but can be a long-term concern of the working class; this perspective is consequentialist.

Concerning welfarism, Marx does mention "higher activity" (CW 29:97), "the artistic, scientific, etc., development of individuals" (CW 29:91). However, according to Allen, Marx's expression, "free development of individualities" (CW 29:91) emphasizes an individual's free choice. "The distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' depends not on . . . a priori theory of human nature and intrinsic moral value, but on

the *decided* preferences of individuals" (Allen 1973, 198). Through this reasoning, Allen insists that Marx supports welfarism.

Bentham advocates "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" ([1789] 1970, 14–15), that is, the maximization of the total sum of all members' welfare in a society, whereas Marx supports the interests of only the working class. Bentham and Marx's opinions may seem contradictory. However, according to Allen, the communist revolution abolishes class itself and enables not only the emancipation of the working class but also "universal human emancipation" (CW 3:280). Marx's revolutionary theory is compatible with sum-ranking since all members within a society can benefit from it (Allen 1973, 189–96). Thus, Allen maintains that Marx's view includes all three elements of utilitarianism and can therefore be deemed to be utilitarian.

George C. Brenkert considers Marx to be a deontologist, resulting in a debate with Allen (Allen 1973, 1976; Brenkert 1975, 1981). The ground for Brenkert's interpretation is a passage in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. "Assume *man* to be *man* and his relationship to the world to be a human one: . . . Every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a *specific expression*, corresponding to the object of your will, of your *real individual* life" (CW 3:326). According to Brenkert, Marx affirms that behavior is right not because it maximizes nonmoral goods but because it is suitable for the human essence. Allen maintains that Marx is a consequentialist on account of his free-trade argument. In response, Brenkert writes, "Marx does indeed appeal to consequences to determine certain judgments. But the nature and context of this appeal is within Marx's mixed deontological theory, which is centered on the notion of treating man as an end in himself, as having human dignity" (1975, 433).Although Brenkert admits that Marx's insistence includes consequentialist logic, he claims that it is nonutilitarian since it realizes a communist society wherein everyone can fully achieve human flourishing.[9] Moreover, Brenkert stresses that consequentialist judgments are subordinate and derivative in Marx's ethical system. Deontology, which believes human beings to be ends, secures the essential status in Marxism. Brenkert thus counters Allen's utilitarian interpretation with a mixed deontological interpretation.[10]

Hillard Aronovitch, who recognized Marx as an essentialist, engaged Allen in a debate (Allen 1980; Aronovitch 1980a, 1980b). According to Aronovitch, Marx's idea of human nature is a form of morality that respects the demand for individuals' full and free development. "We have

at least established the foundation for his theory that the realization of human nature is the criterion of the good" (1980a, 364). Aronovitch interprets the passage, "the full and free development of every individual" (CW 35:588), as the expression of essentialism.[11] He disagrees with Allen's utilitarian interpretation. The grounds for Aronovitch's support for nonutilitarian interpretation are Mrax's condemnation of Bentham in *Capital* and critique of psychology in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844*. "Bentham, because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with each other is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each" (CW 35:186). Hitherto, human psychology "was not conceived in its connection with man's *essential being*, but only in an external relation of utility" (CW 3:302). Marx criticizes utilitarianism that reduces all phenomena to "*vulgar need*" (CW 3:303) and a single principle of utility that aims to maximize utility.[12] Aronovitch refuses the utilitarian interpretation.

7.4 Stages of Social Development

According to Marx's historical materialism, productive forces in each society determine the relations of production, and relations of production determine the superstructure. If productive forces develop, new relations of production correspond to them; accordingly, the new superstructure corresponds to the new relations of production. Historically, capitalism is but one social system among many and is never an eternal social system. Marx expects that a socialist society will develop after a capitalist society. Socialist society will render the means of production socially owned in the dimension of its relations of production but will adopt the contribution principle for the development of productive forces since the influence of capitalism will remain in the superstructure. Further development of productivity results in a communist society. This society annuls labor and employs the needs principle under a steady-state economy. Thus, according to historical materialism, the social system advances through the stages of social development: capitalism, socialism, and communism. The next discussion is on Marx's evaluation of utilitarianism from the viewpoint of the stages of social development.

7.4.1 Capitalist Society

What are the relations between the stage of social development and the three elements of utilitarianism? Concerning capitalist society, Marx welcomes all three elements of utilitarianism: consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking. He blames the "theory of utility" (CW 5:409) for viewing human relationships as the means for the consequence of utility. However, he acknowledges the significance of consequentialism. Capitalism brings with it "THE GREAT CIVILISING INFLUENCE OF CAPITAL" (CW 28:336). The development of capitalism itself creates contradictions and opportunities to overcome them. Thus, Marx admits the progressive qualities of capitalist society from the perspective of consequentialism.

Marx's theory of needs and wealth is concerned with welfarism. Workers' needs are alienated in a capitalist society, which leads to hedonistic reliance on subjective standards. However, as "a system of universal relations, universal requirements and universal capacities" (CW 28:95), capitalist society also stimulates workers' desires and increases production, promoting all forms of their capabilities. For this reason, Marx positively evaluates welfarism.

The productive forces are related to sum-ranking. In a capitalist society, on the basis of private ownership of the means of production, economic crises halt production, and exploitation of surplus value foments inequality in income distribution. However, "the development of the productive forces under capitalist production" (CW 37:263) prepares the material condition of socialism. Socialist society distributes the total amount of welfare more equally. As the total welfare increases, so does the welfare that individuals receive. Sum-ranking is the most effective index for the increase in total welfare. Capitalist society dramatically increases the total sum of welfare. Marx acknowledges this effect as the advantage of capitalism.

Thus, capitalist society contains all three elements of utilitarianism: consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking. Marx positively evaluates these elements of utilitarianism in capitalist society.

7.4.2 Socialist Society

How does Marx evaluate utilitarianism in a socialist society? As mentioned in the next chapter, in this society, nonwelfarist consequentialism becomes dominant; however, the influence of utilitarianism still remains. Marx allows the three constitutive elements of utilitarianism in this society. The aim of the exploitation theory is to realize property based on one's labor because "the rights of property seemed to us to be based on a man's own labour" (CW 35:583). In a socialist society, capitalist exploitation is abolished, and the right to a share of the product is based on one's labor. The contribution principle applied in this society is consequentialist because this principle considers only labor to be a means of obtaining the outcomes of income. From the viewpoint of a communist society, this principle is alienating and should ultimately be nullified. Nevertheless, this principle must be adopted to achieve the productive forces that enable a communist society. A socialist society employs the principle of property based on one's labor to realize a communist society that denies this principle. This logic is consequentialist.

In this society, the contribution principle achieves the principle of property based on one's labor. Still, individuals do not sufficiently experience self-realization in their free time because they are not freed from labor as a means of earning income. Since they improve their subjective welfare through the consumption of goods, welfarism persists in this society, although its influence gradually weakens. Communist society overcomes welfarism and realizes essentialism. However, denying welfarism does not directly lead to essentialism. "With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants" (CW 37:807). For individuals to voluntarily accept essentialism, they must fully expand their subjective desires and be aware of its limitations. Therefore, a socialist society accepts welfarism.

For this society to promote welfarism, it must develop its productive forces to gratify the individual's desires. "The forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase" (CW 37:807). This society applies the contribution principle to increase productive forces and the total sum of welfare. The contribution principle is egalitarian since it implements the principle of property based on one's labor that capitalism violated. However, the promotion of egalitarianism is limited to the extent that it does not infringe on the contribution principle because society may reduce a worker's incentive if it introduces further egalitarianism. This

society respects egalitarianism as long as it does not interfere with the sum-ranking. In this sense, a socialist society approves sum-ranking.

Thus, in a socialist society, utilitarianism, which comprises consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking, gradually loses its influence, but it still remains. Marx tolerates utilitarianism as long as it contributes to the growth of the productive forces in a socialist society.

7.4.3 Communist Society

Marx anticipates that all three elements of utilitarianism—consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking—will lose their significance in the communist society. Consequentialism is applied in precommunist society since it promotes the ultimate realization of a communist society. Accordingly, when communism is realized, consequentialism is no longer required. The communist "society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow" (CW 5:47). In this society, individuals can do whatever they "have a mind" (47) to do without considering the consequences because the negation of consequentialism in social institutions is reflected in individual morality.

In the communist society, the needs principle becomes dominant on the basis of the condition that has been established in a socialist society. The communist society abolishes labor and endorses the qualitative development of well-being, resulting in "the human being *in need of* a totality of human manifestations of life" (CW 3:304). These individuals expand their potential freely; for them, others' existence is essential for self-realization. "The free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (CW 6:506). When individuals freely actualize and externalize their powers and abilities, they encourage others' self-realization and vice versa.[13] Essentialism is possible when individuals stop satisfying subjective welfare in isolation and pursue objective human essence in community. Accordingly, the communist society achieves essentialism, and welfarism ceases to be the fundamental principle.[14]

In this society, if a combination of production and consumption appropriate to human nature is achieved, the increase in production stops because "the satisfaction of requirements" (CW 37:257) halts production. "The growth of the productive power of labour can mean only

that less immediate labour is required to create a larger product" (CW 29:209). As labor productivity is the ratio of production volume to labor input, if productivity increases under a constant production volume, the labor input, which is the denominator, decreases, and eventually labor is abolished (CW 5:80). "In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases" (CW 37:807).[15] This description expresses Marx's vision of a communist society. In precommunist societies, sum-ranking is prioritized to maximize productivity, but in this society, sum-ranking is no longer a priority because the stationary economy emphasizes substance metabolism between nature and humanity.

Thus, in a communist society, all three elements of utilitarianism—consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking—lose their status as the fundamental normative principles of society.

7.5 Marxism and Utility

The aforementioned consideration provides the following explanation for the relation between Marxism and utilitarianism. Marxist theory of social development is based on historical materialism. Marxist evaluation of utilitarianism is not constant and varies with the developmental stages of the relations of production. Utilitarianism is an ethical norm and belongs to the superstructure. According to historical materialism, the capitalist relations of production correspond to its productive forces, and a capitalist superstructure corresponds to its relations of production. In a capitalist society, utilitarianism that belongs to the superstructure plays an effective role in increasing the productive forces and diversifies individual desires through welfare enhancement. Marxism praises the progressive aspects of utilitarianism in the capitalist society.

The abolition of capitalist society does not imply that the individuals' utilitarian ideas vanish. Therefore, Marx sets a socialist society between a capitalist and a communist society. In a socialist society, utilitarianism, which was dominant in a capitalist society, still survives. Socialist society allows utilitarianism since it increases social welfare by increasing productive forces. However, in this society where the means of production are socially owned, and the conditions that enable individuals to develop their humanity are created, they gradually recognize that utilitarianism

has filled its role. Ultimately, nonwelfarist consequentialism becomes dominant in this society. After experiencing this stage, individuals will start to build a communist society wherein they freely pursue their self-realization in community. In a communist society, utilitarianism has become unneeded, and essentialism becomes dominant. Historical materialism can explain the development from a capitalist society that produced utilitarianism to a socialist society that utilizes it and the communist society that transcends it. Thus, the question of how Marx positions utilitarianism has been answered.[16]

Finally, concerning the relations between the three interpretations and my conclusion, utilitarian and deontological interpretations only pay attention to capitalism and socialism, and essentialism is related only to communism. None of the interpretations explains its validity concerning all the social systems. My proposal, however, provides a consistent explanation. Marxists accept utilitarianism and deontology in capitalist and socialist societies, but they do not recognize both of them as the primary principle in communist society, thereby approving essentialism as a fundamental structural principle.

Notes

1. Other than Keynes, Talcott Parsons (1937), from outside Marxism, finds a utilitarian tendency in Marx's theory. According to Parsons, utilitarianism comprises four features: atomism, rationality, empiricism, and the randomness of ends; Marx combines British utilitarianism with Hegelian dialectical evolution theory.
2. MacIntyre's description of utilitarianism includes all three elements of utilitarianism, which are discussed later in this chapter.
3. Other classifications are, for example, act and rule utilitarianism and direct and indirect utilitarianism. See Kymlicka ([1990] 2002, chap. 2). I do not deal with these classifications anymore because they do not influence the argument in this chapter.
4. This chapter understands well-being as a concept that includes both subjective and objective standards. For the subjective and objective standards of well-being, see Scanlon (1975, 656–58).
5. For the classification of welfarism, see Parfit (1984, 493–502).
6. The discussion in this section relies heavily on Peffer (1990, chaps. 2–3).

7. Another significant advocate of the utilitarian interpretation is William Shaw. After studying Marx's historical materialism (Shaw 1978), Shaw (1981, 1988) proposed that Marx's normative theory should be understood as a moral theory almost equal to the ideal rule utilitarianism of Richard Brandt (1979).
8. Allen does not use the concepts of consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking but contends in substance that Marx's view contains these elements.
9. Vogel (1994) also criticizes the interpretation that regards Marx as a consequentialist and considers Marx to be an antimoralist. In my opinion, however, Marx is a moral realist.
10. For mixed deontological theory, see Frankena ([1963] 1973).
11. Nielsen (1973, 26) asserts that the notion of Aristotelian human nature, with its teleological character, is quite arbitrary unless it assumes an absolute being such as God. Aronovitch (1980a, 364–69) objects that Marx's notion of human nature employs ability, not function or purpose, and recognizes the realization of human nature as the exercise of human capacity. In this respect, Aronovitch's perfectionism is the nonconsequentialist type.
12. See Melanson (1999).
13. Elster describes Marx's concept of self-realization as "the full and free actualization and externalization of the powers and the abilities of the individual" (1986, 101).
14. Heller (1976) focuses on Marx's opinion: "Only a revolution of radical needs can be a radical revolution" (CW 3:183). She insists that when people's desires are entirely alienated, only then will the radical desires for social change be generated (Kap. 4). I cannot understand why those whose desires are entirely alienated seek radical desires.
15. Some ecologists brand Marxism as productivism since they equate an increase in the productive forces with an increase in the production volume. However, productive forces can be recognized as productivity. An increase in productivity is compatible with ecology because it indicates a decrease in the amount of resources and labor input when the production volume is constant.
16. John Stuart Mill's defense of utilitarianism is based on the qualitative separation of pleasures. "Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference

to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties" ([1861] 1969, 211). According to Mill, individuals who have had "their opportunities of experience" (214) of physical and mental pleasures will necessarily choose the latter since they recognize its superiority through their experience. "There should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when anyone thinks fit to try them" ([1859] 1977, 260–61). Mill supposes that people can improve their lives only through their individual experiences of living. By contrast, Marx anticipates that human essence can be attained only through historical processes. Mill and Marx agree that individuals must experience utilitarianism to overcome it. However, although Mill assumes overcoming utilitarianism to be a personal process, Marx acknowledges it as a historical process of social development.

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CHAPTER 8

Essence

8.1 Introduction

Thus far, normative ethics has been divided into two types, namely, deontology and utilitarianism, for which the prominent advocates are Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham, respectively. After the 1980s, virtue ethics appeared as a third type, which derived from Aristotle's philosophy and argued that individuals should acquire virtue as the essential quality. Perfectionism also originates from Aristotle's thought and respects the perfection of human capability; it differs from deontology and utilitarianism.[1] Perfectionism includes broad and narrow versions; the former values some development of capacities or achievement of excellence regardless of human nature, and the latter values only the perfection of human nature.[2] Although virtue ethics and perfectionism slightly differ in the concept of essence, both regard it as the most crucial for ethics; thus, this chapter describes the third ethics as essentialism.[3]

This chapter explores the positioning of the Marxist concept of essence from the perspective of the three ethics. Section 8.1 has introduced the theme, and section 8.2 reviews the two types of ethics that have been dominant, namely, deontology and utilitarianism. Section 8.3 examines nonwelfarist consequentialism, which lies between utilitarianism and essentialism. Section 8.4 investigates the relation between Marxism and

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essentialism. Section 8.5 clarifies the four characteristics of the Marxist concept of essence, and section 8.6 concludes the chapter.

8.2 Two Types of Ethics

8.2.1 Deontology

Deontological ethics argues that a judgment of whether an action is right or wrong should be based on a principle of justice, which is independent of its consequence. "A deontologist contends that it is possible for an action or rule of action to be the morally right or obligatory one even if it does not promote the greatest possible balance of good over evil for self, society, or universe" (Frankena [1963] 1973, 15). The moral philosophy of Kant ([1785] 1996) is typical of this ethics. As for the relation between Marxism and deontology, the following points can be enumerated.

First, justice is often applied as a slogan by leftists supporting the weak. Some Marxists take the deontological viewpoint that justice is a core idea for them.[4] Exploitation theory occupies the central critique of capitalism, and this argument relies on the idea of justice in that capitalism unjustly exploits workers. Furthermore, socialism is fairer than capitalism because socialism abolishes the exploitation due to differences in ownership of the means of production. Justice thus has a progressive role both in capitalist and in socialist societies.

Second, justice is the justification for the parties' positions in circumstances in which their interests conflict with each other; therefore, what is truly just cannot be judged in this situation. Although justice as fairness, as John Rawls ([1971] 1999) advocates, is the mainstream, Robert Nozick (1974) proposes justice in holdings. Whose position is truly just cannot be judged if the only standard is justice. Notably, the law is the institutionalization of the dominant class's interest. "Between equal rights force decides" (CW 35:243). Thus, what is philosophically just is not determined.

Third, according to historical materialism, justice changes with the times. In a feudalist society, an individual of a lower class must obey an individual of a higher class; in a capitalist society, justice is that everyone is formally equal under the law. Deontology can prescribe that justice of each social system should be observed but cannot prescribe that we should follow transhistorical justice.

Fourth, justice is possible and necessary under "the circumstances of justice" (Rawls [1971] 1999, 109–12), which is composed of modest scarcity and tolerance. Before a communist society, justice can exist; however, in this society where the productive forces have sufficiently developed, and class conflicts have vanished, the circumstances of justice cannot completely hold. Although this society will undergo minor conflicts between individuals, these conflicts will not necessarily require justice. Even if categories such as justice, law, and rights remain in a communist society, these categories will lose the status of the primary principle in the society.

Fifth, the Marxist critique of capitalism comprises three types. The first type is an internal critique from the viewpoint of simple commodity production as the basis of capitalist society. The second type is an external critique from the standard of justice in a socialist society. The third type is another external critique of justice from communist society. The internal critique and the external critique from socialist society overlap. The standard of justice formed in capitalist society remains effective in a socialist society. This multilayered structure of the critique enables the principle of justice to play a crucial role as a norm of social change. Marxists employ deontology when they criticize a capitalist society and envisage a socialist society; however, they oppose placing justice as a primary principle in a communist society. If we agree with the logic of historical materialism, the position of justice in society must change. Thus, the Marxist attitude toward justice is multifaceted but never contradictory.

8.2.2 Utilitarianism

Karl Marx branded Bentham's ([1789] 1970) utilitarianism as a theory defending capitalism, and Marxists have considered themselves to be the utilitarian's opponents. However, John Maynard Keynes ([1938] 1972) describes Marxism as an extreme case of utilitarianism, and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) accuses Marxists of being imbued with utilitarian ideas. Historically, utilitarians have contributed to social reforms. In the United Kingdom, early socialists such as Robert Owen ([1813–16] 1991) attempted progressive social experiments from a utilitarian perspective. After the Second World War, social democratic governments built the welfare states. Hence, characterizing utilitarianism as a mere justification of capitalism is misleading.

Historical materialism holds that the superstructure corresponds to the economic bases: capitalism, socialism, and communism. Marx's position on utilitarianism in each historical stage is illustrated below. In a capitalist society, all social relations are dictated by utilitarianism, which Marx criticizes as an alienating idea. However, utilitarianism promotes the dramatic development of productive forces and encourages "THE GREAT CIVILISING INFLUENCE OF CAPITAL" (CW 28:336). He praises these progressive aspects of utilitarianism. In a socialist society, utilitarianism, which occupied a dominant position in capitalism, remains influential and aims to improve social welfare by increasing the productive forces. Marx respects utilitarianism as long as it contributes to this aim. In a communist society where productivity is fully developed, and a material standard of living is guaranteed, maximizing the sum of welfare is not the primary goal. Utilitarianism, therefore, loses its role. Marx approves of utilitarianism in capitalist and socialist societies but stops its appliance in a communist society. Thus, his valuation of utilitarianism changes according to the development of the social system.

8.2.3 Two Types of Ethics

According to historical materialism, ethics is part of the superstructure, and it varies as the relations of production change. In a capitalist society, utilitarianism and deontology are adequate ethical theories because liberalism presupposes that individuals' sole purpose is to improve their welfare, which will inevitably collide with others' pursuit of the same objectives. Utilitarianism addresses the improvement of individual and social welfare, and deontology addresses conflicts of interest between individuals. From the Marxist perspective, such liberal ethics will ultimately fail, but Marxists criticize capitalism by using these ethics as these doctrines dominate capitalism. Moreover, even in a socialist society, utilitarianism and deontology are employed since the superstructure of such a society is "still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society" (CW 24:85). In a communist society, both utilitarianism and deontology cease to be influential. Individuals accomplish their human essence not because essentialist morality dictates them to do so but because they desire to do so. Morality has lost its normative authority in this society. Essentialism is not an imperative prescription that individuals must achieve their human essence but a description of individuals' free pursuit of human essence.

8.3 Nonwelfarist Consequentialism

8.3.1 Definition

Some moral philosophers have argued that virtue ethics and perfectionism belong to nonwelfarist consequentialism.[5] Nonwelfarist consequentialism differs from utilitarianism in that it adopts objectivism, not hedonism.[6] According to nonwelfarist consequentialism, virtue ethics and perfectionism are ethics arguing that individuals should act such that consequences such as virtue and perfection are produced.

Essentialism concentrates on subjects' virtue or perfection and hence, is the third ethics. Nonwelfarist consequentialism differs from essentialism since it is merely one version of consequentialism. Even when an individual behaves to cause a consequence with essential value, he or she does not achieve essentialism because the behavior plays only an instrumental role in causing the consequence. If the second ethics is consequentialism, nonwelfarist consequentialism belongs to the second ethics; if the second ethics is utilitarianism, nonwelfarist consequentialism is in the middle between the second and the third ethics.[7] Thus, nonwelfarist consequentialism is not the third ethics.

8.3.2 Marxism and Nonwelfarist Consequentialism

Richard Miller highlights the similarities between Aristotle and Marx, arguing that both the thinkers are nonutilitarian consequentialists. "As against rights-based morality, both judge institutions by the kinds of lives they promote and judge proposed rights by assessing the consequences, of employing them in institutions. At the same time, their general conceptions of the kinds of lives worth promoting are highly similar, and emphatically opposed to utilitarianism. In short, as political philosophers they are non-utilitarian consequentialists" (1981, 323). According to Miller, Marx is neither a deontologist nor a utilitarian. Marx judges a social system by the consequence of how much it advances people's well-being.[8] Although Marx is a consequentialist who evaluates a social system by the consequence of well-being, he is not a utilitarian because he does not reduce well-being to subjective welfare. Miller equates nonutilitarian consequentialism with perfectionism and substantially regards Marx as a perfectionist in this sense. I refer to Miller's nonutilitarian consequentialism as nonwelfarist consequentialism.[9]

However, according to my definition, nonwelfarist consequentialism is not perfectionism; Marx is a perfectionist, but not a nonwelfarist consequentialist. The conclusion on the relation between utilitarianism and Marxism can be applied to the relation between nonwelfarist consequentialism and Marxism. Nonwelfarist consequentialism and utilitarianism share consequentialism. A communist society that abolishes consequentialism also abolishes nonwelfarist consequentialism. However, when comparing nonwelfarist consequentialism with utilitarianism, the former adopts objectivism about the good and is more distant from a capitalist society and closer to a communist society than utilitarianism that applies subjectivism about the good.

Therefore, nonwelfarist consequentialism becomes dominant in a socialist society between a capitalist and a communist society. In a socialist society where the means of production are socially owned, the individuals are liberated from the condition of being divided by competition and gain opportunities for self-realization through cooperation among the members; accordingly, although the influence of utilitarianism still remains, the individuals can gradually overcome the subjectivism about the good and approach objectivism. However, as its task, a socialist society continues to promote the development of the productive forces. Consequentialist ethics persists because the superstructure of this society continues to be dominated by capitalism. Hence, nonwelfarist consequentialism is the most suitable principle for a socialist society.

8.4 Social Systems and Ethics

Deontology and utilitarianism are indispensable ethics for a capitalist society, and Marxists apply these ethics as effective tools for criticizing this society. Nonwelfarist consequentialism is adopted in a socialist society since it is objectivist about well-being and more progressive than utilitarianism. However, these ethics lose their status as a primary principle in a communist society; essentialism prevails in this society where human beings are liberated from alienation as individuals can freely realize their essential value in this society.[10]

As for the relation between Marxism and perfectionism, Steven Lukes argues that Marx's critique of capitalism is based on an idea that is "perfectionist, committed to an Aristotelian realization of distinctively human

potentialities and excellences" (1985, 87).[11] According to Marx, the individuals under capitalism live in a situation of alienation (CW 3:270–82). He foresees a communist society where individuals overcome alienation and realize "an all-round development of individuals" (CW 5:439). In this society, human perfection is one of the main goals. Regarding the relation between Marxism and virtue ethics, although MacIntyre (1981) criticizes Marx's disinterest in morality, according to Blackledge (2008), Marx's theory of social change includes a type of virtue ethics.[12] Workers in a capitalist society not only struggle against capitalism but also against the egoism born of their circumstances of competition, and they attain the virtue of solidarity through proletarian practices.[13]

Based on this observation, I explain the relations between social system and the three types of ethics. Marxists adopt deontology and utilitarianism as a means of critiquing capitalist society and employ nonwelfarist consequentialism as a means of constructing a socialist society. In a communist society, essentialism prevails. Table 8.1 presents the level of validity of each type of ethics in the three societies.

Table 8.1 Social systems and ethics

Ethics \ Social system	Capitalism	Socialism	Communism
Deontology	+++++	++	+
Utilitarianism	+++++	++	+
Nonwelfarist consequentialism	+	+++++	+
Essentialism	+	++	+++++

The number of "+" denotes the degree of validity of each ethics in the respective societies.

8.5 Problematic Elements of Essentialism

Essentialism has many versions. Some are progressive, and others are conservative. Then, what type of essentialism is predominant in a communist society? In what follows, I consider four problematic elements of essentialism: relativism, moralism, elitism, and paternalism.

8.5.1 Relativism

The relativism mainly discussed in this subsection is moral relativism, which argues that individuals disagree about what essential value is. The opposite of relativism is universalism, according to which essential values apply to any individual and society. Virtue ethics and perfectionism differ in the stance toward relativism. In essentialism, virtue ethics is more relativistic than perfectionism; in perfectionism, the broad type is more relativistic than the narrow type because the difference in human nature among individuals is smaller than that of their capacities or excellence.

As for virtue ethics, in ancient Greece, the cardinal virtues were a quartette of prudence, justice, temperance, and courage. In medieval Europe, where Christianity prevailed, faith, hope, and charity were added to the list. In China, the five Confucian virtues were benevolence, righteousness, courtesy, wisdom, and sincerity. Thus, each society has socially constructed different virtues, and in virtue ethics, relativism is more predominant than universalism. MacIntyre writes the following about the relativity of morality: "Hence, what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity" (1981, 220). According to him, morality is determined by the idea of the good, which is a characteristic of the community where an individual was born; individuals treat this morality as the first standard of any value judgment when evaluating various views.[14] Thus, virtue ethics has a strong tendency to be relativistic.

As previously mentioned, perfectionism has two types, and broad type is more relativistic than narrow type since the difference in human nature among individuals is smaller than that in their capacities or excellence. An example of the contrast between these two types of perfectionism is the debate between Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen on human capability.

Nussbaum (2006, 76–78) proposes a list of 10 central capabilities, which possess universality based on human nature. By contrast, Sen avoids specifying a list of capabilities on account of "a legitimate recognition of the role of politics and social choice" (2003, 169). Although Sen is as much a perfectionist as Nussbaum in that he believes that all individuals should have access to the resources required to develop their capabilities, Nussbaum, with her concrete list, is less relativistic than Sen, who refuses to establish a list.

The Marxist-Leninist countries such as the Soviet Union have inculcated proletarian morality on the people to confront Western bourgeois morality. They are relativists since they suppose that morality differs depending on the economic structure. They also believe in the conflict in morality between the Eastern and Western blocs and cannot find any continuity between them. Does Marxism necessarily lead to relativism? Historical materialism denies the existence of morality that prevails in any age and society. Marx writes against the view that transhistorical rights exist. "Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development which this determines" (CW 24:87). This is because each society has its corresponding morality, and there is no morality that prevails transhistorically in any society. Marx does not acknowledge transhistorical morality. His idea that different social systems differ in morality is historical relativism.

However, historical relativism differs from moral relativism, which argues that essential value is different among individuals. According to historical materialism, history develops in any country or region in the order of a primitive community, ancient slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism. Each society has the morality that corresponds to it. In this sense, historical relativism is substantially universalism. Particularly after capitalism, thanks to the universality of capitalism, Marxists expect the tendency of universalism to increase. As a communist society is envisioned based on the achievements of universal capitalism, "each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism" (CW 5:49). Marxism does not adopt moral relativism but universalism because the latter predicts that any advanced society will become a communist society and applies essentialism that corresponds to this society.

8.5.2 Moralism

Moralism argues that morality should be respected more than other fields, such as the economy, and attempts to change society by instilling essential values into the people. When comparing deontology with utilitarianism, the former has a stronger tendency toward moralism than the latter since it allocates heavier weight to obligation than happiness. When comparing essentialism with deontology, the former has a stronger tendency toward moralism as essentialism addresses how human beings live and deontology addresses the rule of a human act. Between virtue ethics and perfectionism, the former is more receptive to moralism than the latter because the former and the latter emphasize character and capacities, respectively.

In Marxist-Leninist countries, "Marxist ethics" has been dominant. "The moral code of the builders of communism formulated in the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union contains the communist criteria of moral concepts including the categories of good, duty, conscience, honor and happiness" (Archangelski 1965, 7). The political leaders have employed moralism, by which they attempt to control the populace. Such an ideological policy would not be acceptable in the communist society that Marx foresaw. According to historical materialism, morality is one part of the superstructure, which corresponds to economic structure. Even when a representative of the society attempts to imbue the people with essential values, the people will not accept the values that do not correspond to the economic structure.

By contrast, if the economic structure reaches a stage of communism, the value corresponding to it will naturally infiltrate the society. This result occurs not because the representatives of the society promulgate the essential values through enlightenment activities but because the consciousness that belongs to the superstructure necessarily becomes essentialist. This society where labor becomes "life's prime want" (CW 24:87) does not impose essential values on individuals. Essentialism is predominant in a descriptive sense and does not have a normative influence. Marxists' task is not to encourage moral movement but to change the economic structure of the society. Therefore, Marxists do not adopt moralism.

8.5.3 Elitism

Elitism is the idea that elites should control society. The standards for determining the elite are diverse and encompass status, class, race, intelligence, and talent. Elitism sometimes includes the idea that the elite should receive preferential treatment. Although elitism is deeply connected to paternalism, these ideas differ from each other. Although paternalism focuses on the controlled individuals, elitism highlights the individual who controls the public. Paternalism does not always presuppose elitism. The leaders who are democratically elected can apply paternalistic policies. Inversely, elitism does not always cause paternalism. A small number of elite leaders may allow individual discretion in all respects.

What type of relation does essentialism have with elitism? Plato ([n.d.] 1991), who advocates aristocracy, and Friedrich Nietzsche ([1873–76] 1997), who praises superman, combines essentialism with elitism.[15] They argue that the public cannot pursue essential values such as virtue or excellence and that only the elites can; thus, essentialism inevitably results in elitism.

In Marxist-Leninist countries, communist elites have benefited from privileges in all aspects of life. In *What Is To Be Done?*, Vladimir Lenin ([1902] 1961) refers to the communist party as a vanguard. Does vanguardism necessarily give rise to elitism? The origin of vanguardism can be observed in Marx. "The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement" (CW 6:497). According to Marx, of the various types of labor movements and parties, the communists are the most advanced since only they know the laws of the movement of capitalism and understand the necessity of transforming the system. Vanguardism implies communists' self-awareness that they should struggle at the forefront of class struggle. Vanguardism transformed into elitism because the communists who had gained power perpetuated dictatorship and forced their self-definition as the vanguard onto the people that they led.

However, the case of the Marxist-Leninist countries does not prove that Marxist essentialism causes elitism.[16] The core idea of essentialism is

that not only some qualified individuals can achieve essential values but that anyone can pursue them and be guaranteed such an opportunity. A communist society wherein multiple political parties compete for people's support does not allow the emergence of elitism. Although this society realizes essentialism, it does not cause elitism. First, a communist society is a classless society where inequality stemming from the differences in ability and talent has been eliminated; therefore, those differences among individuals do not lead to a division between the elites and the public. Second, in a communist society, as individuals assume that promoting others' perfection results in their perfection, the notion that only some people would achieve perfection and become elites does not hold. Third, in this society, the situation of alienation in which individuals are mutually isolated and cannot communicate with each other has been overcome; the individuals freely communicate their intentions to each other. This situation renders it unnecessary and impossible to find a method by which elites lead the society unilaterally. Essentialism in a communist society does not result in elitism and enables individuals to form a collective will.

8.5.4 Paternalism

Paternalism is the idea that individuals who cannot rationally judge their true interests should follow the instructions of those who can, either independent of or against the former's will. Liberalism denies paternalism. For example, John Stuart Mill criticizes paternalism in his justification for the harm principle. "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant" ([1859] 1977, 223).[17] As liberalism rejects the existence of objective well-being and accepts subjectivism about well-being, it need not exert paternalistic force on the public.

What is the relation between essentialism and paternalism? According to liberalism, essentialism leads to paternalism since it adopts objectivism about well-being. If individuals unskilled in rational judgment are allowed to act freely, their objective interests cannot be realized; therefore, the individuals who can rationally judge must decide what those who cannot rationally judge should do.[18] Thus, liberalism claims that essentialism and paternalism are inseparable.

In Marxist-Leninist countries, paternalism has been observed. Lenin supported paternalism in which the theoretical leaders instill Bolshevism

into the members of the society (Kleinig 1983, 173–74). Additionally, socialists have supported materialism, which argues that individuals' social existence determines their consciousness, and have employed objectivism about well-being. An early socialist, Robert Owen ([1813–16] 1991), emphasized the influence of the environment and education on human beings and followed paternalistic methods.

However, objectivism about well-being does not necessarily cause paternalism. Marx's socialism originates from his opposition to Owen's paternalism (Smith 2006, 112). Marx argues against old materialism as follows: "The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated" (CW 5:4). According to Marx's materialism, individuals can change their circumstances and educate the educators. Although Marxists cannot espouse subjectivism about well-being as long as they support essentialism, they do not embrace paternalism, in which an authority imposes on people a certain way of life from the top down. In a communist society, members of the community form the common good through serious debates. Even individuals with no special ability to recognize objective well-being can do so if they frequently cooperate with one another and engage in deliberations. Thus, members participating in the discussions voluntarily accept the objective well-being.

8.6 Marxism and Essence

This chapter has investigated the relation between Marxism and essentialism and divided contemporary ethics into the following types: deontology, utilitarianism, nonwelfarist consequentialism, and essentialism. Deontology and utilitarianism are the main ethics in a capitalist society; Marxists employ these ethics to criticize capitalism. Although nonwelfarist consequentialism is close to essentialism, which denies hedonism, it has not overcome consequentialism, and hence, is influential in a socialist society. The ethics prevalent in a communist society is essentialism, which is a description of the individuals' acts in this society and does not have prescriptive force.

However, Marxists do not accept the following four elements of essentialism: relativism, moralism, elitism, and paternalism. Although Marxists adopt historical relativism about morality in general, they are universalists

because they expect that essentialism will be predominant in a communist society in any region or culture; thus they do not adopt moral relativism. According to historical materialism, the economic structure determines the superstructure that includes morality; therefore, Marxists do not espouse moralism, which attempts to change society by morality. As this society respects cooperation and solidarity, it denies the rule by elites who lead the masses even if they possess particular capacities to pursue perfection or virtue; hence, elitism will not hold. Essentialism does not presuppose that all individuals possess the full capacity to judge anything rationally; however, the members of a communist society do not accept paternalism and voluntarily accept the objective well-being through their deliberative discussions.

Essentialism may sometimes include the following characteristics: relativism, moralism, elitism, and paternalism. The existing Marxist-Leninist countries that have treated essentialism as national morality have stuck to these four characteristics. However, Marxist communist society denies all of these characteristics. Essentialism in a communist society has such a proviso and is unique in this sense.

Notes

1. For the distinction between perfection and excellence, see Scheers (2005, 63–65).
2. See Hurka (1993, 3–4).
3. Sano's (2010) version of essentialism combines virtue ethics and perfectionism.
4. For example, see Peffer (1990).
5. On the consequentialist understanding of virtue ethics, see Driver (2001). For the viewpoint that assumes perfectionism to be consequentialism, see Hurka (1993).
6. Objective consequentialism, such as the ideal utilitarianism of Moore ([1903] 1993), is sometimes included in the definition of utilitarianism.
7. According to Hursthouse (1999, 1), normative ethics was dominated by two theories: deontology and utilitarianism. However, according to Crisp and Slote, the second ethics that conflicts with deontology is "utilitarianism or 'consequentialism'" (1997, 1).
8. The word "well-being" refers not only to the subjective but also to the objective condition of human being.

9. This is because the term nonutilitarian consequentialism can be misunderstood as including the Pareto principle, which is nonutilitarian but consequentialist. See chapter 2.
10. Meikle (1985) and Wilde 1998) recognize Marx as an essentialist.
11. In addition to Lukes, see Hurka (1993, 3–4) and Kymlicka ([1990] 2002, 190–95).
12. See Brenkert (1983).
13. Care ethics, which has recently attracted much attention, is often included in virtue ethics. For the relation between care ethics and Marxism, see Bubeck (1995).
14. George (1989) and Wachbroit (1985) assert that MacIntyre's ethics are relativistic.
15. See Annas (2006) and Driver (2001).
16. See Svensson (2008) and Wall (1998, 15–17; [2007] 2017).
17. Recently, however, libertarian paternalism has been observed. See Sunstein (2014). This phenomenon demonstrates that liberalism can no longer maintain its consistency.
18. Conly (2013) opposes perfectionism from the viewpoint of coercive paternalism.

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CHAPTER 9

Community

9.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to clarify the meaning of community, one of the basic values of Marxist communism. According to historical materialism, productive forces and the economic structure based on them determine the character of the social system. Notably, the ownership form of the means of production determines the economic structure. Usually, communism is defined as an economic system wherein the means of production are socially owned, and production is jointly conducted.[1]

However, this chapter considers communism that pursues not only the social ownership of means of production but society based on community of individuals.[2] The essence of a human being is "the ensemble of the social relations" (CW 5:7). Human nature is not demonstrated in an isolated individual but only in a social connection. If communism aims to perfect human beings, community is indispensable. "*Human nature* is the *true community* of men" (CW 3:204). Community is human life and human nature. As discussed in chapter 4, although regulative liberty is prior to personal liberty in time, personal liberty is superior to regulative liberty in value. The relation between the social ownership of the means of production and community is similar to the relation between the two liberties. In terms of time, the social ownership of the means of production is prior to community, but in terms of value, community is superior

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to the social ownership of the means of production. Thus, communism in this chapter comprises not only the social ownership of means of production but also the pursuit of a society based on community.

Section 9.1 has introduced the theme. Section 9.2 explains the definition of communitarianism that emphasizes the concept of community. Then, section 9.3 examines nine elements of the Marxist concept of community. Finally, based on this consideration, section 9.4 elucidates the significance of community in communism.

9.2 Communitarianism

Modern communitarianism, which has emerged since the 1980s, values community, and its advocates comprise Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. Modern communitarianism is simply referred to as communitarianism for convenience. What Karl Marx advocated was communism, which idealized a society based on community. Both communitarianism and communism respect the idea of community. The concept of communitarianism originally indicated the movement in which early socialists built the cooperative colony in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. At that time, communitarianism and communism were almost synonymous. Some of the exponents, such as MacIntyre and Taylor, have been deeply committed as Marxists to the New Left Movement in the United Kingdom; others, such as Walzer, have self-identified as democratic socialists.[3] Thus, communitarianism and Marxism have a close relation.[4]

Since the 1980s, communitarians have been engaged in a liberal-communitarian debate, the main theme of which is the individualistic view of liberalism. However, Marxism has energetically addressed the individualistic character of liberalism much earlier. Nevertheless, after the collapse of most of the existing socialist countries in the late 1980s, the biggest rival of liberalism was considered to be communitarianism, and Marxism was excluded from the discussion. Communists emphasize the social ownership of the means of production, whereas communitarians question communists' economistic tendencies and underscore the values of the community. Communitarians distinguish themselves from Marxist communists. Since the issues that communitarians raised are significant to establish the concept of community in communism, this chapter explores the characteristics of the Marxist community while referring to communitarian criticism of communism.[5]

9.3 Nine Elements of Marxist Concept of Community

This section investigates nine elements of the Marxist concept of community: moralism, perfectionism, liberalism, individualism, conservatism, localism, particularism, democracy, and radicalism.

9.3.1 Moralism

In this chapter, moralism indicates attaching more importance to morality than to other fields such as the economy.[6] Marx addresses capitalism mainly from an economic perspective. The future communist society he foresees is also an economic community based on the socialization of means of production. Marx employs historical materialism and emphasizes the influence of the economic structure.

Walzer states, "It is one of the major failures of Marxism that neither Marx himself nor any of his chief intellectual followers ever worked out a moral and political theory of Marxism" (1987, 56). According to Walzer, Marxists concentrate on capitalist economic structure but do not address their moral or political principles. However, in my view, although Marxists focus on economic issues, they are not indifferent to moral issues. Marxists oppose capitalist society and pursue communist society to eliminate human alienation. The concept of alienation concerns not only the economic dimension but also the moral dimension, and Marxists have never neglected the moral issue.[7]

Why do Marxists not question capitalist morality while respecting moral issues? That is because of their historical materialism. The economic structure of society defines the moral consciousness of individuals. Therefore, to abolish a capitalist society, what should be changed is its economic structure, not its morality. According to MacIntyre, "Marxists have always fallen back into relatively straightforward versions of Kantianism or utilitarianism" (1981, 261). As MacIntyre indicates, Marxists have opposed capitalism by adopting deontology or utilitarianism since these ethics belong to the superstructure that inevitably emerges on the capitalistic economic structure. The only way to convince individuals living in this society of Marxist censure of capitalism is to apply the morality accepted in this society. Marxists set and promote goals consistent with deontology or utilitarianism, such as improving workers' rights or welfare. Marxists

are interested in moral issues, but instead of directly condemning moral principles in the capitalist society, they attempt to overcome these principles by changing the capitalist economic structure. Thus, Marxists do not employ moralism.

9.3.2 Perfectionism

According to Thomas Hurka (1993, 3–4), there are two views of ethical perfectionism. Broad perfectionism values some development of capacities or achievement of excellence regardless of human nature; narrow perfectionism values only the perfection of human nature.[8] This chapter adopts the definition of ethical perfectionism in a broad sense.[9] Andrew Reeve defines perfectionism from a political point of view. "The view that the role of the state is to promote morally acceptable conceptions of the good life, rather than simply to provide a neutral or impartial framework in which each person may pursue his or her own conception of the good life" (2009, 397). According to political perfectionism, the state is a community in a broad sense, and the state should address the promotion of human perfection as a public issue for the community. Therefore, ethical perfectionism argues that human beings should cultivate capacities or seek excellence, and political perfectionism holds that this goal must be considered a public issue for the community. This chapter defines perfectionism as the synthesis of these two versions.

Hurka (1993, 3–4) recognizes Marx as a perfectionist.[10] Marx insists that individuals are alienated in a capitalist society. Communism, which focuses on human perfection, transcends this alienation and enables "the absolute unfolding of man's creative abilities" (CW 28:411).[11] Thus, Marx's argument includes perfectionism in a broad sense and hence, differs from liberalism, which regards the pursuit of good as a private matter and refuses to address it as a social issue. Although communitarians and Marxists support perfectionism, they substantially differ in how they promote perfection in their communities and overcome utilitarianism.

Marxist perfectionism has the following characteristics: First, Marx strongly opposes direct methods, such as moral education, regarding how individuals attain perfection. "The communists do not preach *morality* at all" (CW 5:247). According to historical materialism, morality is a part of the superstructure, which corresponds to economic structure. Therefore, even if society attempts to impose perfectionist morality on individuals, it will fail if the economic structure of society is not yet

mature. By contrast, when the economic structure reaches a certain stage, the morality corresponding to it naturally appears. The communists' task is not to encourage moral movement but to change the economic structure of society. Although Marxists adopt political perfectionism, they refuse direct methods such as preaching morality; thus, Marx's political perfectionism is an indirect type.

Second, Marxists apply utilitarianism to the extent necessary to criticize capitalism. MacIntyre accuses Marxism of being incorporated into utilitarianism. "Marxists have in the past crippled themselves intellectually by adapting even their Marxism to a determinist, mechanistic mould and consequently to a utilitarian mould" (1960, 235). MacIntyre's view that Marxism has a utilitarian element is accurate. Marxists partially accept utilitarianism. Has Marxism been fully incorporated into utilitarianism? In chapter 7, I presented my conclusion on this point. Marxists attempt to abolish capitalist society based on utilitarianism. In a communist society, if everyone's material desire is satisfied, individuals spontaneously pursue human perfection; utilitarianism is no longer required. Marxists expect such a process.

9.3.3 Liberalism

This subsection examines the relation between liberalism and the Marxist concept of community. Marx emphasizes that human beings actively work on the conditions of their interaction. The conditions for the interaction among the individuals are initially given to them; this condition allows them to express themselves.[12] However, when these conditions become fetters for the individuals, a new form of interaction suitable for "the advanced mode of the self-activity of individuals" (CW 5:82) is required. As individuals' creative activities accumulate, a new form of interaction emerges, and eventually, society changes.

Taylor, who introduced the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844* to the University of Oxford, discovered in this early Marx's work a humanist thought, which argues that liberation from alienation is the self's active expression.[13] Marx states the following: "This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the *genuine* resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man—the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification

and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species" (CW 3:296). Taylor recognizes in this writing "the expressivist aspiration to wholeness" (1979a, 146). This desire is unified with the scientism observed in *Capital*, and it attempts to freely control nature and society. The concept of "complete freedom" is based on self-dependence and is found not only in classical liberalism but also in Marxism (1979a, 156–57); Marx views the proletarian revolution as a "leap into untrammelled freedom" (149). Marx plans the unification of expressivism in which individuals express themselves in their interaction with society and nature and scientism in which human beings control society and nature by applying science and technology. Marx foretells a communist society as a realm of freedom that has overcome all conflicts and alienation, but it is unreal "situationless freedom" (153).[14]

The following three points are significant regarding the relation between liberalism and community. First, I disagree with Taylor's understanding of "leap into untrammelled freedom." Taylor writes: "The revolution will abolish bourgeois society and hence the laws of its operation, and a united class of proletarians would take over and dispose freely of the economy which it inherited" (1979a, 149). However, Marx does not consider the transition process from a capitalist society so simply. He proposes that a socialist society exists between a capitalist and a communist society and that a transitional society plays a crucial role between a capitalist and a socialist society (CW 24:81–99).

Second, Marx does not state that a communist society will overcome all conflicts. "The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of existence" (CW 29:263–64). Marx anticipates that in a communist society, major conflicts rooted in economic structures such as class conflicts will disappear but not all conflicts will.

Third, in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscript of 1844*, Taylor finds the unity of expressivism and the Enlightenment and observes only the aspects wherein human beings actively attempt to control nature and society. However, Marx also mentions the human passivity in this essay. "As a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a *suffering*, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants" (CW 3:336). Marx always considers both the activity and passivity of human beings when he discusses the unification of naturalism and humanism; he discovers the essence of human life also in a passive and restricted existence.[15]

9.3.4 *Individualism*

From the perspective that human nature exists in community, Marx challenges the individualistic view of humanity.[16] "It is a question of the liberty of man as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself" (CW 3:162). Liberty in civil society is the rights of selfish individuals to act freely to gratify their desires while confronting each other. They assume the relationship in which individuals cooperate with one another as members of a community to be an unrealistic state. Marx thus negatively portrays the alienation where individualism dominates the real world.

However, MacIntyre discovers individualism in Marxism. As aforementioned, he claims that Marxism was incorporated into Kantianism and utilitarianism for the following reason: "Secreted within Marxism from the outset is a certain radical individualism" (1981, 261). Marx denounces the individual character of liberalism, but MacIntyre alleges that Marxism embraces individualism. MacIntyre's recognition is correct.

Although Marx blames individualism, his normative theory also contains individualism. Marx's attitude seems contradictory but is natural from the viewpoint of historical materialism, according to which an individualistic superstructure responds to the economic structure of capitalism. Marx encourages a departure from individualism as the ultimate goal of communism, but his criticism of capitalist society is based on individualism. For example, exploitation theory is an argument to expose injustice based on the individualistic premise of property based on one's labor. Although in a socialist society, individualism is not as prevalent as in a capitalist society, the reestablishment of individual property is based on individualism. In a communist society, individualism will no longer be the primary principle of society since the influence of capitalism will be eliminated. Thus, Marx anticipates the historical process in which individualism gradually loses its influence.

9.3.5 *Conservatism*

Marxists envision progressive communities formed within civil society after the dissolution of conservative communities.[17] Marx describes a consciously built association. "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (CW 6:506). The Marxist community is an artificial association created by the free will of individuals.[18]

MacIntyre explains Marx's concept of community as follows: "In the first chapter of *Capital* when Marx characterizes what it will be like 'when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations' what he pictures is 'a community of free individuals' who have all freely agreed to their common ownership of the means of production and to various norms of production and distribution" (1981, 261). MacIntyre's understanding of Marx's community concept is appropriate. The Marxist association is a community that individuals create and join based on their free will after conservative communities in feudal times have been completely destroyed by capitalism. The Marxist community is "*community as yet to be achieved*," whereas the communitarian community is "*community as recoverable*" (Delanty 2003, 19–20). What is important is where to find the subjects who disapprove of the present civil society and build a community to replace it.

Why does MacIntyre defend the traditional community? He questions Marxist progressivism as follows: "Marxist socialism is at its core deeply optimistic. For however thoroughgoing its criticism of capitalist and bourgeois institutions may be, it is committed to asserting that within the society constituted by those institutions, all the human and material preconditions of a better future are being accumulated. Yet if the moral impoverishment of advanced capitalism is what so many Marxists agree that it is, whence are these resources for the future to be derived?" (1981, 262). According to MacIntyre, anticapitalist subjects never appear in a capitalist society, and Marx is too optimistic about such subjects' emergence. Since alienation in capitalist society is more serious than Marx assumes, it destroyed the human morality indispensable to oppose this society.[19]

Though recognizing that workers are divided in a capitalist society, Marx supposes that the working class is the subject of the change, because capitalist society increases the working class's ability and solidarity, that is, the large-scale industry provides a "fully developed individual" (CW 35:490). The workers resist capitalism and become the subjects to change it. Marxism is progressive in that it aims to develop workers' solidarity in a capitalist society.[20] Whether Marx or MacIntyre is correct depends on the present and future situation of the leftist movement. In either case, the contrast between communitarian conservatism and Marxist progressivism is obvious.

9.3.6 Localism

Localism is the opposite concept of globalism, which is the doctrine that the size of a community should be limited to neighboring areas where all members can put faces with names. Marx describes the size of associations as follows: "*National centralisation of the means of production* will become the national basis of a society composed of associations of free and equal producers, carrying on the social business on a common and rational plan" (CW 23:136). "The proletariat can thus only exist *world-historically*, just as communism, its activity, can only have a 'world-historical' existence" (CW 5:49). The basic unit of association designed by Marx is a local organization such as a labor union and political association. However, on the premise of the internationalization of capitalism, he foresees the socialist society, which manages the economy at the national dimension, and the communist society founded on its worldwide association. Marxist associations thus aim to expand to national and global dimensions while being based on small local communities.

As for the size of the community, MacIntyre states, "When practice-based forms of Aristotelian community are generated in the modern world, they are always, and could not but be, small-scale and local" (1994, 302). The moral community that MacIntyre considers viable in today's society is a small local form of community. The goal of democracy is to deepen communication among participants. To achieve this objective, the community must be sufficiently small so that all members can put faces with names.

Walzer extends the scale of the community concept to nation-states with established "bonds of communality" (1983, 29) because individuals share not only their language, history, and culture but also the feeling and a common political experience under one political power.[21] However, Walzer, who supports particularism, denies expanding the scale of the community to "humanity itself, the society of nations, the entire globe" (29) and rejects cosmopolitanism. His argument can therefore be labeled as enlarged localism.

The concept of communitarian community includes democracy based on direct communication, as recommended by MacIntyre, and particularism based on shared feelings and experiences, as emphasized by Walzer. Although both deny globalism, MacIntyre attaches importance to democracy and prefers small communities, whereas Walzer focuses on

particularism and expands the size of communities to the national dimension. The Marxist communities are based on associations existing in each region as a starting point, but they attempt to expand the network of solidarity and develop globally. Marxists allow a national community in the process of expanding a community on a global scale; however, they ultimately deny a national community because their platform aims to abolish states. Thus, Marxists adopt both localism and globalism.

9.3.7 Particularism

Liberalism supports moral universalism wherein values such as human rights are universal and must be prioritized in any society. By contrast, Walzer (1983, xiv) espouses particularism, which contends that the question of a good life cannot be generally discussed as each community has a particular morality. This subsection examines the Marxist stance on moral particularism.

Marx's historical materialism is universalistic in that the mode of production in any society develops from primitive communism into slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and communism. This universalistic tendency is strengthened in historical development after the capitalist society on account of the universal character of this society. The development of a capitalist society "finally puts *world-historical*, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones" (CW 5:49). The communist society emerges as a result of the universal development of the capitalist society.[22]

Walzer argues that the belief of "the imperialism of nations that called themselves Christian" is "covering-law universalism" and that Hegelianism and Marxism are typical examples (1990, 511–12).[23] According to Walzer, Marxist internationalism attempts to realize a universal state beyond the framework of a nation-state, but this attempt is impossible without a common culture. Even if the language of a universal state is created, it is nothing but a reflection of the culture of a dominant ethnic group. "There is no neutral (unexpressive) moral language" (1994, 9). Thus, Walzer discovers universalism in Marxism and asserts that it inevitably fails.

However, I disagree with Walzer's conclusion. First, historical materialism denies the existence of morality that is universally applicable to all ages and societies. Marx questions the argument for universal rights. "Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its

cultural development which this determines" (CW 24:87). The reason for such a restriction is that each society has its morality and that no morality can be accepted throughout history. Marx is not a moral universalist who thinks that a single morality rules the world. Second, Marx argues that only the principal part of the superstructure involved in maintaining the regime corresponds to the economic structure and acknowledges that some part of the superstructure does not correspond to the base.[24] Theory of alienation rather recommends diversity of moralities that does not correspond to economic structure.[25] Although Marxism is close to moral universalism, it is compatible with moral particularity.

9.3.8 Democracy

This subsection examines the differences in thought on democracy between communitarians and Marx. Both sides highlight the formality of liberal parliamentary democracy and endorse a more substantive democracy. MacIntyre states, "Politically the societies of advanced Western modernity are oligarchies disguised as liberal democracies" ([1997] 1998, 237). Liberal democracy in Western society is indeed equivalent to an oligarchy wherein a few elites control policymaking. For procedural liberalism with a value-neutral stance, participation in politics is only a means for individuals to secure their ends. By contrast, communitarians argue that the raison d'être of democracy is not limited to the means of aggregating their preferences. Sandel writes: "According to republican political theory, . . . sharing in self-rule involves something more. It means deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape the destiny of the political community" (1996, 5). Democracy is a process in which citizens deepen their recognition of the common good through deliberation and cultivate civic virtue.

Although Marx acknowledges the significance of parliamentary democracy, he emphasizes its limitations and calls for a more direct and substantial realization of democracy. "*Electoral reform* within the *abstract political state* is, therefore, the demand for its *dissolution*, but also for the *dissolution of civil society*" (CW 3:121). Marx appreciates electoral reform as the progress of democracy but predicts that the complete form of parliamentary democracy will reveal the contradiction between a species' life and private life and the limitations of civil society. Only in a communist society, where free communication among individuals is possible, can democracy be substantial. "When communist *artisans* associate with one

another, theory, propaganda, etc., is their first end. But at the same time, as a result of this association, they acquire a new need—the need for society—and what appears as a means becomes an end" (CW 3:313). Democracy is not merely a means to coordinate opinions but a purpose in which the process of discussion becomes an opportunity for human development.

Communitarians and Marxists both identify the limitations of liberal democracy. They both insist that the value of democracy lies in enabling human development through public deliberation and that the concept of the common good is a prerequisite for democracy because it requires citizens to share a common purpose to enhance mutual humanity. However, Marxists and communitarians disagree on whether the common good is fixed. Since the communist society that Marxists envisage is premised on the universalization in a capitalist society, when individuals engage in democratic discussions in pursuit of the common good, the common good is not fixed and constantly changes.[26] By contrast, the common good considered by communitarians is fixed as it is rooted in tradition. Taylor furthers the formation of a democratic common purpose because the real threat to democracy for him is that individuals fall into fragmented situations (1991, 117–18). He indicates the bond of solidarity among compatriots as a condition for a republican regime to be effective and underscores that "a sense of shared fate" (1995, 192) is vital for that. However, in the Marxist view, in a community where such a sense is shared, plurality and distinctiveness are damaged and the fundamental debate is not realized. If the common good is fixed by tradition and destiny, it is ultimately incompatible with democracy.[27] Thus, communitarians and Marxists differ on the common good that underlies democracy.

9.3.9 Radicalism

Radicalism is the political stance that the fundamental change in the social system is indispensable for constructing the community.[28] According to MacIntyre, Marxists cannot radically transform the social system. "For he would now see no tolerable alternative set of political and economic structures which could be brought into place to replace the structures of advanced capitalism" (1981, 262). Instead, MacIntyre recommends "the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained" (263). He proposes the

restoration of a traditional community and not the construction of a socialist system.

Sandel describes the history of public philosophy, a political principle of the United States since its founding, from the perspective of the confrontation between liberalism and republicanism (1996, 317–51). He advocates civic republicanism as his positive political principle to replace conservatism and liberalism. Its policy is the revival of the republican tradition in conventional politics of the United States.

Taylor judges that modern welfare state capitalism is fragmented by the hegemony of instrumental reason and emphasizes the importance of democratic initiatives to counter it; he proposes a combination of the principles of "market allocations, state planning, collective provision for need, the defense of individual rights, and effective democratic initiative and control" (1991, 110).[29] Taylor asserts that a transition from capitalism to socialism is neither possible nor desirable (chap. 10). This is because he reflects on Marxism and the New Left as follows: The belief "that there is a major systemic change that we could bring about between capitalism and socialism which would, by the same stroke, overcome a number of very deep human woes, problems, divisions, and so on" is crippling (1989, 145). According to Taylor, even if a socialist society is realized, the society cannot balance self-governance and abolition of exploitation, achieve both freedom and solidarity, nor address the issues presented by new social movements such as feminism and ecology.

According to Walzer, the answers to the question "what sorts of institution should we work for?" (1992, 90) provided by social thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are democratic citizenship, socialist cooperation, individual autonomy, and national identity. He judges that all these answers are wrong since they provide only a singular answer. Walzer concludes that social democracy can balance various principles. "It seems to me that the best name for the balance itself—the political creed that defends the framework, supports the necessary forms of state action, and so sustains the modern regimes of toleration—is social democracy" (1997, 112). Social democracy has two types: the first type gradually solves the defects of capitalism and attempts to shift to socialism in the long run, and the second type eternally maintains a mixture of capitalistic and socialistic elements. The social democracy that Walzer refers to is the second type.

Communitarianism has ended in reformism that preserves the traditional community in capitalism. Marxism adopts radicalism that attempts

to fundamentally abolish capitalism. "The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations" (CW 6:504). The contrast between communitarianism and Marxism on social change is evident.

9.4 Marxism and Community

The characteristics of the communist community are summarized as follows. As the goal of communism is human flourishing in cooperation, it respects morality and endorses perfectionism. However, the communist community does not accept moralism, which emphasizes morality more than other fields such as the economy. The idea that individuals enjoy absolute freedom isolated from society is entirely false, but communism expects liberalism and individualism to form the basis of personal liberty in new associations. Communism does not support conservatism, which preserves traditional community in a capitalist society, since it assumes that workers are the main subjects who build a new society by enhancing their abilities. This community neither denies localism nor is limited to it as it is based on the associations that exist in each local area and expands networks of solidarity to a global scale. Historical materialism, which argues that every society progresses through historical stages of development, is closer to universalism than particularism. Still, it does not deny moral diversity. The common good always changes because communism finds the essence of democracy in the development of humanity through deliberation. Marxist communism employs radicalism in that it attempts to abolish capitalist society and build new associations.

In the *Grundrisse*, Marx describes the three stages of human history as follows:

> Relationships of personal dependence (which originally arise quite spontaneously) are the first forms of society, in which human productivity develops only to a limited extent and at isolated points. Personal independence based upon dependence *mediated by things* is the second great form, and only in it is a system of general social exchange of matter, a system of universal relations, universal requirements and universal capacities, formed. Free individuality, based on the universal development of the individuals and the subordination of their communal, social productivity, which is their social possession [Vermögen], is the third stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third. (CW 28:95)

The first stage is the precapitalist societies based on communities, which comprises primitive communism, slavery, and feudalism. The second stage is a social system ranging from simple commodity production to capitalism; in the capitalist society, the market economy surpasses communities. The third stage is a new communist society that transcends the second stage, premised on the productive forces, relations of production, and superstructure in capitalist society. Although the first and third stages are societies based on communities, the third stage fundamentally differs from the first stage in that the third stage presupposes the results of the second stage. The communist community is based on the development of productive forces and the relations of production in the capitalist economy. The third stage is possible only after the second stage has matured.

Both communism and communitarianism confront liberalism and promote communities that enable the perfection of human nature. However, although communitarians criticize liberalism, they eventually abandon social change and attempt to maintain a traditional community in a capitalist society.[30] Communists start from capitalism and liberalism and attempt to transcend them from within and build a new society based on association. Communitarians are pessimistic about social change after they experienced a decline of the New Left after 1960. However, since the end of the last century, the movement of alterglobalization is developing against neoliberal globalization. In Europe, radical leftists such as Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in Greece have gained power, and even in the United States, a core of the capitalist countries, democratic socialists such as Bernie Sanders have garnered broad support. The rise of today's left-wing movements proves the rightness of Marx's optimistic progressivism. Communitarian criticism of Marxism eventually contributed to illuminating the significance of the communist community.[31]

Notes

1. In Japanese and Chinese, communism is expressed as "common property-ism."
2. Fraternity is a concept close to community. Karl Marx is critical of fraternity. "The phrase which corresponded to this imaginary abolition of class relations was *fraternité*, universal fraternisation and brotherhood" (CW 10:57). Fraternity attempts to reconcile class conflicts in capitalist societies.

3. Blackledge (2007), Blackledge and Davidson (2008), and Fraser (2003, 2007) explore what values the ardent Marxists, such as MacIntyre and Taylor, abandoned and retained in Marxism.
4. The New Left refers to a political movement active in the United Kingdom from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s that centered on the *New Left Review*. See Lin (1993).
5. In Japan, Hirata (1969) emphasizes Marx's concept of individual property and restructures Marxism as civil society theory. Yamanouchi (1982) criticizes Hirata and irradiates early Marx's alienation theory. Hirata recognizes Marxism as individualism, whereas Yamanouchi opposes his recognition from the viewpoint close to communitarianism.
6. Moralism in this section differs from Kant's ([1788] 1996) moralism, which opposes eudaimonism.
7. Walzer writes, "The writings of the young Marx represent one of the early appearances of communitarian criticism, and his argument, first made in the 1840s, is powerfully present today" (2004, 144). In my view, the writings of not only young Marx but also old Marx represent his endorsement of human essence and community.
8. Wall labels narrow perfectionism "human nature perfectionism" and broad perfectionism "objective goods perfectionism" ([2007] 2017).
9. Chapter 8 collectively referred to virtue ethics and perfectionism as essentialism in order to position Marxism as the third ethics.
10. Other than Hurka, see Kymlicka ([1990] 2002, 190–95) and Lukes (1985, 87).
11. Kymlicka writes, "In Marx's case, our distinctive excellence is said to be our capacity for freely cooperative production" ([1990] 2002, 190). Kymlicka assumes that Marx considers productive activity to be the only criterion of excellence and disrespects leisure and consumption. However, I disagree with Kymlicka's interpretation. Marx clearly states, "Free time . . . is both leisure and time for higher activity" (CW 29:97). For Marxists, leisure or free time is the essential condition for human perfection.
12. Marx's concept of *Verkehr* is a broad concept that includes not only traffic but also human communication, as is clear from the expression, "the mental intercourse of men" (CW 5:36).
13. See Lin (1993, 34).

14. See Lin (1993, 119).
15. Yamanouchi (2004) underlines the significance of Marx's notion of human beings as passive and suffering beings.
16. The individualism addressed in this subsection is ethical individualism, not methodological individualism.
17. I do not intend the term "conservatism" to bear a negative connotation. Green conservatism asserts that human beings cannot easily create the natural environment, and community conservatism insists that they cannot easily create a community, that is, a social environment. Thus, why communitarianism is conservative regarding communities must be seriously considered.
18. According to Delanty, "Marx did not idealize the community of the past, rooted in tradition, guilds and/or in ways of life. His conception of community was urban, egalitarian and universalistic" (2003, 19). D. Miller notes that communitarian communities differ from socialist communities in that individuals in the former are embedded in the communities regardless of their intentions (1989, 60–72).
19. Hayek (1973–79, vol. 3, epilogue) contends that traditions that were not the result of intentional human construction formed the rules of conduct. MacIntyre adopts conservatism that relies on traditional communities since it is difficult to intentionally build community traditions. They support opposite social systems but share conservatism.
20. Delanty (2003, 189–90) observes that new types of communities, different from traditional communities, are emerging in today's society.
21. Sandel (2005, 168–71) is skeptical about extending the community to the national scale. However, Taylor (1995, 181–203) extends his idea of community to the national scale to support patriotism. Even MacIntyre (1995), who claims that communities should be small, defends patriotism. Refusing to expand communities to a national scale is by no means the essence of communitarianism. See O'Neill (1994).
22. See Delanty (2003, 19).
23. See van der Linden (1996, 235–36); he recognizes Marx as Kantian and refutes Walzer's denunciation of Marx's universalism.
24. Walzer (1994) divides morality into thick and thin. However, in my view, a standard that clearly divides both is necessary. The Marxist standard is historical materialism.

25. See van der Linden (1996, 244).
26. Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) radical democracy also criticizes the fixed character of the communitarian concept of the common good.
27. See Mouffe (1996, 23).
28. Radicalism carries three implications: radicalism that promotes rapid change, and the opposing concept is gradualism; radicalism that means using force for social change, and the opposing concept is parliamentarism; and radicalism that aims at the fundamental change of the social system, and the opposing concept is reformism. Radicalism in this chapter represents the third sense.
29. In 1987, a conference was held at Oxford University to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the birth of the New Left Movement. This quote is from Taylor's (1989) speech. The proceeding of this conference (Archer et al. 1989) has the same title as *Out of Apathy* (Thompson 1960), published in 1960.
30. The New Left, supported by MacIntyre and Taylor, which rejected gradualism and adopted radicalism, sought rapid change to quickly overcome the existing alienation. Young Taylor wrote, "Now a qualitative (revolutionary) change in society in any of these ways is something which we cannot even discuss as long as we will only talk in terms of piecemeal reform" (1960, 4).
31. Little (2002, 79–80) discerns the emergence of radical communitarianism integrating solidarity and pluralism in the process of individualization in modern society. Ross (2002–3) advocates left-communitarianism, which is a more rationalistic and universalistic variation of modern communitarianism. These new types of communitarianism are more Marxist than the communitarianism discussed in this chapter.

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CHAPTER 10

Alienation

10.1 Introduction

The social normative theory inquires into what a society should be. The liberal theory of justice has strenuously developed normative theory. Marxism, founded on historical materialism, has rarely systematically discussed the normative theory.[1] However, alienation theory, another vital theory of Marxism, has the character of the normative theory. This chapter explores the nature of alienation theory as a normative theory by comparing it with the justice theory.[2] Section 10.1 introduces the theme. Section 10.2 confirms that the theories of justice and alienation are characterized as normative theories. Section 10.3 compares the justice theory with the alienation theory from the framework of normative theory. Section 10.4 compares the two theories in terms of value concepts. Finally, section 10.5 proposes the theory of two dimensions of alienation.

10.2 Theories of Justice and Alienation as Normative Theories

This section confirms that the theories of justice and alienation are characterized as normative theories. The liberal theory of justice has the character of the normative theory. Liberal thought opposed feudalism and

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provided values for designing civil society. The social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes ([1651] 1991) and John Locke ([1690a] 1988, [1690b] 1975) presented the liberal normative theory, which intended to guarantee the freedom of individuals from the viewpoint of property based on one's labor.[3] When civil society was established, the weight of normative theory in liberalism became relatively small. However, as the contradiction of the capitalist economy became severe and the influence of socialism critical of this system became large, the normative theory became vital. John Rawls ([1971] 1999) reinstated the normative theory of justice on the basis of an individual's equal liberty. Since then, justice theory has maintained its status as a representative of the liberal normative theory.

Early socialism, such as utopian socialism, was overly normative. Marxism, which attempts to replace utopian socialism, underlines the importance of the positive analysis of the capitalist society. Does alienation theory possess the character of a positive theory? The most concise definition of alienation is in the following passage of *The German Ideology*, "As long as man remains in naturally evolved society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him" (CW 5:47). Alienation is the situation wherein an individual's activities are divided, and as a result of conflict between the individual's and common interests, what the individuals produce becomes independent and controls them.[4] Human beings achieve their essence as species-beings through interaction with nature and society. In a capitalist society, they are controlled by the products due to their separation from nature and society. *Capital*, which is in the framework of alienation theory, empirically analyzes how capital controls labor. Thus, the alienation theory has the aspect of a positive theory.

However, as long as Marxism denounces the capitalist society and advocates a communist society as its replacement, the alienation theory cannot abandon its character as a normative theory.[5] "Communism, as the supersession of private property, is the vindication of real human life as man's possession and thus the advent of practical humanism" (CW 3:341). "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it" (CW 5:5). Communism is a movement to liberate people from the alienated life in the capitalist society and restore human beings as species-being, and in that sense, it is practical humanism.

Alienation theory is a normative theory that not only describes the capitalist society but also insists that it should be changed from the viewpoint of value judgment. The justice theory of liberalism and the alienation theory of Marxism are both characterized as the normative theory, and thus, a comparison is possible.

10.3 Three Points on Framework

This section compares the framework of the justice theory with that of the alienation theory. When justice theory is compared with alienation theory, the first question is why liberal normative theory is justice theory and Marxist normative theory is alienation theory. The justice theory deals with justice in a desirable state, whereas the alienation theory deals with alienation in an undesirable state. There are fundamental distinctions that transcend mere naming differences. The second question is whether the two normative theories have some commonality. This question concerns the relation between liberalism and Marxism. In the context of these two questions, this section presents three points at issue on the framework: idealism and materialism, historical universalism and historical relativism, and individualism and socialism.

10.3.1 Idealism and Materialism

In liberalism, values vary according to individual subjectivity. However, a certain standard is indispensable to adjust diverse values when they conflict with one another. For the standard to be universally acceptable, it must be an objective standard independent of individual interests. Justice provides such an objective standard. However, this objectivity is an average of various individuals' subjectivity and is not derived independently of the subjectivity. Rawls labels the method of deriving the principle of justice as Kantian constructivism, according to which morality consists of our mutual subjectivity. Kantian constructivism is idealistic objectivism, opposite of materialistic objectivism grounded on empirical facts.[6]

Alienation theory is a positive theory and belongs to moral realism because it studies the cause of alienation in the objective fact that human needs are not satisfied in a certain social system. Moral realism is divided into two types, depending on whether a real moral fact is rooted in natural property or not. The alienation theory is similar to the naturalistic moral

realism represented by Cornell realism since the moral fact on which the alienation theory is founded is that of natural property.[7] Therefore, the distinction between theories of justice and alienation derives from the difference between idealism and materialism.[8]

Liberal justice is an ideal created in our subjective ideas and, hence, can serve as a yardstick to judge reality as it is far from reality. Alienation theory does not set an ideal apart from reality and derives the communist society as an ideal society from the alienation of the real society. However, the idealism of justice theory and the materialism of alienation theory are not contradictory to each other. Their ideals are comparable when the ideal of justice theory approaches social reality. Alienation theory can cooperate with justice theory as long as the latter agrees with the liberation from alienation.

10.3.2 Historical Universalism and Historical Relativism

Justice theory holds that justice is universally valid at any time, and alienation theory asserts that the content of alienation differs according to the historical development stage. However, generally characterizing justice theory as universalism and alienation theory as relativism is inaccurate. The alienation theory is also universalistic because it seeks an objective and material economic structure as the condition for achieving human essence and it argues that every economic structure will converge into that of communism. According to the alienation theory, the values of the later period should have advanced more than those of the earlier period. Both the theories of justice and alienation are progressive, but their implications differ from each other. Progress in justice theory implies approaching a civil society composed of the standards of justice; no further social development is possible. Progress in alienation theory implies that the situation in which people are alienated from nature and society decreases; unlimited social development is possible.[9]

Alienation theory takes the progressive historical view that different moralities reflect the historical stage of development of the social system and the alienation decreases over time; this theory approves of moral realism that the morality of each period objectively exists. Alienation theory addresses the alienation in modern capitalist society in the first place and envisions the future communist society after overcoming it; thus, the alienation theory is grounded on historical relativism. The justice

theory views the validity of modern civil society as universal and evaluates all societies on the basis of the principle of justice. Therefore, justice theory relies on historical universalism. However, as long as a criticism of capitalism depending on justice theory reflects the contradiction of capitalism, alienation theory can share it. For example, alienation theory accepts Rawls' ([1971] 1999) theory of equality of social primary goods and Ronald Dworkin's (2000) theory of equality of resources as long as they attempt to correct inequality stemming from the economic structure of capitalism. In this sense, the justice theory founded on historical universalism and the alienation theory based on historical relativism can cooperate with each other.

10.3.3 Individualism and Socialism

The justice theory of liberalism endorses individualism rooted in atomic individuals.[10] Individuals act to maximize their utility by always competing with others and seeking to resolve conflicts of interest by appealing to justice. Justice theory has two types: utilitarianism, which gives priority to utility, and deontology, which prioritizes rights, and both often conflict with each other. However, they are two sides of the same coin in that they are individualistic. Liberalism envisages an ideal society from the viewpoint of how a society should be for atomic individuals to reconcile their interests.

Alienation theory views society as a community of individuals pursuing self-realization. Individuals attempt to achieve human perfection through discussions on living a good life in a cooperative relationship with others. The concept of utility and rights founded on the division among individuals cannot be the first principle of society since true well-being is achieved in a society where an individual's self-realization leads to others' self-realization. Justice theory recognizes that individuals are inevitably opposed to each other, but alienation theory judges such a situation as alienated. Thus, individualism of justice theory and socialism of alienation theory are directed in the opposite direction, but they are not entirely incompatible because alienation theory does not completely deny individualism and instead considers it a starting point for the construction of community. Karl Marx envisions a scenario in which mutually divided individuals in a capitalist society overcome alienation and build a communist society.

The conflict between individualism and socialism in normative theory is the conflict between individualism, which recognizes an individual as having an independent, free existence separated from society, and socialism, which holds that individual freedom is truly feasible only in social relations. Although socialism opposes individualism, which separates an individual from society, it is compatible with individualism, which intends to recognize individuals in a social context; thus, the latter type of individualism can be incorporated into alienation theory.

This section has taken up three points at issue as a framework of normative theory, namely idealism and materialism, historical universalism and historical relativism, and individualism and socialism, and compared justice theory of liberalism and alienation theory of Marxism from the perspective of three points. A theoretical necessity for the theories of justice and alienation to adopt their respective frameworks does not necessarily imply that they are utterly hostile to each other regarding the content of the normative theory. The liberation from alienation is partly consistent with the realization of justice, and as long as it is compatible, the two theories can work together.

10.4 Values

10.4.1 Scope of Alienation Theory

The values of justice theory are freedom, equality, property, and utility, and the central concept of alienation theory is labor. Justice theory seems to have a broader scope than alienation theory.[11] However, in my opinion, alienation theory has a broader scope than justice theory does.

First, alienation theory is not only a theory for workers in a capitalist society. According to this theory, wage labor in a capitalist society is alienated as it is a means of obtaining wages. This explanation does not imply that people other than workers are outside the scope of alienation. The principle of property based on one's labor, dominant in a capitalist society, alienates all individuals. The market economy makes the relationships among individuals conform to the norms of commodity exchange in the market and forces individuals to compete with one another. This results in all the members of a capitalist society being isolated and alienated.[12] The communist society promotes the needs principle, according

to which whether an individual has worked is not a criterion for distribution, and all members, including those who do not work, are entitled to a distribution. Thus, alienation theory concerns all people.

Second, alienation theory does not insist that labor is the only ideal activity for human beings. Alienation theory highlights the alienation of labor because labor in the production process intensively expresses the alienation in capitalist society. However, this theory asserts that not only labor in a capitalist society but also labor itself gives rise to alienation; it aims to nullify labor in a communist society.[13] This society endorses the extension of leisure time and the activity of free self-realization.

Third, alienation theory does not treat only active activities as human perfection. Alienation theory indeed contends that a consumer life that pursues only quantitative pleasure is alienated.[14] However, this theory does not recognize human passivity as alienated: "Suffering, humanly considered, is a kind of self-enjoyment of man" (CW 3:300). Passive enjoyment of an object through all sensory organs is also included in human perfection.

Fourth, the scope of alienation theory is extended to all realms concerned with human beings. Marx divides alienation into four types: alienation from the products or nature, alienation from the activity of labor, alienation from species-being, and alienation from other human beings (CW 3:276–77). Alienation theory covers all areas, including the relationships between individuals and society and between humanity and nature.

10.4.2 Injustice as a Part of Alienation

Workers must abrogate the capitalist system and shift to the communist society to overcome alienation since the ultimate cause of alienation is this system. However, how alienation appears and how it is negated differs according to the social situation. "Naturally, the transcendence of the estrangement always proceeds from that form of the estrangement which is the *dominant* power: in Germany, *self-consciousness*; in France, *equality*, because it is politics; in England, real, material, *practical* need taking only itself as its standard" (CW 3:312–13). Justice in a capitalist society is an alienated idea from the viewpoint of communism, but alleviating alienation is possible even from the viewpoint of liberalism. Marxists, therefore, exercise liberal justice as long as it reduces alienation. I examine the ideas of freedom, equality, property, and utility from this viewpoint.

Marx argues in *Capital* that workers are free in the double sense. The first meaning is that "as a free man he can dispose of his labour power as his own commodity" (CW 35:179). Such acts were impossible for slaves and serfs in precapitalist societies and became possible for the first time in capitalist societies. Marx respects this freedom provided by capitalist society. He expects the communist society as "a community of free individuals" (CW 35:89) because individuals who have accepted freedom in a capitalist society now choose a new society by overcoming this society with their own free will.

Marx appreciates justice as equality. Although Marx proposes the contribution principle in a socialist society, he denies its existence in the communist society. "A *different form* of activity, of labour, does not justify *inequality*, confers no *privileges* in respect of possession and enjoyment" (CW 5:537). Communist society abandons the contribution principle that allows distributional inequalities in the differential capacity to work, and encourages the needs principle. Marxists promote equality because equality among individuals fosters a sense of community. Therefore, he supports justice as equality.

By appealing to justice as property, Marx reveals that capitalists exploit surplus values produced by workers. Profits earned by capitalists rest on the "*theft of alien labour time*" (CW 29:91). The claim that capitalists steal surplus value from workers presupposes the principle of property based on one's labor, namely, justice as property. The abolition of exploitation is a prerequisite for a communist society. To that end, Marx applies justice as property.

Justice as utility is decomposed into three elements: consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking; Marx agrees with all elements. Marx employs consequentialism in his evaluation of social development. He emphasizes the "THE GREAT CIVILISING INFLUENCE OF CAPITAL" (CW 28:336). The development of capitalist society itself will eventually encourage the abolition of this society. Although he condemns the capitalist society, he affirms it in that it results in its abolition. This logic is consequentialist. Marx evaluates welfarism as it creates conditions for perfectionism. In a capitalist society, the selection and consumption of goods is an individual's private process, and subjective welfare is dominant. However, the quantitative expansion and diversification of desires enhance consumers' ability to evaluate their goods, leading to "cultivating all the qualities of social man" (CW 28:336). Marx agrees with sum-ranking in that high productive forces that sum-ranking pursues prepare

a communist society. He writes as follows: "The productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism" (CW 29:264). By pursuing sum-ranking, a capitalist society dramatically develops productive forces in comparison with the previous society. The development of productive forces requires the abolition of capitalist society and enables the needs principle in communist society.

Although liberalism does not recognize injustice related to liberty, equality, property, and utility as alienation, it attempts to mitigate it as they conflict with justice theory.[15] For Marxism, the injustice that appears in capitalist society is a part of alienation. The complete elimination of alienation is possible by abolishing this society. However, if liberalism rectifies injustice within a capitalist society, the abolition of this society will be furthered; Marxism supports the correction of injustice. Thus, the removal of injustice is a common goal of liberalism and Marxism, and justice theory is positioned as a part of alienation theory.

10.4.3 Justice as Alienation

Marx describes the values of liberal civil society as "Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham" (CW 35:186). From the viewpoint of alienation theory, all these values of justice possess defects in terms of the normative principle of social systems.

The idea of liberty is alienated. According to the alienation theory, human beings are species-beings, and they interact with others in social relationships and pursue their self-realization while promoting others' self-realization. When individuals are community members, they do not appeal to the right to realize their desire. At the core of a liberal civil society is the human right of liberty, and its essence lies in private property. Freedom of action is guaranteed only to the extent that it does not violate others' similar rights. Human beings in civil society are opposed to each other as selfish individuals, and others are merely instruments in meeting their own interests. The idea of liberty is alienated because society appears as "a restriction of their original independence" (CW 3:164) rather than being species-life.

Marx argues that equality is not the most fundamental value but an alienated idea. The liberty of civil society is the right of individuals who own their bodies and property to dispose of them freely as long as they do not infringe on others' bodies and property. For all members of society to

be guaranteed this right, it must be equally distributed to all. This equality of liberty assumes each person to be "a self-sufficient monad" (CW 3:163) and is not rooted in the individuals' cooperation but in their division. Equality presupposes the opposing individuals, and from the perspective of a human being as a species-being, this idea of equality is alienated.

In liberalism, private property is "incorporated in man himself," and human being is "recognised as its essence" (CW 3:291). Locke justified private property by the logic that individuals possess their own body, and those individuals also possess the fruits obtained through their labor as an exercise of their body. Private property is one of the fundamental human rights in modern society. However, according to Marx, the concept of private ownership is created in the market economy, and from this, the concept of an individual as the owner of a body is deduced. Justice as property is an alienated concept created by the economic structure of the market economy.

Utilitarianism is an alienated norm from the viewpoint of communist society. There are three elements of utilitarianism: consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking. Consequentialism dominates the relationship among individuals in a capitalist society, wherein others are only a means of advancing their interests, and relationships are valued only in terms of the results of how much their interests have been advanced. By contrast, in a communist society, individuals act as they want (CW 5:47); activities that deepen human relationships possess essential value. Consequentialism that evaluates even human relationships by the achievement of results is an alienated idea. According to the subjective welfarism in capitalist society, labor is merely a painful means of obtaining income, and the amount of pleasure obtained from the consumption of goods is a measure of well-being. In contrast, in communist society, the theme of the good life is publicly discussed through social cooperation, and objective well-being is formed. Compared with the self-realization in a communist society, capitalistic well-being is alienated. Sum-ranking is adopted as an indicator because a capitalist society founded on the principle of pursuing profits demands incessant economic growth. In contrast, in the communist society, economic growth is not the social goal thanks to high labor productivity and falling propensity to consume; labor is not required, and individuals' voluntary activities can maintain substance metabolism between humanity and nature. From the perspective of the stationary state in communist society, sum-ranking relying on economic growth is an alienated concept.

10.5 Two Dimensions of Alienation

This section proposes a new theory of two dimensions of alienation. The previous sections of this chapter have compared the theory of justice with that of alienation. On the one hand, alienation theory affirms justice theory since the realization of justice promotes the abolition of alienation. On the other hand, it denies justice theory as it is an alienated idea. Alienation theory takes two opposing positions regarding justice theory. How should this attitude be understood? Although Marx himself does not claim to distinguish the two dimensions of alienation, a logical analysis of the whole of his discourse separates the two dimensions.

The second dimension of alienation is described first. This dimension of alienation occurs when individuals are divided and cannot cooperate with one another and hence, are dominated by what they produced. This dimension of alienation is recognized from the perspective of communist society and can only be eradicated by abandoning capitalist society. However, alienation has another first dimension, that is, alienation on the premise of atomic and free individuals. Justice theory focuses on the alienation in the first dimension and rectifies injustice that deviates from justice. This dimension of alienation arises when justice as liberty, equality, property, and utility is violated. Alienation theory, which deals with two dimensions of alienation, recognizes injustice as alienation in the first dimension.

Marx addresses justice from the perspective of two dimensions of alienation. Even if individuals living in a capitalist society are alienated from it, they are dominated by liberal values. The fundamental norm in capitalist society is liberalism, and the values that refuse this society do not become dominant. Even if revolutionaries force radical social change to annul alienation in the second dimension, individuals will retain liberal values. In that case, a chasm will open between their consciousness and the social system, and sustainable social management will be impossible. Therefore, the only choice is to follow justice theory, which attempts to rectify injustice, namely, the first dimension of alienation, in capitalist society. By this strategy, a capitalist society is transformed into a socialist society, and the superstructure will gradually reduce the liberal values. Through this process, the abolition of alienation in the second dimension and the realization of the communist society emerge as the next



Fig. 10.1 Alieanation theory and justice theory

issue. This scenario of social change is grounded on historical materialism. Thus, the Marxist concept of alienation comprises two dimensions, as demonstrated in Fig. 10.1.

The theory of two dimensions of alienation can solve the two controversies in Marxist normative theory. The first controversy is over the relation between a community and an individual. Communitarianism criticizes the individualistic limitations of justice theory and embeds individuals in the community but denies the possibility of free individuals building a community of their will and cannot utilize the results of justice theory. Analytical Marxism significantly contributed to the construction of Marxist normative theory by introducing egalitarian liberalism; however, this school has serious limitations in that it reduces Marxist issues to those of egalitarian liberalism and disrespects the significance of communities. Communitarianism considers alienation only in the second dimension, whereas analytical Marxism comprehends alienation only in the first dimension. Both suffer a common defect; they do not understand the multilayered structure of alienation theory.

The second controversy revolves around whether Marx's early alienation theory was preserved in later periods. The interpretation of the break (Althusser [1965] 2005; Hiromatsu 1969) argues that a break is observed between Marx's early and late ideas and that his early normative and humanistic alienation theory was overcome in his later years; the interpretation of the consistency (Fromm 1961) holds that Marx's theory

of alienation is consistent from his early to later period. The theory of two dimensions of alienation provides answers to this controversy. The interpretation of the break is inappropriate in that it equates the first dimension of alienation with the full scope of Marxist alienation theory. The interpretation of the consistency is similar to the view of this book; however, by understanding that alienation comprises the first and second dimensions, the criticism of the break interpretation becomes more convincing.

Notes

1. Some socialists have espoused normative theory. Friedrich Engels laments that some socialists upheld justice theory (CW 45:361–63).
2. Although the narrow-sense theory of justice, which limits justice to rights, does not include utilitarianism, the justice theory in this chapter implies a broad sense and includes not only deontological liberalism but also utilitarianism.
3. Macpherson (1962) characterizes Hobbes and Locke's liberalism in the seventeenth century as possessive individualism.
4. The Popperians insist that autonomy is necessary for a social system to function effectively, and autonomy is not alienation. See Bartley (1985). Popperians misunderstand Karl Marx's theory of alienation.
5. Inevitablism, which assumes the communist society to be a historical necessity, has ignored the normative character of Marxism.
6. See Darwall et al. (1992, 138).
7. Boyd (1988, 183), who represents Cornell realism, proposes that Marxism should adopt moral realism. For Cornell realism, see A. Miller (2003, chap. 8).
8. When Boyd contributed the above paper to the collection of papers, *Contemporary Materialism* (Moser and Trout 1995), he added a new postscript, "Materialism and Realism in Metaethics" (Boyd 1995). He admits that his homeostatic consequentialism is materialistic because it recognizes all the elements of human flourishing as physical.
9. See Norman (1983, 179).
10. Sandel ([1982] 1998) challenges the individualistic character of Rawls's justice theory.

11. Kymlicka ([1990] 2002], 190–95) alleges that Marx's perfectionism values only labor and neglects consumption and friendship. I disagree with Kymlicka's allegation.
12. See Ash (1964, 140).
13. According to Yamanouchi (2004), alienation theory advocates the abolition of labor.
14. See Elster (1986).
15. Rawls argues, "the idea of property-owning democracy tries to meet legitimate objections of the socialist tradition" (2001, 177). His argument suggests that justice and alienation theories share a common task.

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CHAPTER 11

Socialism as the Development of Liberalism

11.1 Socialism as the Extension of Liberalism

When Karl Marx opposes capitalist society and envisions socialist society, he accepts the fundamental values of liberalism: justice, liberty, equality, property, and utility. He envisages a communist society as an extension of liberalism.

Marx condemns capitalist exploitation from the standard of property based on one's labor, which is dominant in a society of simple commodity production, the base of a capitalist society. Furthermore, according to the same standard, Marx foresees a socialist society, which abrogates the exploitation deriving from the private ownership of the means of production and realizes the contribution principle. Although justice is no longer the main principle in a communist society, it continues to be the basis of social institutions in the form of fundamental human rights. In this sense, this society is built on an extension of justice.

Marxist theory of liberty is divided into regulative and personal liberties and the latter into developmental and communal liberties. The subject of regulative liberty is the group, and that of personal liberty is the individual. Although regulative liberty is the condition for personal liberty, the latter is more valuable than the former. The pursuit of regulative liberty is therefore prohibited from infringing on personal liberty. Communist societies promote personal liberty by eliminating the

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bourgeois elements from civil liberties and ensuring every member the opportunity of self-realization. Consequently, this society is an extension of liberalism.

When egalitarianism and communism are at odds, Marxists prioritize the latter, but that does not lead to their denying the former. Exploitation theory and the contribution principle aim to annul inequality that emerges from the unequal ownership of external assets. Communist society socializes internal assets and eradicates the inequality that arises from unequal ownership of internal assets. Furthermore, in this society, the needs principle realizes the equality of condition. Marxists first pursue equality of opportunity and subsequently the equality of condition. In this respect, socialism promotes equality.

Private ownership is vital for liberalism. In simple commodity production, private property was property based on one's labor. Private property in a capitalist society is also formally founded on this principle. In this society, however, workers are denied this principle. Capitalists exploit the surplus value produced by workers by owning the means of production. Private property in capitalism is guaranteed by the ownership of the means of production, not by the principle of property based on one's labor. As communist society nullifies private ownership, it refuses liberalism, but they inherit the framework of capitalistic ownership when they realize social property based on the ownership of means of production. In liberalism, private property has evolved from property based on one's labor to property based on the ownership of the means of production. The social property of a communist society is an extension of property based on the ownership of the means of production.

Socialism appraises utilitarianism according to the stage of social development. Under a capitalist society, individuals pursue various pleasures, and when satisfied, seek new pleasures. In this process, they become satisfied with material pleasures and pursue spiritual ones. In a socialist society where institutions for self-realization are established, each individual pursues the essentialist consequences such as virtue or perfection. In a communist society where the needs principle prevails, individuals realize their human nature without considering any consequences. J. S. Mill ([1861] 1969) expected the development from quantitative utilitarianism to qualitative utilitarianism in individual morality. Marx finds a similar phenomenon in the historical development of the social system and foresees a communist society where utilitarianism is overcome as a result of the maturation of individuals' desires.

Thus, socialism can be understood as an extension of liberalism. Marxists not only adopt liberal values when they evaluate capitalism but also agree that they are essential in a socialist society. Communist society does not treat liberal values as their primary principles but respects them as the basis of the society. Marxists distinguish themselves from utopian socialists because Marxists recognize socialism as an extension of liberalism, not the opposite of liberalism.

11.2 Socialism as the Negation of Liberalism

In a communist society that socialists envisage as the final goal, the central values of liberalism, namely, justice, liberty, equality, property, and utility, cease to be the primary principle. In this sense, socialism denies liberalism. Although some socialists boast that socialism truly realizes these values, they do not understand that Marxist normative theory has a multilayered structure.

Justice, the primary value in a liberal civil society, is no longer a fundamental principle in a communist society. It assumes the existence of the state power and solves the conflict among individuals by this power. A communist society solves social problems through deliberative discussions among community members. This society places more importance on the realization of human nature through the discussions than on resolving the problems. Of course, even in a communist society, justice such as basic human rights exists, but it loses its status as the primary principle.

Traditional Marxists have professed that liberty under liberalism is illusory and that liberty under socialism is real. However, Marxism does not recognize absolute liberty as the ultimate goal. Marxist concepts of liberty are divided into two types: regulative liberty, which regulates the relationship between human beings and society or nature, and personal liberty, composed of developmental and communal liberties. In total, Marxism has three types of liberty. Although regulative liberty takes precedence in time, personal liberty is superior in value. Developmental liberty, which allows individuals to develop their abilities in every direction, is fully achieved only when combined with communal liberty. If the members of communist society demand the coexistence of humanity and nature and that of the individual and society, no individual can enjoy unlimited liberty.

According to the standard viewpoint, liberals prefer liberty to equality, and socialists prefer equality to liberty. However, what Marxists demand

does not equal private but social ownership. Equality presupposes private ownership. As the object of equal distribution expands, each individual's life is spent within equally allocated private property. This situation may reduce opportunities for collaboration among individuals and increase alienation. Furthermore, in a communist society, even if equal distribution has been achieved, individuals will attempt to contribute to the society, with each diminishing their shares. Consequently, equal distribution will collapse. In this sense, equality is not the ultimate ideal of a communist society.

Private property is vital for liberalism. Under liberalism, individuals are autonomous subjects. The principle of property based on one's labor is a normative value that deems private ownership as a fundamental human right. However, socialists allege that the individuals as owners of their private property are divided and alienated; socialists insist that private ownership should be replaced by social ownership. The socialist revolution renders the means of production a social property. In a communist society, the means of production entitles the owners to receive their products, and labor cannot be the basis for procuring products. As labor, which is the cause of private property, is abolished in this society, private property also disappears.

Utilitarianism comprises three elements: consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking. In a communist society, members engage in their favorite social activities without considering the consequences of their actions; therefore, consequentialism is no longer a social norm. Members of the community can objectively form their well-being through discussions with others; accordingly, welfarism loses its influence. As the productive force that enables the need principle has been achieved, sum-ranking also loses its significance. Thus, consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking cease to be fundamental principles of society.

After all, in a communist society, liberal values, such as justice, liberty, equality, property, and utility, lose their statuses as the primary principles. In this sense, socialism negates liberalism.

11.3 Socialism as the Development of Liberalism

11.3.1 Development of Liberalism

The notion of socialism that Marx proposes is not only the extension of liberalism but also its negation; therefore, socialism can be described in

this sense as the development of liberalism. The concept of development means "dialectical development" (CW 43:121) or sublation (*Aufheben*), the synthesis of extension and negation. The traditional Marxists, who define socialism as the opposite of liberalism, have not accepted the notion of socialism as the development of liberalism. Consequently, little mutual exchange has existed between liberals and socialists. However, whatever his successors' ideas, Marx advocates socialism as the development of liberalism, and his intention is evident from his three-stage theory of human history in the *Grundrisse*.

> Relationships of personal dependence (which originally arise quite spontaneously) are the first forms of society, in which human productivity develops only to a limited extent and at isolated points. Personal independence based upon dependence *mediated by things* is the second great form, and only in it is a system of general social exchange of matter, a system of universal relations, universal requirements and universal capacities, formed. Free individuality, based on the universal development of the individuals and the subordination of their communal, social productivity, which is their social possession [Vermögen], is the third stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third. (CW 28:95)

Although the word "liberalism" is not observed in this excerpt, it is evident that the first, second, and third stages are preliberal society, liberal society, and communist society (in a broad sense), respectively. Marx thus stresses that advancing directly from the first to the third stage is impossible and that the third stage can be established only after the second stage is fully achieved. The third stage is not a mere extension of the second stage; it extends the advantages of the second stage and eliminates its disadvantages. Hence, socialism is the development of liberalism.

11.3.2 Historical Materialism and Revolutionary Subject

Historical materialism has a serious problem. Marx writes, "No social formation is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society" (CW 29:263). According to historical materialism, the economic structure of the society corresponds to a certain stage of development of the productive forces, and a superstructure corresponds to this economic base. When the productive forces develop, they conflict with the existing economic structures, and the latter are replaced with new economic structures that then come into conflict with the existing superstructure, and the latter is replaced with a new one. Social change cannot be attributed to human consciousness because such change occurs in the order of productive forces, economic structure, and superstructure. Marx emphasizes the predominance of material factors over ideal factors.

However, Marx attaches importance to the role of the revolutionary subject. In the *German Ideology*, he mentions the mission of the proletariat: "The proletarian, for example, who like every human being has the vocation of satisfying his needs and who is not in a position to satisfy even the needs that he has in common with all human beings, . . . this proletarian is, if only for these reasons, confronted with the real task of revolutionizing his conditions" (CW 5:289). Workers in a capitalist society are exploited and alienated, making them aware that social revolution is imperative. The transition from a capitalist to a socialist society requires a revolutionary change. Marx anticipates that once the working class becomes conscious of their exploitation and alienation, they will fight for social change. For this reason, Marx declares, "WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!" (CW 6:519). The theory that underscores the active role of the revolutionary subject in social change can be referred to as the theory of the revolutionary subject.

Historical materialism and the theory of the revolutionary subject seem to contradict each other. Historical materialism argues that a change in the material dimension precedes a change in the ideal dimension, and the economic structure restricts individuals' consciousness and practices. By contrast, the theory of the revolutionary subject insists that workers can conduct a revolution because they are fully aware of the contradictions of capitalist society and their revolutionary mission.

The conflict between historical materialism and the theory of the revolutionary subject can be overcome by applying the two-dimensional theory of alienation. The situation that liberalism views as injustice is the first dimension of alienation. The situation that socialism recognizes as a lack of community and human essence is the second dimension of alienation. According to historical materialism, alienation in the first dimension cannot be transcendentally denounced from communist viewpoint but can be addressed from liberal viewpoint since the dominating superstructure is liberal in a capitalist society. If this criticism is practiced, the economic structure and its superstructure will incrementally shift toward a socialist direction. Within the liberal system, the welfare state, which has socialist elements, will be established, and subsequently, a socialist society will appear. In this process, the revolutionary subjects who criticize alienation from the viewpoint of alienation in the second dimension will emerge.

The two-dimensional theory of alienation can overcome the conflict between historical materialism and the theory of revolutionary subject. The two-dimensional theory of alienation is derived from the theory of socialism as the development of liberalism. On the one hand, socialism is the extension of liberalism; alienation from the liberal viewpoint is the main problem. On the other hand, socialism is the negation of liberalism; thus, alienation from the communist viewpoint is the main problem. Thus, the conflict can be solved by deploying the notion of socialism as the development of liberalism.

11.3.3 Crisis of Liberalism and Its Resolution

The perspective of socialism as the development of liberalism is indispensable to break through the crisis of liberalism. Let us think about the identity of liberalism. Liberalism attained a predominant position after the collapse of the Soviet-type socialist countries, and liberal social science has dominated the normative theory. However, ironically enough, liberalism is currently experiencing an identity crisis. Modern liberalism has witnessed several debates between utilitarianism and deontology, libertarianism and egalitarian liberalism, and liberalism and communitarianism. Although these debates have contributed to revitalizing liberalism, they have also shed light on its identity crisis.

The first debate was conducted between utilitarianism and deontology. Utilitarianism aims to increase the sum of individuals' welfare. As individuals are mutually divided, they are devoid of communication with others; they are avid for only material consumption and subjective welfare. In the postwar welfare states, expanding material consumption by economic growth became the most vital social purpose. When the welfare states experienced a low growth era, the conflict over individuals' resources became severe. To manage this situation, the notion of justice emerged to improve welfare state capitalism. Consequently, the conflict between utility and right became clear. This conflict reflects the identity crisis of liberalism because its root cause lies in the notion of autonomous individuals who can freely pursue their interests.

The second debate arose between egalitarian liberalism and libertarianism. Robert Nozick (1974), the leader of libertarianism, charged that Rawls' ([1971] 1999) egalitarian defense of the welfare state violated self-ownership, which constitutes the core of liberty. Egalitarian liberals oppose this accusation by claiming that the concept of equality can not only be found in egalitarian liberalism but also in libertarianism. The harm principle, which provides that the individuals' property is secured if they do not harm others' identical rights, presupposes that they enjoy equal rights to their property. This argument suggests that the point at issue in the debate is not the conflict between liberty and equality but the difference in the degree of equality. Further, some egalitarian liberals, such as Ronald Dworkin (1977), contend that equality is the central idea of liberalism. Socialists do respect equality as a basis for their communities. If equality becomes the essence of liberalism, its identity becomes unclear.

The third debate was held between liberalism and communitarianism. According to communitarians, the liberal concept of justice presupposes the idea of the autonomous individual. When justice becomes the main principle of society, rights founded on power govern all human relationships. Consequently, individuals are divided and isolated, and alienation becomes serious. Liberal attempt to construct a society grounded in independent individuals is fatally flawed because such an individual is isolated from the community. Communitarians recommended the restoration of traditional communities. This debate ended when both sides accommodated each other, but in this process, liberals attempted to accept the idea of essence and community as the vital elements of liberalism. However, essence and community are the central ideas of communism. As a result, the identity crisis of liberalism aggravated.

Liberalism has progressively lost its identity through the aforementioned debates. From the perspective of historical materialism, the identity crisis of liberalism reflects the crisis of capitalist economic structure and a situation that demands the introduction of socialism. Therefore, although paradoxically, socialism as the development of socialism is vital for liberalism. If liberalism attempts to solve the contradiction that it contains, it must be transformed into socialism.

11.4 Conclusion

The conventional studies of normative theory, which reflected the East-West confrontation in the Cold War era, have deemed liberalism and socialism as mutually incompatible. Socialists branded liberalism as a vulgar bourgeois idea and did not take its achievement seriously. Liberals, who were accustomed to an analytical method, also ignored socialist thoughts expressed in a dialectical method. This situation was regrettable for both sides.

Socialism is the synthesis of the extension and negation of liberalism. Therefore, socialist normative theory is a historical and general system, which embraces liberal normative theory as a part of it. Socialism is the development of liberalism because it inherits the accomplishments of liberalism and overcomes its limitations. However, distinguishing these accomplishments from limitations is difficult as both change as society develops. Realizing socialism as the development of liberalism is an extremely challenging task.

Therefore, the road to socialism as the development of liberalism has to be, in principle, a gradual and lengthy process. Revolution is often understood as a short-term change, which occurs with an economic crisis as the starting point. However, Marx acknowledges two types of revolutions, namely, short-term and long-term (CW 10:117), underlining the importance of changing power relationships in legislatures (CW 24:248–49). If socialism is accepted as the development of liberalism, we should understand that social change is, in general, not short-term and rapid but a long-term and gradual process.

One factor in the collapse of the Soviet-type socialist states is that they attempted to achieve socialism without experiencing liberalism. According to historical materialism, there can be no socialist society that has not experienced liberalism and capitalism. Any socialism is the development of liberalism.

In the welfare state capitalism in developed countries, although liberal values are fundamental, socialist values are gradually infiltrating them. Values such as community and essence have been introduced into liberalism. Despite some emergence of reactionary politics such as neoliberalism or libertarianism, socialism as the development of liberalism is steadily expanding its influence in developed capitalist countries.

In the contemporary global society, every country and region is experiencing the expansion of capitalism. In developing countries and regions, liberal justice is playing a progressive role, but as capitalism takes hold and matures, its limitations will become apparent, and ultimately implementing socialism will be unavoidable. Accordingly, socialism as the development of liberalism will be an agenda in the global dimension.

Every country and region will experience socialism as the development of liberalism because the historical development of humanity requires it. Socialist normative theory will be universally practiced in every country that attempts to overcome liberalism and capitalism. If one feature of liberalism is universality, then socialism is the orthodox successor of liberalism since it achieves universality further than liberalism.

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